NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS

NACDL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT TASK FORCE

TASK FORCE MEETING

DAY 1

THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 2009

The Task Force convened at 9:30 a.m., in offices of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 1660 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., Rick Jones, Co-Chairman, presiding.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

RICK JONES, Co-Chairman

MARVIN SCHECHTER, Co-Chairman

ADELE BERNHARD, Member

JAY CLARK, Member

ELIZABETH KELLY, Member

JOEL SCHUMM, Member

GAIL SHIFMAN, Member

VICKI YOUNG, Member

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(9:36 a.m.)
3	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: So we're going
4	to start.
5	Good morning, everyone and
6	welcome. We are, as I'm sure you all know,
7	NACDL's Problem-Solving Court Task Force and
8	have been on a journey these last several
9	months around the country, really sort of a
10	listening tour to understand the good, the
11	bad, and the ugly of problem-solving courts
12	around the country.
13	We are pleased that the last leg
14	of this portion of our journey brings us to
15	Washington, D.C. at this wonderful time to be
16	and exciting time to be in D.C., and also to
17	be with all of you and actually to be at home
18	here at the NACDL offices.
19	Before I go any further, let me
20	just say that my name is Rick Jones. I'm the
21	Executive Director of the Neighborhood

Defenders Service of Harlem and on the faculty

22

a group of individuals who have some expertise or particular relevant experience to relate to the panel.

And the way that we run the panels is that one of our number usually leads the discussion. Unfortunately, we're missing one of our panel members this morning. Hopefully he will join us shortly, and then we can incorporate him into the discussion, but we are particularly excited this morning both to have Julia and Peter from the D.C. Public Defenders Service and from the Maryland public Defenders Service here to talk with us.

We've got a nice, long amount of time to spend with you. You are not only the last defense attorneys that we'll have an opportunity to speak to, but the last public defenders that we will have an opportunity to speak with before we actually begin to write what we hope will become a seminal document on problem-solving courts in America.

And so we have lots of stuff that

1 we want to talk to you about and a robust 2. conversation ahead. I will tell everybody 3 just because it's my responsibility to lead 4 the questioning in this panel that what I 5 thought we would do is sort of walk you through and divide the questioning up into 7 segments, and during each segment I'll have questions certainly to ask, but I'm assuming 8 9 that all of my colleagues will jump in and ask 10 you whatever questions they might have about 11 the particular topic.

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There are six different topics that we want to discuss with you over the course of the next 90 minutes or so, but by way of starting, what we'd like to do is to have you all sort of tell us a little bit about yourselves, the work that you do, and the benefit, whatever thoughts you have about problem solving course generally and within your specific jurisdiction.

So the floor is yours, and I'll leave it to you to decide who wants to go

first. 1

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MS. LEIGHTON: Well, since you've 3 tossed the ball this way, my name is Julia 4 I've started in the Public 5 Defenders Service in D.C. in, I think, '89. I was there but for a brief stint while I was 7 in the Department of Justice as a federal 8 prosecutor prosecuting environmental crimes.

> I came back to PDS after eight years of litigation at PDS, three years of litigation with the Department of Justice, and came back to PDS and ultimately became a General Counsel, which is a position I've held now since, I think, about 2004.

> So my days of being in a problemsolving court are over, and I don't profess to be an expert. I actually think there are very few experts, and certainly very few in our courthouse, despite everybody's best efforts.

But I sit on a number of committees that address the problem-solving courts and performance measures for the courts and the development of the courts, and I

certainly am involved in assigning other

people at PDS to be involved as our court goes

about developing courts.

5 We have a number of courts.

There's a prostitution court. There's a John court. There's a mental health court.

There's a community court. There's a drug court, and I'll bet I'm even missing one that are down in the traffic court. PDS does not by statute handle many, if any, misdemeanor cases, and we handle no DC cases, traffic offenses, except on sort of rare occasions where we're asked to step in.

What PDS does in the District of Columbia is handle the majority of the most serious cases. They handle about 80 percent of the felony ones, probably about 60 to 70 percent of the life offenses, or what we call AFTC, accelerated felony trial calendar cases.

But we are the attorneys for drug court with a stand-in, and that was a creation

that happened while I was actually away from PDS, the negotiation between the court and PDS as to how was drug court going to be staffed when things had to happen on such a rapid pace and trying to find the individual lawyer, what we call CJ lawyer or panel attorney, to handle sanctions hearings would be difficult as opposed to having someone staffed every day the court meets to be available.

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So we don't really participate in the other problem solving courts except sort of in a policy perspective. I think in the District problem-solving courts sort of come from three forces: popular press, what people hear about as being good ideas; a desire to try and grab at a problem that's made its way to the criminal system, I think, in large part because we've failed somewhere else; and I speculate about this, but we've seen a steady decline in crime in the District of Columbia, but we've had no reduction in the number of judges or prosecutors. We have had a

1 reduction in the number of defense attorneys,

and so maybe the resources are there and

3 there's a certain cache to creating problem-

4 solving courts.

But I'm not sure it comes out of any sort of systematic effort in the District to study who's coming into the system and what really does help keep them out of it once in.

And I think there are just so many pressures.

You know, who controls who's eligible for these courts? I think it's largely in the District the U.S. Attorney's Office, which of course answers to a different sovereign, and to a lesser extent in the regulatory offenses and offenses that are prosecuted by the Office of the Attorney General.

How it gets staffed is determined by the court, and our court rotates judges.

And then sometimes we're called in after the plan is devised and asked to participate, and one of the struggles that we've had and the tensions that have existed is whether or not

we're in at the ground level or not, and our
effort to suggest that while we may never buy
into a court because we can't bind a future
client, that it would be useful to have us
there to sort of talk about what does the due
process look like, what does the
representation look like in this court.

And so in some of the courts that I've described we've been in it at the ground level. In others, it has been suggested we have no participatory role because we actually don't handle those kinds of cases, and instead the committees have been staffed by panel attorneys who are, of course, paid by the court.

So I think there are efforts in the District to study the courts. The performance measures, I think, are a real struggle. Data is a real struggle. I think the court is making genuine efforts to get at it, but I'm not sure that we have social scientists experts helping us decide what

really should be measured and what is a true control group.

Are we simply funneling the people into these courts that would actually do fairly well anyhow because of how risk adverse we are to who should be in the courts, or are we funneling the people into the courts that we actually could have the most impact on?

Are we really designing courts
that address mental health issues, address
what drives prostitution, what drives the
consumption of prostitution, what drives drug
addiction?

And is anybody figuring out what happens when you have a prostitute with mental health issues and a drug addiction?

MR. ROSE: Great. Thank you.

The thing that you just said that jumps out at me, first and foremost, is, gosh, what is an ethical control group, but those are issues that we sit around at the Public Defenders Office and talk about without any

expertise, as well, and yet the reaction I

have to what Julia has just said is, my gosh,

we're not alone.

By way of a brief background, I am but for a brief period in private practice a career public defender. I began as a trial lawyer for a couple of years. The bulk of my experience is as an appellate lawyer in the Maryland appellate courts.

I was aware of drug courts, but hadn't been a trial lawyer involved in drug courts as a trier, and my introduction or reintroduction to drug courts was when I came back as a public defender after my brief period in private practice, also to be in General Counsel's office. And one of the first things that I encountered when coming back to General Counsel's, Public Defenders office was this thing, drug court as it was called.

The larger umbrella of problemsolving courts in Maryland is directed through the Office of Problem-Solving Courts, which is a branch of the Administrative Office of the Courts.

with a commission that was put together by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to study the issue, and then problem-solving courts developed seemingly at the same time that the Office of Problem-Solving Courts, the overseeing entity, developed. Sort of the commission evolved into the Office of Problem-Solving Courts, that initial commission.

But at the same time, these courts were popping up, and in the beginning there was a lot of interest that came from the lawyers on the ground, the trial lawyers. I think there was this promise of drug treatment where there otherwise was next to nothing, at least next to nothing meaningful, and the lure of treatment, I think, allows the eyes of well meaning lawyers to glaze over a little bit as it regards basic due process, the fundamental

1 role of an advocate, among other things.

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And as we sort of allowed the local offices to drive the development of these what are really local courts in Maryland, and there are 23 counties in the city so a couple dozen jurisdictions, there were sort of drips and drabs of good things we would hear, but frustrations began to emerge and problems began to emerge. Difficulties began to emerge on micro levels.

When it came really at us squarely a couple of years ago, what are these things and how are we to manage them, it came out of the fact that they began to really exponentially develop, seemingly without our participation at least from the top, and in Maryland we're a centralized Public Defender Office. We are based out of Baltimore. We're a large organization, 1,000 employees, 1,000-plus, and 560-some lawyers across the state. And then there are actually 12 districts that we're

divided into.

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But because they were locally developed and it seemed to be the important feature of them that the local personalities put together these courts, which again, there was the lure of drug treatment in what was an informal setting, I think it seemed innocuous enough.

When it began to really proliferate, there became an issue of resources. We have always been -- and I dare say never will be asked to do anything other than more with less, and in these fiscal times and in this climate, that's really hitting home, especially in the past six months with my agency.

But even before the financial sort of crisis trickled down on us all, the question of resources became the guiding force with the public defender Nancy Forster wanting to closely examine these courts, and the reason is obvious. They take up, they consume

a great deal of time. It isn't simply to

complete somebody into one of these courts and

off they go to drug treatment.

There is, as you all know, weekly, if not in some cases probably more than weekly, court hearings that stretch out over a long, long period of time, and that may have been the first sort of red flag indicator of what's going on here. These things seemed to stretch out beyond a normal period of probation and what may be otherwise a low level drug case, and where is this person?

When do they finish this thing and when do they come out and demonstrate some success?

That may have been the first real sort of shot across the bow. What is the usefulness of this thing?

In any event, we began to examine the resource issue. How many lawyers do we have in these courts? What kind of time is this taking up? We've got lots of priorities, and we have to triage in many instances.

1 That is to say in the larger 2. scheme of things what it is we're going to do as an agency. What is the Public Defender 3 4 going to set her priorities on in terms of 5 representing clients the most effective way 6 and the best way and the most crucial places? 7 That resource issue, it's 8 interesting. It came to a head over that two-9 I'm not really sure how many year period. 10 courts popped up across our 23 or four 11 jurisdictions. We now have 40-plus courts. 12 It certainly wasn't 40 courts when we started. 13 Multiple courts in different jurisdictions, including DUI courts, mental health courts; 14 15 there was at least one shot at a prostitution court which I have to say anecdotally the 16 conversation about talking about sex 17 addiction, it seemed a little absurd at the 18 19 time. So we were being stretched in all 20 directions. 21 And at this time when we were gathering information about what these courts 22

looked like, the stacks of materials, we pored
over them and actually in particular Nancy
Forster herself read every page of these
documents and was utterly appalled at just
really the unbelievable suspending or
disposing entirely of basic due process
rights.

The requirements that were put on people, and that raised, of course, all the questions about who is going into these courts, and as I said, I think you're going to hear from me something familiar as I just heard, which is are they cherry picking. Are they sustaining these courts for their own reasons? Are we graduating people who don't have drug problems? Are we missing the people who do?

Then we set about visiting some of these courts, and I was stunned. My first visit into a drug court, it was a very interesting experience. There was a judge who seemed to me to be the epitome of the style of

1 judge you want in a drug court, a very 2 approachable, amenable, folksy guy, with a real air of authority, but not an iota of a 3 sense of abusing that authority, a father 5 figure who, you know, as I watched this 6 morning unfold in drug court, who was it 7 seemed t moe that the chemistry was all there until the supervisor on hand stepped away from 8 the defense table and crossed the aisle to the 9 10 state's table. Another attorney stepped up 11 who was an underling to represent someone who had been talked about in a staffing meeting ex 12 13 parte, and there was a decision about sending this man to jail, and I almost threw up right 14 15 there. I mean, I just couldn't believe it. 16 The greatest possibility it seemed we had and right before my eyes it seemed to 17 18 all turn upside down, anecdotal experience 19 from others who went to look at other drug 20 courts around the state, and we sort of

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sampled them. Maryland is a complicated

place. We've got the inner city involved

1 more, clearly an urban area, and then we've 2. got suburban districts that are largely populated, and a lot of rural districts around 3 4 the edge of the state, and I can just offer 5 that Ms. Forster's observations in the 6 Baltimore City drug court where, in 7 particular, a judge just out of control, super probation agent just couldn't be more opposite 8 9 than the personality that I had encountered, 10 notwithstanding the problems of drug court. 11 So there we were. What were we to 12 We had to get some control over the do? 13 enormity of this problem, resources, and that really became secondary. 14 The entire resource 15 question became secondary because really that was enormously distracted by the legal 16 problems that we saw. 17 18 That struggle led us to corral all 19 of our drug court folks and say, "Give over 20 these agreements, everything you've got. We're going to write up a memo to indicate 21 what is absolutely prohibited in these drug 22

court agreements so that they're at least

legal in our view, and then we're going to

3 have a real sit-down with our training folks

4 and figure out how to make sure our advocates

5 are advocates. They're effective advocates,

6 and they maintain that role."

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And we are now sort of in a bit of a lull. Just before the holidays things heated up with the folks who are running the office from some courts. They've been distracted by other things.

But I guess the main thrust of
what I'm trying to say is that we very much
felt like we couldn't get our hands around
this thing. It took us really -- if there had
been a time to do that these past two years,
and there's a certain element of, gosh,
embarrassment that the centralized office, the
public defender somehow missed what was
happening, and I think that that was the
result of, as I said at the outset, this
promise of drug treatment and the promise of

- an informal setting which just seems to be not the promise to live it.
- The last note I would make on this

  is that we are in the midst of litigation,

  appellant litigation now on the threshold

  question of whether our courts even have

  fundamental jurisdiction as regards drug

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courts.

9 I remember the first question that 10 we bounced around when we had to get our hands 11 around this thing. Is this an Article 4 court? Article 4 is what -- our Constitution 12 13 is what enables our court system. No, it's There's no Constitution provision for 14 15 this court system, no statutory structure. There are no rules, and in fact, local rules 16 in Maryland are illegal, and you either have 17 18 illegal courts or legal courts operating 19 illegally. So that's being litigated now, and 20 that's where we stand.

- 21 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you.
- We've actually seen your brief,

and some of the questions that we've got flow from some of the issues that we think that you raised legitimately in that brief.

You both touched on a number of areas that we want to exposure with you in substantially more depth. The first area that we want to explore with you, and you both touched on it, is the creation of these courts. You talked a little bit about being surprised. There are 40 some odd courts in Maryland, and you talked about all of the various and sundry types of problem-solving courts that exist in the District.

These questions are directed to both of you, and if you could just sort of give us a sense, an overview maybe of the mechanisms by which problem-solving courts are created in your jurisdictions. Sort of what's the genesis, who's involved, who are the players, and what role, if any, does the defense Bar or the Public Defenders Office get involved? What input do you have?

1 So we want to sort of explore 2 right off the bag how these things spring up, 3 how they're created and your thought about So I guess we'll start, Julia. 5 MS. LEIGHTON: I'm probably going 6 to get back to you on some of these because I 7 may have to actually find out. I have, 8 candidly, no idea where prostitution and John 9 court came from. I can speculate, but I 10 won't. 11 The community court, it's not 12 clear to me what problem community court is 13 designed to solve, but I guess part of it is the idea behind it is that these individuals 14 15 will pay back the community in which they committed the offense, which of course assumes 16 that they committed the offense, and when 17 you're paying back the community before you 18 19 actually have your case resolved, it's not 20 clear to me how all of that works out. 21 The community court, I believe, 22 was really an idea of the courts, and I think

that is where for the most part it starts in

the District of Columbia, an idea of the

courts, and again, with good intentions,

right? It's like how often do you see the

same problem come into your courtroom when you

want to get your hands around a different way

of addressing it.

In the District I suppose there's some sense of how removed or not is the court system from the community. We have just one courthouse. It's not located anywhere near Southeast Washington, which is where most crime occurs or at least most arrests occur.

So we're going to hear from them, and candidly, they should have been given more time than I do. PSA, Pretrial Services

Administration, and specifically Spurgeon

Kennedy who is an expert or as close to an expert as I've seen at any of the meetings I go to.

The notion of sort of giving back, of trying to get intervention into folks with

low level crimes, you know, sort of nuisance,
slightly above nuisance level crimes. So it
was a brainchild, you know, of a judge, and
the judge spearheaded it. The judge involved
the defense lawyers that I believe the judge
thought were appropriate to choose. That was

A defense lawyer became involved in the training of folks what the programs were, what was available in community court.

I took a look at it at one point, and it seemed to me for a year that I was looking at it that there were probably about ten to 12 panel attorneys who, rough numbers because I don't have all the data, were probably making the better part of their year's living practicing in community court.

no the Public Defender Service at the time.

The judge made the appointments
with coordination of an officer of our
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,
which is a voluntary organization of the panel
lawyers; coordinated the appointments there,

and then also paid the vouchers. And that is not usually how it works in Superior Court.

There's usually an appointing judge assigned each week who handles the appointments with the administrative assistance of our office that coordinates who's available from the panel, from us, and what cases in the pro bono cases, and then it is the individual judges in the cases that then do the final work on the vouchers.

So there is at least a difference between who's appointing you, but it's a small court. You know, it's still a small court, and I think there is some tension there with that even on that system, but in this court it was very specific.

And there's that tension, right?

I'm trying something new. This is a pilot.

I need people that understand what the program is, what's available to people. I need to be able to process a number of cases, and at times that was the reason given for

disqualifying a PDS lawyer who was picking up
a misdemeanor as a single representation and
having other cases or the clinics, Georgetown
Clinic.

One of the other features we noticed in that is even when we made clear that we were actually going to stay in the case absent an absolute ruling putting off the case, our cases were always called at the end of the day I suspect because they took longer.

One argument was because we were less familiar with the various programs and options and the way the court worked. Another might be that we were advocates.

So that court changed a lot over time. I think it started very much where the argument could be made that you were in that court for a lot longer than if you had been assigned to another court. Yes, there are options and ways to resolve your case sometimes even short of a sentence, short of an adjudication, but it seemed to take, you

1 know, hours and hours and hours and 2 hours of community services and sort of almost insurmountable hurdles. 3

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PSA was really, I think, a driving 4 force at pushing that back. I think, again, some good expertise, a sense of, you know, 7 what can people accomplish, and I'm not sure whether people did a lot of comparisons between, you know, what it meant for a defendant to go through that court as opposed to another court in a world of, you know, 50 percent probability of a dismissal for want of prosecution because nobody shows up and you're out.

> So in terms of which was more onerous, there were no options here. charges, arrested in a certain jurisdiction, and you ended up in community court. If you weren't in that jurisdiction and if you weren't arrested on those charges, you couldn't get to it, and it's still being studied.

1	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Let me ask you
2	a question. You guys are in drug court.
3	MS. LEIGHTON: Yes.
4	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: With a caveat.
5	Were you at all involved in any of the pre-
6	planning, creation meetings around drug court?
7	MS. LEIGHTON: That was
8	unfortunately the three years that I was away
9	from the Public Defender Service and a
10	Director earlier than, two Directors earlier
11	than the Director I'm working for now. So I
12	can't answer that.
13	It was created when I was actually
14	trying cases. We had drug court, and in the
15	'90s, drug court, I think, was one way of
16	answering our mandatory minimums, and
17	candidly, I had a number of clients who never
18	tested positive who were distributing or
19	accused of distributing that were in drug
20	court and it avoided a four-year mandatory.
21	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Could you
22	explain how that happened? How do you get

1	away from the mandatory if you went into the
2	drug court?
3	MS. LEIGHTON: Drug court?
4	Because part of it is you'd get an attempt
5	plea-off or an attempt plea-off and a
6	successful completion of drug court.
7	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: A U.S.
8	Attorney would agree to that in advance?
9	MS. LEIGHTON: Yes, yes. You
10	know, talking to people here that know what
11	happens once you establish mandatory minimums,
12	it just starts to drive so much, and I don't
13	know who was involved in deciding. I just
14	represent the people at that time. So who was
15	doing the policy work and making the
16	agreement, I can't answer except that it was
17	a way to address this problem.
18	We no longer have mandatory
19	minimums for drug offenses. Knock on wood it
20	stays that way, but we still have drug court,
21	and, no, I think our role primarily and if
22	I learn differently I can keep writing down

1 these questions where I'm not absolutely 2 positive of the answer so that I can get back 3 to you -- our role is really the staffing issue, and how do you staff sanctions hearings 5 if the idea behind it is the more immediate 6 the better the impact? 7 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: So your sense 8 is the fact that this court was going to 9 happen was a fait accompli --10 MS. LEIGHTON: 11 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: -- and you 12 were brought in just to sort of work around 13 the perimeter. MS. LEIGHTON: And in terms of the 14 15 contract, I mean, I think we had been involved in the contract, but again, I think PSA was 16 really the expertise, and they have a fair 17 amount of expertise in this, but this is what 18 it looks like, and I just pull out one piece 19 20 of a transcript for you. 21 The Court: "Sir, I don't want you 22 here arguing with me about how I run the drug

- 1 court. You, respectfully, you made a request.
- 2 I listened to it, and I ruled."
- The lawyer: "Your Honor."
- 4 The Court: "Now, after that there
- 5 really is nothing we can talk about."
- The lawyer: "I'm here to advocate
- 7 for my clients."
- 8 The Court: "But these are not
- 9 your clients. You're here standing in."
- The lawyer: "They're my--"
- 11 The Court: "Call the next case."
- 12 The lawyer: "May I be heard, Your
- Honor?"
- 14 The Court: "No."
- 15 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: That's a
- 16 federal judge?
- 17 MS. LEIGHTON: Well, no, that's
- 18 our Superior Court.
- 19 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Superior
- 20 Court judge.
- 21 MS. LEIGHTON: Presidentially
- appointed.

I mean, there's a lot of tension
in these courtrooms about what really is our
role when they already signed a contract. We
want the lawyers that were engaged with them
when they signed the contract where they're
handling stand-ins, and it's personality
driven.

part of, I think, how these courts get started, our mental health court right now looks great. We've been involved since the beginning. The judicial officer who took it on has a real expertise in this area, drafted, solicited our involvement from our Mental Health Division, which has far more expertise than trial lawyers and more than anyone in this city about what does the mental health system look like and what does it mean, the various diagnoses, what can these people accomplish or not in terms of the kinds of hoops we make them jump through.

Right now we have a judicial officer that understand that, that understands

- 1 that, boy, 60 percent compliance from a 2. paranoid schizophrenic is fabulous.
- 3 keep working our way towards it.

doesn't work, I suppose.

grow.

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4 They're sort of dealing with, 5 again, the U.S. Attorney's Office controls what's eligible, and it's very low level right 6 7 So nobody is going to look bad if it

9 But one of the things that we're 10 working towards in that that I don't know 11 exists in the others is how can we design this 12 the way you would a lab, the way you would a 13 scientific endeavor so that the personality that's there doesn't drive how these courts 14 15

And I don't know how you do that. I mean, I think hopefully there are other experts that can talk about that because I've seen studies that say personality matters, the interaction between the judicial officer and the person matters, but that's true of any treatment model, right? The better the

treatment people you get in there, the more successful the person is going to be, and yet everyone that's involved in this with the exception of some of the PSA folks, none of us are trained as clinical psychiatrists or psychologists to do this. Either we just have it from perhaps our experience as practitioners, but we're still not the experts.

So I think that it would be fair to say that the model in D.C. is that it starts with the judiciary. They engage with the prosecuting authorities because they need sign-off from them about who can participate. I suspect sometimes the reason we're not at the table there, for those of you who aren't familiar with D.C., I think we are described as a particularly adversarial criminal justice system, and maybe they feel that it's more likely to get buy-in from the prosecutors and law enforcement if PDS isn't at the table initially.

1	And then I think there is a push-
2	pull after that of are the cases that we're
3	involved in and if we're not typically
4	involved in, why not rely on the panel
5	attorneys and their structure as opposed to
6	PDS' particular expertise?
7	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: We have been
8	joined by Paul DeWolfe, who is the District
9	Public Defender from Montgomery County,
10	Maryland.
11	Welcome.
12	MR. DeWOLFE: Thank you.
13	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: We're happy to
14	have you here, and you haven't missed much.
15	If you could just take five minutes or so and
16	give us the benefit of sort of who you are and
17	what you do and anything thoughts you might
18	have just generally sort of about problem-
19	solving courts in your home town.
20	MR. DeWOLFE: Thank you, and
21	welcome to Washington.
22	I'm the District Public Defender

1 in Montgomery County. I'm also the president-2 elect of the Maryland Criminal Defense 3 Attorneys Association and the current president of the Bar Association of Montgomery 5 County, Maryland. 6 I'm testifying today though as a 7 member of the ABA Diversion and Specialty Courts Task Force, and the task force is 8 9 chaired by Irma Raker, who is a judge on the 10 Court of Appeals in Maryland, retired. 11 Included on the committee are academics, Walter Dickey, University of Maryland, 12 13 Madison, University of Wisconsin, Madison Law School; Tamara Meekins, Howard University Law 14 15 School; Michael Schrunk, elected District 16 Attorney for Portland, Oregon; Michael Thomas, elected District Attorney for Saginaw County, 17 Michigan; Richard Andreas, who is from the New 18 19 York Court of Appeals; and Hal Hadden, a 20 criminal defense attorney, Denver Colorado. 21 Ex officio members are Norm 22 Reimer, Executive Director of NACEL; Tim

Murray, who is with the pretrial courts

project in D.C.; as well as Spurgeon Kennedy

from the same organization.

I wanted to talk just briefly about what the task force is designed to do, and the purpose is to propose Black letter standards and commentary to be presented to the ABA Standards Committee. The Standards Committee will either adopt or edit the standards to be presented by the Board of Governors.

I would like to address my comments, if I could, not to the standards as a whole, but to actually the role of the defense attorney.

16 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Absolutely.

MR. DeWOLFE: Rather than addressing the issue of whether or not these courts should exist, the task force took the position at the beginning that they do exist, that they're proliferating throughout the country, and that they are essentially

1 standardless.

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2. And, again, rather than addressing the problems associated with the courts 3 themselves, the task force set out to address 4 5 the roles of the various participants. 6 Arguably, no participant in the specialty 7 court team, not the judge, not the prosecutor, not the treatment provider, has struggled with 8 9 his or her own identity other than the defense 10 attorney.

Specialty courts are designed to reject the adversary model where an impartial judge resolves conflict between the parties. In specialty courts, the universally shared goal is successful treatment of a behavioral problem. The judge assumes the role not just of resolving disputes, but also actively directing, controlling, and supervising the defendant's rehabilitation.

The model is one of flexibility controlled by an ever increasing authority of the judge, one, to intervene, to impose

sanctions, and to remove the defendant from the programs, and in some cases impose severe punishment.

The defense attorney is required to strike a constant balance between acquiescing to informal procedures and practices that are not tolerated in criminal court, and trying to protect the client from the severe punishment that the court retains authority to impose.

The tension along with the defense attorneys in these specialty courts are the tensions between becoming a zealous partisan and advocate, maintaining the secrecy of all information learned about the client during the representation, and advising the client to protect himself or herself by withholding information damaging to the outcome of his case.

In a specialty court model, the role is at best ambiguous. There is institutional pressure to be a team player.

He or she must try to reconcile ethical rules of advocacy with the competing goals of the treatment team.

individually evaluate each case for referral to specialized courts and fully advise the defendant of the advantages and the disadvantages of consenting to the jurisdiction in the specialty courts.

The defense counsel should

In doing so, we felt, the task force felt that the defense counsel should position the accused to make informed decisions about the pretrial motions available, the possible outcomes, the consequences of the waiver of pretrial motions, the likelihood of conviction, and the direct consequences of participating, and the rights that are waived.

The accused agrees to specialized court programs, and the defense counsel should advise the potential implications of waiving other rights, including the right to counsel.

1	I'd like to sort of jump, if I
2	could, to some of the highlights of some of
3	the proposed standards that we're looking at.
4	The process hasn't yet completed, but in
5	discussing the role of the defense attorney,
6	the task force thought that the defense
7	attorney should advocate for due process
8	protections in the design and the
9	implementation of the specialty court. They
10	should advocate in the team meetings for the
11	stated interest of the client, despite
12	pressure to be a team player concerned with
13	the best interests of the client.
14	They should demand hearings and
15	zealously advocate against arbitrary and
16	unfair sanctions against clients.
17	Specialty courts should not be
18	created without sufficient funding this is
19	something that has been discussed for the
20	defense function. Resources should not come
21	at the expense of the other courts.
22	Other considerations that have

been considered and proposed are that courts should monitor the qualifications and licensing the treatment programs, the cost to the defendants in treatment programs, and specialized courts should be periodically and independently evaluated.

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The consent of the defendant should be required for specialized court to assume jurisdiction over the defendant, and that's not the case in a lot of the programs that we have looked at, and there's a huge concern for the unrepresented defendants, and we have looked at programs throughout the country that don't seem to see the need for defense attorneys in certain aspects. So we're looking very closely at the concern of unrepresented defendants.

The court should not have ex parte communications with the defendant, the defense counsel, the prosecutor, the treatment providers, or anyone else in the case. And that is not recognized in virtually any of the

programs that we have looked at. The exparte
communication is considered part of the
program, and I think that is a major concern
of the task force.

And all participants in the administration of specialty courts, including the judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, pretrial services, corrections and treatment providers should participate in joint training, and with notice that there is virtually no training in some of the program that we've looked at.

One more thing I'd like to comment ion and that's sort of a personal observation. I think the major problem with these programs being standardless is that the rules change, and I heard Julia speak about the rules really being or the programs really being dependent on the personality of the judge, and we've noticed that in my jurisdiction and really throughout the country.

And when the rules change, our

experience is that generally the sanctions are ratcheted up. I have seen programs that begin as community treatment and really end as residential programs, where prison and where jail and where halfway houses and people are required to go to jail before they enter into these programs.

And so as the failure level increases, the rules just change, and they changes generally in the way that the sanctions are ratcheted up right from the beginning of the program, where people are required instead of coming from the street to come to the program from jail, and then instead of living at home in the community, we've noticed that they have been required to live in halfway houses and then to be removed from halfway houses to sober treatment homes.

And so the programs that we have looked at sort of morphed from community based programs to essentially residential programs as the failure rate increases.

1	And one other point I'd like to
2	make if I have time.
3	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Sure,
4	absolutely.
5	MR. DeWOLFE: And that is what it
6	has been our experience to notice that the
7	judges, while almost universally caring and
8	treatment oriented, tend to take these
9	programs that are under their watch
10	personally, and they take the failure of these
11	programs very personally as well.
12	And so when you have a judge that
13	is personally committed to the success of all
14	the participants and the same judge becomes
15	the person that deals with the criminal case
16	after the failure and the bouncing out of the
17	program of the defendant, that individual
18	tends to be treated much more harshly because
19	of the fact that he has failed this individual
20	judge. That is at least one observation.
21	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Well, listen.
22	Thank you very much for those thoughtful

1 comments and also for the work that you and 2 others are doing on that ABA Task Force. 3 Let me just ask Peter very 4 quickly, if you would, to just give us sort of 5 the short-hand version of the creation of 6 these courts in your jurisdiction and whether 7 or not -- I mean, I know in your opening 8 remarks you said that you sort of were 9 surprised at how quickly they grew up and the 10 task that it was to sort of get your arms 11 around them. 12 Are you at all involved in the 13 formation of these things, the creation of these things? Does the Public Defenders 14 15 Office have any opportunity for input? Just sort of give us the flavor of 16 17 that. Well, let me just say 18 MR. ROSE: 19 this. On the administration side, we 20 certainly are now. Early on, as I understand 21 it, these were judge driven programs, clearly,

and there was money coming from someplace.

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1 may be wrong about this, but it may have been 2 originally that there was some federal money 3 that was flowing from these courts, and that 4 to get the grant money, you had to be certain 5 that all of the stakeholders were 6 participating, and that obviously included the 7 judge, prosecutor, and really it seems to me in all cases the Public Defender or public 8 9 defense organization, and then the treatment 10 providers, and you could divide those between 11 those treatment providers, juvenile service providers, education providers relevant, and 12 13 of course, mental health.

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So they're all sitting around the table, and I think the noticeable feature of that group of stakeholders is that in the classical, traditional sense you've got one guy on one side of the power structure, and then you've got everybody else on the other side.

But that's what happens, is they were judge driven. There was a desire to get

money, and maybe that's a little too cynical,

although I think my job is to be skeptical and

cynical, or it was really for a judge to say,

"Hey, I want to make a difference or I can

make a difference."

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And I'm not going to cover all of the anecdotal bases because I'm certain that there are cases where prosecutors thought, "Hey, let's start a drug court," or maybe even our local offices would say, "Hey, I have an idea," but you've got to get the fire lit under the judge. The judge drives the You get these parties together. process. They generate a document that's an agreement, an interagency agreement that everybody subscribes to after some whittling and chiseling, and again, that process notably, our investigation of how that happened across the jurisdictions in Maryland was often the result of being overpowered by everybody on the other side of the table.

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So you had some agreements that

were not favorable to the defense, and as I
said, there was sort of a shock to us when we
looked at them all how different they were and
how in our perception wrong they were in many
respects.

That document, once assembled, and I'll sort of pick up where Paul left off, seems to be flexible and a moving target in some cases so that the rules do change.

And then the question becomes, again, picking up on what Paul said, what is the defense lawyer going to make of his identity when you are faced with deciding how to litigate these rules, in the first instance, and perhaps how they change before your eyes in the second.

Well, the judges and prosecutors, again, anecdotally, seem to me to have no trouble putting their hats on, but all the while encouraging defense counsel to not put a ripple in the water. So that's essentially, it seems to me, how most of the Maryland

1 There's the judge who gets an courts pop up. 2 idea, and it's driven by the judge, and I think I said earlier, with the promise of it 3 and with the right judges, there is this 5 promise of treatment and, wow, this may be a great thing, and then the ground shifts 6 7 beneath you. 8 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you. 9 I want to move on to our next big 10 area of discussion unless anybody here wants 11 to ask any sort of follow-up questions about 12 creating these courts. 13 MEMBER YOUNG: No. Peter, I just 14 had a question because I'm not sure where in 15 the process you are when you said we started gathering all of the information and looking 16 at the agreements and we're going to go 17 18 through and highlight what you thought were 19 the worst practices. 20 Have you gotten to that point?

Are you still gathering?

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I couldn't tell where you are.

1 MR. ROSE: Yeah, I'm glad you 2. asked that because one of the other things I 3 was picking up on what Paul was saying is that 4 the effort from our end, sort of looking down 5 the wrong end of the telescope to be up in administration and looking down at all of 7 these agreements that were made in all of the 8 jurisdictions and trying to decide what's 9 right and what's wrong, that was, in part, an 10 effort to standardize the way these courts are 11 going to function.

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Again, in the absence of any statutory structure or any rules, we simply had to say, "Look. We are the stakeholders. We're not going to participate unless you do the following things. Here's a list of what you've got to remove. Here are the ways that we see these courts are functioning improperly, and unless the individual various jurisdictions would modify and fix these agreements, we're not going to participate."

So we held that hammer over them

1 to try to standardize it ourselves or at least 2. force sort of a standardization at least as 3 best we could, you know, mindful, I think, putting aside the fact that we are litigating 5 the professional question presently, but 6 mindful, I think, of the fact that these 7 courts are here and that they may very well be here to stay and if not in this current form, 8 9 in some form. 10 But that's the process we were in. 11 We had sort of collected these agreements, modified them, sent them back, and I think we 12 13 have worked out all of the major problems, although we still have big problems. 14 15 So the courts are running. We've not allowed them to do the stand. 16 MEMBER SHIFMAN: I just want to 17 18 clarify. So the 24 counties or court systems 19 that you have in Maryland, they've modified 20 the end user agreements basically with the 21 defendants? Is that what's happening? 22 MR. ROSE: No, no. The agreements

between the stakeholders, in other words, 1 2 there were provisions in some of the 3 agreements that we felt was just basic 4 violations of due process. So you've got to 5 pick that out. We need to see a positive drug test. We can't just have an allegation 6 7 of that, an in-court confession and summary 8 punishment. Give the guy the drug results 9 and let's give him a chance to challenge them. 10 Basic things like that, they were 11 retooled to satisfy us as between the 12 stakeholders, not the individual contracts, if 13 you will, that are entered into between the defendants. 14 15 MEMBER SHIFMAN: But those are agreements between the stakeholders that 16 17 you're talking about. Aren't those items that the defendants themselves have to sign onto? 18 19 If I get a dirty test, I know that --20 MR. ROSE: Yes. 21 MEMBER SHIFMAN: -- punishment is 22 going to be X or Y.

1	MR. ROSE: Yes.
2	MEMBER SHIFMAN: And I'm waiving
3	my right to a lawyer and I'm waiving the right
4	to litigate, right?
5	MR. ROSE: Right. That's the
6	front end of that case.
7	MEMBER SHIFMAN: So the front end
8	is the stakeholder agreement between, you
9	know, the power structures, the defense
10	lawyer, the prosecutor, the treatment
11	providers, the court, you know, et cetera.
12	MR. ROSE: Correct, correct.
13	MEMBER SHIFMAN: And the end user
14	agreement is between, I guess, the court and
15	the defendant would you call that?
16	MR. ROSE: Yeah, I'd say
17	MEMBER SHIFMAN: Or the prosecutor
18	and the defendant?
19	MR. DeWOLFE: It's a contract.
20	You know, it's a contract. It's a treatment
21	contract, almost like a probation contract
22	that the defendant signs, and it includes

certain waivers and certain obligations. 1 2. And what the Maryland Public 3 Defenders Office did was that they looked at all of the agreements, including the 5 stakeholders and the individual agreements 6 that the defendant signed, and they demanded 7 that the courts themselves change those 8 agreements in accordance with requirements 9 that we asked them to take out, and if they 10 didn't then we wouldn't participate. 11 And I don't know what the success In my court they simply agreed to 12 13 all of the requests, for example, a due process hearing before liberty can be taken 14 15 away. We are required that there at least be 16 a due process hearing for an evidentiary hearing. 17 18 And some of the agreements 19 honestly waive those rights. 20 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Let me push on 21 to the next big area we want to discuss with

you all, which is admission to these courts.

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Who determines who gets in? Are we treating 1 serious addicts in these courts or are we 2. 3 treating the most likely to succeed or for political reasons? 5 Do you find that there is individualized treatment or is it more sort of 7 one size fits all? If you could all sort of just talk 8 to us a little bit about who are the folks 9 10 that are getting into these courts and are 11 they the folks that need to be getting into 12 these courts and your sense of all that. 13 Julia, we'll start with you. MS. LEIGHTON: I think we don't 14 15 know the answer. I suspect we could be told I think we don't know the answer 16 because I don't think we've tested it and 17 looked at it. 18 I think the leading force of who 19 20 gets into the courts once the court has been 21 established, the leading force of who gets 22 into the court is determined by the

prosecuting authorities of which offenses are
they going to -- for example, in D.C. domestic
violence can't get into any court. It's just
brought off the table.

And so I think that that's what drives who, what charges are available, what jurisdictions. I think that there's a way out of every court that I'm aware of, and we don't end up with the same judge, even in community court. We ultimately decide even though you're coming from a certain jurisdiction in a certain court; if you decide you want to go to trial, you got out into -- walk on the Leo (phonetic) as to where you end up.

The same with drug court. If you pop out, you go back to your county judge. So there is that, and you have counsel at all stages in the District. You have counsel from your first appearance in court throughout, and I'm aware of the sort of ex parte "no, no, I'm talking to your client," and that is handled by each advocate as they see it working to the

1	best advantage of their client, either to shut
2	that down or to let that happen ,maybe not
3	always enough time to communicate with your
4	client to really prepare your client for what
5	that means.
6	I think we see that in drug court
7	because things happen so quickly, and the time
8	to meet clients and time to talk to clients to
9	prepare them for being questioned, and
10	depending on the personality on the bench, a
11	real effort to say, "I think your client is
12	prepared. I discount the answer."
13	So I think you can
14	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: In drug court
15	in D.C., is it just a misdemeanor court?
16	MS. LEIGHTON: No, it's felony.
17	Drug court is felony court charges as well.
18	Everything else is misdemeanor or less, but
19	drug court does include felony offenses.
20	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: And can you be

charged with dealing as opposed to use and get

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in?

And are there

1 MS. LEIGHTON: Yes, yes.

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folks do you think who will get into drug

court who may not have a drug problem who are

dealers, but who think that the drug court

alley is a better avenue?

CO-CHAIRMAN JONES:

MS. LEIGHTON: My information is now dated. I know I said that I saw that when it initially started. I think drug use and drug dealing has changed since the mid-'90s till now, and I think you're seeing more use among an entire population. I think you're seeing more use among the population that's in drug court, and some of that may be that it's being targeted better. Some of that may be just the change in how things are happening.

I suspect we have more availability in the District of some level of individualized efforts, but the problem with all of this, right, is if we did all this stuff up front, we wouldn't be using courts to do it. I mean, that's the biggest absurdity

of it. If we really wanted to be good at
this, we'd do it before it got to the courts
because the courts are not the best, but for
some reason they seem to have the resources
that other departments are lacking.

So that it's exceptionally individualized? No, but we have a fair amount of services available in the District. We have a Pretrial Services Administration that really has worked to create options and to make them reasonable.

MR. DeWOLFE: Peter, who gets in in Maryland? It's all over the map really.

MR. ROSE: Yeah. As I mentioned at the outset, the Office of Problem-Solving Courts, which was the result of the commission that was earlier established, they hand out sort of guides on who will be eligible and who ought to be the gatekeepers, for example, and there may be a lot of options.

The problem with that body, and they do have sort of an oversight committee;

the problem with it is there's no teeth to the

2 oversight committee and there's no

3 requirements from the Office of Problem-

4 Solving Courts in terms of whether you're

5 going to get grant money, and it comes from

6 them now. It's state grant money.

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there.

When someone wants to set up a court, and I guess I neglected to mention this part earlier, now they have to work with the Office of Problem-Solving Courts to ramp up their program. So there is some oversight

But as I mentioned, there is no requirement and there are no teeth to the oversight committee. They can't force anyone to do anything on the ground, and neither can the Office of Problem-Solving Courts, but the answer is there isn't a simple answer because it depends what the group decided when they established the court, and again, that was dependent upon the personality and not to mention the power structure.

1 MR. DeWOLFE: Generally the 2 prosecutor is the gatekeeper in most of the 3 courts we've looked at, and the task force has a real problem with that. When our court was 5 set up in Montgomery County, anybody could recommend someone to the drug court. The team 6 7 would then vote or discuss it, and then the 8 judge would decide who gets in, and that's 9 changed. 10 For the high end addicted people 11 who are violations of probation, who are 12 facing violation of probation and certain 13 jail, which is the way that the program

who are violations of probation, who are facing violation of probation and certain jail, which is the way that the program started, that system still exists, but because their numbers weren't high enough to maintain the court, they changed the rules. They allowed the prosecutors to recommend people who are facing indictment for drug cases, and then the rules are that the prosecutor is the gatekeeper.

21 And I think that's an example of 22 how the rules just more depend upon

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1 circumstances.

2. MR. ROSE: If I could just add briefly that the issue of addicts versus the 3 cherry picking, it's something that we in the 5 administration are very suspicious of, and I'm certain that you will hear later from Mr. 6 7 Marlowe because I have attended a training, 8 and I'm sorry. It's probably Dr. Marlowe. 9 Doug Marlowe gave to our folks, is that it 10 really ought to be desperate measures for 11 desperate folks, and as I say, we don't have 12 any empirical information, but our suspicions 13 are, and we have to be driven and guided by them to some extent, that there is a lot of 14 15 cherry picking, and that's part of the difficulty getting our hands around the whole 16 thing to decide what to do with it. 17 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Just in this 18 19 area of who gets in, do any of you have any 20 sort of hard data, anecdotal data or otherwise 21 with respect to, in your various jurisdictions, racial and/or socioeconomic 22

1	disparities, trends with respect to who are
2	the people who are passing through these
3	courts or do you have any sense of that?
4	MS. LEIGHTON: Ninety-five percent
5	of the individuals arrested in the District of
6	Columbia are African American.
7	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: And are 95
8	percent of the people in drug court equally?
9	MS. LEIGHTON: At that point I
10	suspect. That's what populates that court.
11	The issue starts at arrest.
12	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Right, right.
13	MR. DeWOLFE: I don't know that we
14	have any data.
15	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Does anybody
16	have any?
17	Marvin.
18	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Mr.
19	DeWolfe, I see the things that the task force
20	is upset about. We've run into the same
21	thing. Who's the gatekeeper? What are the
22	standards? Do they change? What are the

1 contracts?

But the battle is the drug courts are there. They exist, and the defense attorneys tell us that they want the drug courts because it helps their clients, but they want the due process stuff with it.

In order to get the due process stuff, my question to you is this: are we tweaking these courts? Is that where you're headed in the task force? Are we tweaking them the way Maryland is trying to tweak the original agreements?

Or is the recommendation that it's not worth it; that the prosecutors are the gatekeepers and we're getting the wrong people into their system? It's just not worth it in terms of due process. We don't get the discovery. We don't get drug testing.

So my question to you is that I hear you, but I'm not quite sure what you're really saying. Should we fight i? Should we recommend doing away with the drug courts, or

is your recommendation the opposite, that we have to change some things and if we change them, we can live with it?

MR. DeWOLFE: well, I think the overriding problem is that we're coming to this process 19 years after drug courts first came on the scene, and they're all over the country and they're in all different forms.

So ideally what I think should be done is that at the beginning, as I think perhaps the Office of Specialty Courts is trying to do in Maryland, at the beginning there should be some minimum standard set.

We're hoping that the ABA can provide the black letter at least for some minimum standards, and then going from there, hopefully the due process concerns that we all have and the right to counsel concerns that we all have and the advocacy, the need for zealous advocacy on the part of the defense attorney that we all see should be built into the original document that creates the courts.

1	Having said that, what do you do
2	with the courts that are already out there?
3	And I think Maryland has started to take a
4	look at them individually and to raise these
5	concerns either through the Public Defender
6	Office backing out of programs or threatening
7	to back out of programs until and unless those
8	due process concerns are built into the
9	structure or perhaps in some cases to
10	litigate.
11	MR. ROSE: Yeah, can I just add
12	onto that?
13	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Sure.
14	MR. ROSE: It seems to me that the
15	philosophical barrier that the Public Defender
16	has is the view that in drug courts due
17	process itself is a barrier to treatment by
18	way of speedy intervention.
19	As soon as you get the guy in
20	trouble and in court, get him into the
21	program. And also this therapeutic
22	intervention which I have seen variously

described in reported opinions as therapeutic incarceration, which you know, we've had many long debates, myself and the Public Defender and Deputy Public Defender about how we're going to accommodate this and what does this mean, not to mention the greater philosophical question about therapeutic incarceration is very Orwellian. 

CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Marvin sot of jumped us to the end of the conversation in the middle. I know, Julia, you wanted to comment on this, and then I want to sort of try to get back to working through some of these issues.

MS. LEIGHTON: As a practicing defense attorney -- I'll put that hat back on and remember those -- I want all options, right? I want all options because every client is different. Every set of circumstances is different. I've got one judge here, one judge here. It may depend on which judge where I go.

1 I can have two absolutely the same 2. If they're in front of two different calendar judges, I may make a different 3 4 decision about whether I recommend to one 5 going to drug court and not to the other. Maybe I have the same calendar and a different 7 prosecutor. All defense attorneys want 8 options, and the more the better, and then you 9 work them for your client. 10 But part of the reason we're 11 driven to want these options is because we 12 don't have the ability to individualize a 13 program for a client in other -- so we're 14 popping from program sort of comes closest to

don't have the ability to individualize a

program for a client in other -- so we're

popping from program sort of comes closest to

works for my client, and I can figure him into

that box as opposed to -- and I don't know how

broadly you all see your trials. I hear this

sort of it's there. They've built it, you

know. We'll never shut it down.

20 And doing the voice that says,
21 "Until we get it right, why are you spending
22 all of these resources on this and why

wouldn't these resources be better spent if

all of our attorneys could spend more time on

each case putting together what is the best

solution for that client and then trying to

pitch it to a judge and a prosecutor?"

take you back 5,000 feet down to sort of some of the real stuff we're grappling with around these issues with respect to the defense bar, and the next sort of big area we want to talk to you guys about is the lawyer-client relationship, but specifically with respect to advising your clients.

How comfortable do you lawyers

feel in advising your clients to enter into

drug programs? How much time do you have with

clients before they have to make that

decision?

What's the quantum of knowledge available to you before and as you're advising clients to make these decisions? What's your sense of that going in with respect to the

1 quantum of knowledge and advice and counsel that the clients get before and as they're making the decision to enter into these 3 4 various specialty court programs?

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MS. LEIGHTON: PDS has a controlled case load, and as a result, I think we are in very good position to advise, to meet, to spend time. I think our lawyers are in a position to understand their programs and have the time to figure out the programs and figure out the options and figure out ways to actually take something that's happening in community court and convince a prosecutor in a whole other court to do the same thing.

I don't know that that necessarily can happen across the board, and I think that is one of the areas that I'd like to see courts getting more data in. I gave you the example of having looked briefly at the data that PDS has about who was getting the appointments, how many lawyers were getting appointments in a particular court, and how

1 many appointments they were getting over the 2 course of a year.

And while those appointment numbers didn't exceed the national standards, some of them came close, and there really isn't a good reason for that in the District of Columbia with the size of the panel that we have and the funding that we currently that we currently have for the CJ program.

about advice to perpetuate and whether people really have time to spend time on clients' individual circumstances and stated goals, I mean, not sort of what's best, but really have the time, and I think everybody has touched on this. You can as a human being buy into the idea of problem solving, but we're not problem solvers. Our role is to perpetuate our client's stated goals however irrational they may appear to someone or even to us. It is advancing the client's stated goal.

And for many clients it would seem

to me that it is far better to role the dice 1 2 on a 50 percent chance of a dismissal for one 3 prosecution in an overcrowded court than to 4 even take on, you know, 20, 40 hours of 5 community service wearing a vest in our 6 neighborhood that says I'm part of this 7 program 8 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Let me just 9 ask you one follow-up question because 10 obviously we are all sort of familiar with the 11 work that PDS does, but just systemically do 12 lawyers generally have enough information at 13 the time they've got to make that "do I advise

work that PDS does, but just systemically do
lawyers generally have enough information at
the time they've got to make that "do I advise
my client I've got to enroll" decision? Do
they know the Fourth and Fifth Amendment
issue? Do they know about the stop, the
quality of the service, the seizure, trying to
think before they advise somebody about
waiving all of these other rights we're
talking about?

21 MS. LEIGHTON: What I would love 22 to know is now you get your open discovery.

1 As you all know, we practice under the Federal 2. Rules of Evidence and federal discovery rules, 3 and we have paperwork, but really who knows a case until you've spent a lot of time, no 5 matter how minor the case? Who knows a case? 6 In the District there's probably 7 about a 20 percent no paper, no charge rate. 8 So if the paperwork is that bad on its fix, 9 what little you might get in the initial, is 10 that bad on its face, it has already been done 11 away with, and so it really is there's a lot 12 more work involved. I mean, in that respect 13 though for all positions at some point it's communicating with clients, but I'm not sure 14 15 if people spend the kind of time you want even 16 talking about what they can tell you about the stop or about the sort of conduct at least 17 right at the time and to dig through and see 18 19 whether or not something might be done.

20 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: What about
21 Maryland? What kind of time do you have to
22 sit with clients and advise them about going

- into these courts and what's the knowledge that you have as you get into that.
- 3 MR. ROSE: I think that depends.
- Time is a luxury, I would guess, across the state, and the quality of information you get and the time you have is going to vary widely,

7 I think.

Paul, do you have a more specific answer?

10 MR. DeWOLFE: Yeah, I mean, we're 11 really talking about courts that have hundreds 12 of people in them and some courts that have 15 13 people in them, and so it's really hard to answer that question. You know, obviously one 14 15 of the skills of the defense attorney is to be able to predict for your client what the 16 consequences will be and, frankly, whether or 17 not your client can make it through this 18 19 rigorous program. We may be in a position to 20 say, "Take your 30 days," or, "take your six 21 months because you're not going to make it 22 through this program. I guarantee you."

1 And that takes knowing the client.

2.

That takes knowing the case, and that takes time, and it's what we have done traditionally with recommending whether to take a plea, to go to trial, to be on probation rather than to go to jail, and so that predictability depends upon the case load of the attorney.

I will say I think for private attorneys it's probably more of a problem because they're not familiar with the drug courts or the specialty courts in terms of the requirement.

One of the requirements in our drug court is in the first phase that you show up every week, and the private attorney is just not going to show up every week and be there for the client, and so it is left to sometimes the Public Defender who has to get to know that client and make the predictions and advice and take on the traditional role of the defense attorney.

So to answer your question it

1 really depends on the program. Discovery is 2. good in Maryland. So we do have the 3 opportunity to look at the case, to see if there are flaws in the case. So you may want 5 to file a motion. You may want to go to trial instead of drug court, but the decision of 7 whether or not to go into drug court depends 8 upon the attorney-client relationship. 9 I think I would have to say at 10 least with the Public Defenders we do have time to look at that. 11 12 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: We run a 13 little bit closer. We come down to jurisdictions, and we've actually got the time 14 15 lines and I'm not hearing that here. So maybe we can just figure it out even with all of the 16 17 diverse districts that you have. If a person is arrested at 9:00 18 a.m. this morning and they are a drug user, 19 20 how soon after that time of arrest does the 21 attorney have to make the decision to recommend the client to the drug court? 22

1	five days? Is it 48 hours? Is it six months?
2	MR. DeWOLFE: I couldn't tell you.
3	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: You
4	couldn't tell.
5	How soon after a 9:00 a.m. arrest
6	this morning
7	MR. ROSE: Also I should say it's
8	not going to be consistent across the state.
9	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: How soon
10	after 9:00 a.m. this morning at an arrest of
11	a drug user do you get discovery?
12	MR. DeWOLFE: Well, actually we
13	get it in my jurisdiction within 30 days.
14	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Montgomery
15	County?
16	MR. DeWOLFE: Yeah.
17	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Montgomery
18	County, you get it within 30 days, but that's
19	not standard throughout the state?
20	MR. DeWOLFE: That's not standard.
21	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Let's take
22	Montgomery County. You get discovery within

1	30 days. So theoretically as a defense
2	attorney, you can hold off making the decision
3	to send the client to drug court so that you
4	could see what you've got, right?
5	MR. DeWOLFE: Yes.
6	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: No one
7	would say to you in Montgomery County you've
8	waited too long. In other counties, Mr. Rose,
9	would you not have that? Can you specifically
10	say that in Maryland, that there are other
11	counties where if you're arrested at 9:00 a.m.
12	this morning you must make the decision? Tell
13	us whether the person is going into drug court
14	or not regardless of whether you've gotten the
15	discovery?
16	MR. ROSE: I just don't know.
17	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Okay.
18	MR. ROSE: I know we collect
19	well, we collect an enormous amount of
20	information. It just simply escapes me as to
21	whether there were any jurisdictions that said
22	you've got a limited time.

1	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: In those
2	contracts that you were asked about before
3	that you've gone over, is discovery
4	specifically one of the things in the
5	contract?
6	MR. ROSE: No, I don't recall
7	discovery being mentioned ever.
8	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Really?
9	MEMBER SHIFMAN: Is that because
10	you get discovery? It's routine now?
11	MR. DeWOLFE: It is routine in my
12	jurisdiction.
13	MR. ROSE: I think it's probably
14	fairly routine that you get it, but I,
15	frankly, don't think it was a consideration
16	for most folks. The question sort of involves
17	whether you're going to do motions or what
18	kind of a court it is, how you enter the
19	court, and that just varies.
20	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Can you
21	make motions in drug court?
22	MR. ROSE: You should be able to

now in Maryland, but it varied up until the time we go hold of the agreements and tried to make them uniform.

MR. DeWOLFE: I think typically the motion practice, if it's going to happen at all, would happen before entry to drug court. Drug court is sort of -- it's not a diversion, but it's a -- usually it takes one of two forms. It's either upon violation of probation or it's an agreement to set aside the prosecution of the case so that the person may by contract agree to enter this treatment program, and at that time they typically waive motions practice or typically waive -- by that time they have probably entered a plea of quilty.

CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: And just in Montgomery County, if you decide to go the motion route after 30 days and you lose the motion to suppress and you then decide you'd like to go to drug court, can you get into drug court?

1 MR. DeWOLFE: Probably not, but 2 the way it is done in Montgomery County is 3 that the person is recommended for drug court, 4 and then an evaluation is done, and that's 5 where you get into the question of whether or 6 not the person is a dealer or a user. 7 person doing the evaluation is supposed to be able to read out that information. 8 9 And then the court makes a 10 decision, and they could make a decision. 11 prosecutor could recommend against it because 12 they have chosen to litigate motions or they 13 could recommend in favor of it, and they judge ultimately makes the decision whether the 14 15 person gets in or not, but usually it typically takes a guilty plea in order to. 16 17 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Vicki, do you have? 18 19 MEMBER YOUNG: Well, in terms of Maryland, maybe I'm hearing it wrong and in 20 21 part what Julia was hearing is that for the 22 people on the ground handling the individual

cases on the trial level, from both of you I 1 2 wasn't hearing that they were having the due 3 process concerns; that the concerns were coming from the top down because if you're at 5 the trial level, that someone saying, you 6 know, if I want someone to go into that 7 program as one of the options, then that's just one of the things I consider in making 8 9 the pool of recommendations.

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But I was just trying to get a sense, you know, where is it that the concerns about the procedures we're using are coming from. Maybe I wasn't hearing you right because I thought PDS, you were saying you're not there at the decision and you're only there at the staffing end, and there's due process concerns there, but I'm getting -
MS. LEIGHTON: It depends on the court. Mental

court. It depends on the court. Mental health court we've been in from the ground level in terms of the design and talking and advising on the development of it. We

1	actually represent very, very few people in
2	mental health court because of the nature of
3	the charges that are available and because of
4	the kinds of charges our staff lawyers handle.
5	We don't even handle ten percent
6	of the general filings, guns and drugs. So we
7	handle a small fraction. I think you would
8	find, and I wish I knew the answer to this one
9	and I may try and figure it out, that our
10	clients enter these problem-solving courts at
11	a lower rate than we represent people. So if
12	we represent ten percent of all the drug
13	eligible cases, that we probably are send, you
14	know, a lower percentage of that to the
15	problem-solving courts than is seen throughout
16	the system, but that is anecdotal. I don't
17	actually have the hard date on it.
18	What I think that I say it's not
19	that they don't have due process concerns.
20	MEMBER YOUNG: They are just
21	willing to overlook them?
22	MS. LEIGHTON: Well, no, I have a

lot of options, and so I can figure out where I want to go. It doesn't mean that they like a particular problem solving court or don't try and change the contract on behalf of their clients, and that has happened in some cases, or try to change the conditions or negotiate how the court will apply to their specific client. 

And we had an instance recently where we got wind that a court was being created in a regional setting, and we thought we were seeing a pattern of how people were being sent to calendar, and everybody said -- we took a constitutional challenge, and the court said it wasn't doing it, wasn't looking at it, wasn't really thinking about it, and the matter took the point away because this idea of a bull's (phonetic) court disappeared or has disappeared for now in terms of sending people.

So individual lawyers will see that pattern if they think someone is being

sent a particular way, and it's not

advantageous to their client. Then they may

raise a constitutional challenge at that

point. If it had been advantageous to the

client they would have not raised the

challenge.

So, I mean, I think that our case loads do allow us to try to make -- what I'm trying to get at is it allows our individual lawyers to try to make the most out of every option out there and to try and push on those options that are out there.

But we don't have the discovery.

So, again our case load sort of allows up some investigative abilities that may not be available. For example, we can start investigating the second we get a case. The panel attorneys have to get a voucher, and the time periods for that and how much is approved and whether it's approved in these kinds of cases for the kind of time, you know, the kind of investigation that you can do in, you know,

five days if you've got the resources to get out there, can allow you to make decisions.

But the flip side of it in D.C. is this is a resource save. The U.S. Attorney's Office and the prosecutors, they're saving resources if they don't have to complete discovery, if they don't have to make motions.

So there's a quid pro quo to getting into any of this, and I don't think we feel the same drive because I think we figure in our world we have to go out in the investigation ourselves anyhow. So we just get started, figure it out, and then advise.

But you still miss key pieces for some of your motions litigation. What would the radio runs have revealed in contradiction to the run reports for Fourth Amendment challenges? And that's always up in the air.

MEMBER SHIFMAN: I wanted to pick up the thread that came through at least from Julia and Paul, and I'm sure it's true for you, Peter, as well, but this idea that

sometimes you would advise a client just do
the 30 days, just do the six months. You
know, you get the sense that they're not going
to be able to show up weekly. You know,
they're just not ready to commit to the kind
of activity level that these particularly drug
treatment courts or community courts might
require.

So my question to each of you, and if you could keep your answers concise, is whether or not you are finding that the sentences that are handed out in these courts for failure are significantly higher or just higher in general than the sentences they would have received had they just done the 30 days or the six months on a routine plea for the offenses but the fact they went into the specialty courts.

MR. ROSE: I can reverse and say from my vantage point, I don't have any information on that, but as I think I said earlier, we're always suspicious.

MR. DeWOLFE: I think here is

where the major problem lies, and that is when

the judge that is the local judge or the

specialty court judge, also has control of the

criminal case because that's where I think you

see you'll get a more serious -- that happened

in our court.

In our court, typically what would happen is another judge would send someone to drug court or agree that the case can go over to drug court, and then if the person busted out, then they would go back to the original judge.

That has changed. That is another example of how the rule has changed, and now the drug court judge becomes the probation judge as well, and that's a very huge concern, and I think the ABA has looked at that as well. I think that there is a real concern that the judge takes it personally and that the sentence might be worse at the end.

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So when you're advising your

client whether to go into this court, you also
have to advise them that that judge is going
to hear the violation of probation case or
that judge is ultimately going to sentence you
on the case itself and you may do better, you
may be better, you know, to keep the case out
of drug court.

But you know, a lot of these

people -- I'm sorry. I'm trying to keep it

succinct -- but a lot of the people that we

represent at least in our jurisdiction, this

drug court really is the last chance before a

long term incarceration, and so if they make

it they avoid that, and so that's the weighing

that the defense attorney has to do in every

case.

Being in drug court is generally better than being in state prison, but if you can end up in state prison anyway, that's the way that the defense attorney has to think.

CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Adele has got one quick question and then Jane, and then I

want to move on to a different --1 2 MS. LEIGHTON: Could I response? 3 Oh, I'm sorry. CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: 4 I'm sorry. 5 MS. LEIGHTON: The answer is that 6 we don't have the data to really know that. 7 I think anecdotally the sense is in drug court 8 you've already been sentenced. You know it's 9 hanging over your head, and then the question 10 is I won't bore you with a transcript where a 11 lawyer tries to get back to the original judge 12 for a sentencing and to actually advocate for 13 a different sentence than the one that was suspended based on his conduct, and the drug 14 15 court judge said, "I'm not having a sentencing I'm not hearing you on sentencing. 16 hearing. 17 All you're stepping back for a sanction and 18 you can set a sentencing data off or you can 19 accept my sentence, but I'm not having a 20 sentencing hearing." 21 And the lawyer said, "Okay. We'll 22 take the sanction. Give us the "-- but again,

know your forums, right, where your client is 1 2. going, and as long as you have people that are 3 paying attention to that, you can work your 4 way through it, and I suspect there may be 5 some change in the District to now to have 6 voluntary sentencing guidelines that have, I 7 think, made more uniform sentencing practices in the District so that we may see less of 8 9 that individual, but it's a risk. It's always 10 a risk. 11 In eight years of litigating 12 cases, I had one client that ever decided to 13 do the time. I think it's rare. It's a rare It's a rare set of circumstances. 14 person. 15 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Adele and then 16 Jay and then we're going to move on.

MEMBER BERNHARD: Okay. I was just wondering. A lot of what we're talking about or hearing about or thinking about seems like it's sort of overarching policy, and so what should the rules be? You know, what should the eligible criteria be.

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1	But the individual lawyers aren't
2	generally involved in those conversations. I
3	mean, what kind of information is being
4	communicated to the lawyers to help them
5	handle the new situations? Are there
6	trainings? What are we doing to give them the
7	information so that they do have all of those
8	options and can move from one court to the
9	other, you know, and avail themselves of
10	what's out there?
11	MS. LEIGHTON: We have ongoing
12	training, either weeks of training before you
13	even get a case.
14	MEMBER BERNHARD: Right, but what
15	specific to this situation?
16	MS. LEIGHTON: Exactly. We have
17	biweekly mandatory trainings at each practice
18	level and a schedule of what you're learning
19	and being trained on, and it includes the
20	problem-solving courts. Again, we're not in
21	those courts a lot.
22	MEMBER BERNHARD: Right.

1	MS. LEIGHTON: But we have a very
2	low lawyer-to-supervisor ratio. It is the
3	supervising lawyers in our Trial Division that
4	sit on the drug
5	MEMBER BERNHARD: Would it be
6	difficult for us to see some of the training
7	materials, to see what people are
8	communicating to the lawyers?
9	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: If you feel
10	comfortable sharing that with us.
11	MEMBER BERNHARD: I mean if you
12	do. I'm not saying that you have to,
13	obviously. I'm just trying to get a sense
14	because we are going to be talking to lawyers,
15	not so much to the policy ends, and so I'm
16	trying to focus on what we could be doing or
17	saying that would be helpful to the lawyers.
18	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Paul and
19	Peter.
20	MR. ROSE: Just briefly. The
21	first question that was asked when we
22	encountered this whole issue was is this

helping our clients. Do our attorneys on the ground like these things? That was question number one.

4 And I was the one who ventured out 5 to convene all of us and perhaps to say, "Is this good for clients? You guys like this." 7 And the rest of it followed and a lot of it policy driven, but that the end of that effort 8 9 when we came to some sort of policy 10 conclusions, we left it at we need -- and we 11 have a training division -- we need to train 12 our own lawyers. Office of Problem-Solving 13 Courts in Maryland offers training. We don't like all of it, but many aspects of it, and we 14 15 don't need to -- that's our plan and that's the endeavor, is to try to put together 16 17 training specific to our view, to what our philosophy is with what we've done to 18 19 restructure the course.

But we don't have any of that, and I couldn't hand over our training materials, but I --

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MEMBER BERNHARD: But you're
thinking about it.
MR. ROSE: Yes.
MEMBER BERNHARD: Maybe we need to
have a way of continuing that kind of back-
and-forth in terms of getting that
information.
MR. ROSE: We'd love to do that.
MS. LEIGHTON: I'll talk to our
training director about it. I mean, it
includes things like we had a specialty group
that does forensic practice work that had
looked at the tech labs, investigated the
labs, the testing, met with all of the staff
of the labs for drug testing, a lot of work
on, you know, what is new use, what is the
science behind new use test, what is the
science behind declining use test, you know.
And my sense is that I don't
want to say this on tape, but I assume this
stays here my sense is that our lab is
pretty bullet proof right now, that we've

- 1 explored all of the challenges, but we have a 2 specialty group, a forensic practice group 3 that's to keep an eye on the lab practices. Lawyers aren't expected to learn 5 that. 6 MEMBER BERNHARD: Right. 7 MS. LEIGHTON: They're expected to 8 come to --9 MEMBER BERNHARD: But they have 10 something can tap into. 11 MS. LEIGHTON: Yes. 12 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Just briefly I 13 want to go through this just because we're interested, but not spend any significant 14
- often?

  And if not, what impact does that
  have on the Public Defenders Office both in
  terms of budget and in terms of case load? If
  you could just really sort of very succinctly

do they appear in these courts?

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amount of time on it, but the role of private

counsel in these courts. Very, very quickly,

If so, how

1 give us a sense of that.

MS. LEIGHTON: Very, very rarely
do they appear, but typically if they appear
they consult with us beforehand to get

information about their employee in court.

CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: And how does that impact you in terms of resources, time, money, case load? Not a major position?

MS. LEIGHTON: No,b ut again, we don't handle the bulk of these cases. Our role in this area is to be support and to try to develop training. So one of the things I'm thinking about is whether we've done training for panel attorneys in this area.

MR. ROSE: As Paul mentioned
earlier, we pick up where private counsel
leave their clients, and it's not an enormous
problem for us right now as far as I can tell,
but every penny counts, and we're watching.
We're paying attention to it because in the
event there is going to be some rule making,
we're going to have to address that problem.

1	And I think the root of it is that
2	private counsel don't really know what they're
3	getting into .
4	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Right, and I'm
5	assuming that there's no additional
6	remuneration for you when you pick up the case
7	that the private Bar has left at your
8	doorstep.
9	MR. DeWOLFE: No. As a matter of
10	fact, there's a grant in our jurisdiction, and
11	it includes I have to have a prosecutor, but
12	there is no money in the grant for the defense
13	motion, and that's typical.
14	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: If I could
15	ask one question.
16	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Okay.
17	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: One of the
18	things we've heard across the country and it's
19	exactly the same, private attorneys don't show
20	up, and concomitant with that, we also have
21	heard that in many instances the public
22	defenders are not showing up in these courts

- after the initial acceptance. It's varied;
- 2 it's spotty.
- In Tucson, they show up. In
- 4 Brooklyn, New York, they're not showing up.
- 5 So my question is: if I'm a staff attorney
- 6 and I pick up a case and it's assigned to drug
- 7 court and the judge calls me back for 20
- 8 conference over a two-year period, am I
- 9 expected by my office to appear at each of
- 10 those conferences?
- MR. DeWOLFE: Yes.
- MS. LEIGHTON: And yes in my
- office, but I guess to go back to the answer,
- 14 we by agreement pick up all drug court cases
- for sanction hearings, even the panel.
- 16 Ninety-five percent of those arrested in the
- 17 District of Columbia quality for court
- appointed counsel. So the vast majority of
- 19 the representation in the District is done by
- 20 court appointed counsel.
- 21 But the cost to the system of
- 22 bringing in on any given sanction day ten

different lawyers apparently troubled the
court, which manages its suday (phonetic)
budget and doesn't feel what happens to our

budget.

So part of our decision to get involved and to staff that was a decision we made cognizant of our budget, cognizant of the court and trying to have a role in these problem-solving courts.

I will tell you we get pressure from our staff about the frustration they feel in these courts. We hie them to be scorched earth litigators, and these are frustrated courts, and likewise we hear from the judges who question, you know, how suited we are to this work.

CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Inevitably what we've found as we've traveled around is that no matter how much time we allot to a panel, there's never enough of it to get to all of the things that we want.

One of the last two really issues

1 that we want to discuss with you all as we 2 come up against the clock is sort of the 3 overarching issue of ethics, and if you could just sort of give us a sense of what you think 5 are the most frequent ethical dilemmas that 6 your lawyers encounter as they operate in 7 these courts and how the individual lawyer 8 grapples and resolvers these ethical dilemmas 9 and whether or not there are office-wide 10 conversations, thoughts, policies about some of the sort of myriad ethical dilemmas that 11 12 the lawyers encounter as they work through 13 these courts, we'd appreciate it. Julia, on the ethics question? 14 15 MS. LEIGHTON: I don't think we 16 do, and I think that may be sometimes why the court doesn't want us there. I think, yes, 17 18 there's pressure on the issue of client 19 confidences, but that's true in every court, 20 in every setting whenever a client doesn't 21 show up, whenever a client is late. How

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quickly do you answer? How do you answer?

1 How do you handle that situation?

2.

change from the myriad of circumstances in which they typically find themselves. The concern I see for the District is when the universe of attorneys that appear in a particular court becomes very small and the court is controlling the budget and who helps them, supports them, monitors them for maintaining their independence. I think that's the biggest concern I see in the District.

MR. DeWOLFE: Yeah, I think it's a huge problem, and I think the biggest problem is that institutional pressure to be a team player and to be concerned about the best interest of the client as opposed to being an advocate concerned with the expressed interest of the client on any given, and that's where the due process problems come in, when an attorney has to stand up to the judge and to the team and say that my client denies the

allegation or that my client does not want the sanction, and we want a hearing, and we want to litigate.

The pressure is enormous, and we generally have one or two attorneys that handle the drug court in our jurisdiction, and it's a constant battle, and as District Public Defender, we sort of have to back them up and bolster them on this issue of standing up to the judge and demanding hearings and demanding due process. It's a big problem.

encounter situations where the defense attorney and his client may not be in alignment, maybe in disagreement about what should happen where? And the defense attorney may think after coming from one of these private meetings in the back, ex parte meetings in the back, thinking that, well, if he takes the sanction, the judge is going to go softly on him, and I know this because I've been in the back and I know where, but the

- 1 client comes into court that morning and says,
- 2 "I didn't do anything wrong. I don't want
- 3 this sanction."
- 4 The defense attorney thinks the
- 5 sanction might be the best thing. How do they
- 6 -- and they're part of this team -- how do
- 7 they resolve that dilemma?
- 8 MR. DeWOLFE: Well, you know,
- 9 frankly, the real problem is that the
- 10 sanctions can happen anyway. After that team
- 11 meeting, the sanction is going to happen, and
- the attorney has to work with the client, tell
- the client what's likely to happen, like
- 14 almost in any other case, and if the client
- 15 says, "I want a hearing. I want to fight
- this," then the attorney has the obligation to
- 17 fight it, but with the knowledge that that
- 18 sanction is going to happen. That person is
- 19 going to go to jail because it has been
- 20 decided. It has been decided in the team
- 21 meeting.
- 22 That's the reality of the

1	situation.
2	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: How meaningful
3	is that? If the defense attorney has been in
4	the back and says, "I think sanction certainty
5	is appropriate"
6	MR. DeWOLFE: Well, see, I think
7	the attorney should not say that without
8	consulting the client. That's where the
9	advocacy has to happen. Clearly, in this
10	court the best advocacy is done in those team
11	meetings and after consultation with the
12	client and after a full understanding of what
13	is, what might happen, and what will happen.
14	Then I think the attorney has to
15	after the meeting take the client aside and
16	discuss all of the options and then go with
17	what the client expressed interest in. And
18	that's the ethical obligation.
19	The team meetings are

participate in the team meetings?

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CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: you don't

MR. DeWOLFE: But they're really

- rampant in all of the drug courts, specialty
- 2 courts that we've looked at.
- 3 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: They exist for
- 4 you.
- 5 MS. LEIGHTON: Not really.
- 6 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Let's let
- 7 Peter get a chance.
- 8 MR. ROSE: Let me just say that
- 9 hypothetical situation just articulated, it
- 10 was my fear as I sat in court, the anecdote I
- 11 gave you at the top of the discussion,
- 12 watching the Public Defender move from the
- defense table to the state, and the guy comes
- in, the client, and there's a recommendation
- 15 that's being advanced by the state and the
- 16 Public Defender together, and then he's got
- 17 another Public Defender lawyer.
- 18 It was just a nightmare to watch,
- but all of those things went through my head.
- How on earth can he do what he's doing? How
- on earth can he?
- 22 You know all of those

- 1 permutations, and that was the anecdote.
- 2 That's what I witness.
- 3 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: How do you
- 4 lawyers resolve those problems, if at all?
- 5 MR. ROSE: Well, I think across
- 6 the state in large measure they are struggling
- 7 with some of these identity issues, and that
- 8 anecdote is a bit of an exception because
- 9 there are a couple of places where we've seen
- 10 this kind of participation, where the folks
- drink Koolaid, if you will, and we've
- 12 corrected that.
- But that's one of the big fears,
- and the rest of it from my vantage point,
- 15 again, it's philosophical or you read the
- 16 literature and the debate back and forth
- 17 between the scholars about the roles and the
- 18 ethics and the dilemmas, but I think what Paul
- is describing is much more where the grounded
- 20 problem is. It's the institutional pressure
- and the dynamic that's created by the added
- 22 ethical dilemmas.

1 I mean, every lawyer has a 2. question about what am I going to do with this 3 situation, and you have a tough one. This adds another dimension. 4 5 But that description is wholly different from sitting with a client and 6 7 saying, "Okay. Look. This judge is going to 8 knock you out of the park. I'm not going to 9 go in there and ask for nothing. We've got to 10 ask for something to make this realistic.: 11 Getting your client's permission 12 and consent, really understands everything 13 that's going on, that's the fear, and part of our training efforts are absolutely going to 14 be geared toward the role of counsel and not 15 having to encounter ethical dilemmas so that 16 we don't have to deal with it. 17 18 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Can I just ask 19 Julia one quick question? 20 How do you not participate in the 21 team meetings if the judge is there and the prosecutor is there and the social worker is 22

- there? Are there team meetings that happen
  that --
- 2 that --

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3 MS. LEIGHTON: No. Part of it is 4 our court isn't designed quite that way. 5 do their job. We do our job. They wonder why 6 we -- I mean, the push-pull is how much time 7 do we get to talk. Can we push off the 8 sanction? Can we articulate something about 9 the drug test that gets us -- I mean, that's

We certainly convey to the clients, "Look. We've investigated this lab. This is what we know about this lab. This is what we know about the science of it. This is the extent of what we know we can say."

what we do, and we start from the premise.

You can only go so far with the poppy seed muffin, right? You can only go so far. but we know what the options are, and we talk with our clients about what -- you know, what the arguments can be for the testing, and we try to convey all of that information in advance and say, you know, "This argument

- doesn't pass the lab test. This gets us a little closer. This is the only thing we have any scientific evidence on."
- 4 And we end up with that. 5 transcript where a judge says, "Well, give me a reason why your client could, this could 6 7 be, " and so where he starts to argue it, and 8 the judge says, "Argue a scientific basis for 9 the test results." And the judge says -- and 10 then it sort of becomes clear that he hasn't consulted with his client. This isn't where 11 12 this information is coming from.
- 13 And he says, "How dare you put

  14 forward an argument that you aren't taking for

  15 your client."
- And he said, "Judge, you asked me
  how could it be, not how it was in this case.

  I'm telling you how it could be."
- And the judge went after him and said, "That's unethical. I asked you a question."
- 22 And he said, "Let's pull the

- 1 transcript. You did not ask me that question.
- 2 You asked me how it was possible. I'm
- 3 articulating how it would be possible, and I
- 4 still need more time to talk with my client.
- 5 I am not answering that question."
- 6 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: So let me just
- 7 make sure that I'm clear. There are no team
- 8 meetings at all in your staff.
- 9 MS. LEIGHTON: We don't have them.
- 10 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: No staff
- 11 meetings.
- MS. LEIGHTON: No.
- 13 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: So your drug
- court is actually much more adversarial than
- 15 a lot that we --
- 16 MS. LEIGHTON: Not adversarial
- enough according to my lawyers, but yes, I
- 18 have to say.
- 19 MEMBER CLARK: I just have a
- 20 question for Mr. DeWolfe.
- In terms of the ABA standards,
- what is the standard that you've talked about

1 in terms of the defense role participating in 2 the staffings and in the meetings? What is 3 the recommendation going to be? Should they 4 not participate? 5 MR. DeWOLFE: Yeah. No, it is --6 MEMBER CLARK: Or no staff? Ι 7 mean, are they on the team? 8 MR. DeWOLFE: Yeah, they are. 9 It's a recognition that these exist and that 10 the teams exist, and you can either 11 participate or not participate. So the 12 recommendation is that they participate and 13 they advocate for the expressed interest of the clients within the team essentially. 14 15 MEMBER BERNHARD: And that's a key 16 word, that expressed interest. 17 MR. DeWOLFE: I'm not sure that's 18 going to end up in the standards, but that's 19 the thought behind it. 20 MEMBER BERNHARD: All right. 21 That's a key word though because that gets 22 into the gist of the whole thing.

1	MR. DeWOLFE: It does. No, that's
2	the ethical dilemma, was do you advocate for
3	what the client wants or do you advocate for
4	what the team feels, but that's different.
5	MS. LEIGHTON: That isn't that
6	can't be I'm sorry. That can't be the
7	ethical dilemma under the rules.
8	MEMBER BERNHARD: Not for the
9	team, but suppose it is
10	MR. DeWOLFE: Well, you know,
11	that's the ethical dilemma of participating in
12	these drug courts.
13	MS. LEIGHTON: It might be a rule
14	dilemma, but it can't be a dilemma under the
15	rules. The client sets the goals of
16	representation.
17	MR. DeWOLFE: Oh, absolutely, and
18	that's what we are intending to build into the
19	standards, is that the role of the defense
20	attorney is to follow the ethical standards,
21	to advocate zealously within and without,
22	within and outside of the team.

1 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Yeah.

What we've seen in some of these, we've sat in on some of these drug meetings. In one I was invited to sit in by the judge in the team meeting unbeknownst to me. It was quite interesting. It was in Tucson.

And you talk about the ethical dilemma. It came about three-quarters of the way into the staffing meeting on a particular defendant who had violated, and this was the third violation. Probation wanted to continue the person. The prosecutor did not. The judge wanted to continue the person. The defense attorney said nothing, and I watched her. She was very experienced. She said nothing.

And I sat there, "Why is she saying nothing?" And about 30 seconds later it became obvious why, because the staffing person assigned to the court had found a new violation, and it was absolutely crystal clear because I asked the staff attorney afterwards.

- 1 The defense attorney knew about the new 2 violation, but wasn't going to tell anybody. 3 Right, right. MR. DeWOLFE: 4 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: That's the 5 ethical dilemma, and you know, when you say as Adele said, you know, she picked up on the 7 words "expressed interest." This is where we 8 keep running into on this elephant in the 9 room. 10 You know our attorneys are going into those rooms. How far can they go, and so 11 12 we had one attorney in Florida who told this 13 committee that there should be new ethics rules to govern defense attorneys in drug 14 15 courts. I think I'm right. 16 I don't know.
- your staff attorneys on what they can do at
  these meetings. Would that be fair to say?

  MR. ROSE: No, there are no rules
  or statutes or anything, but we told our
  attorneys it's an expression. We don't do

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You don't have guidelines yet in Maryland for

- best interest representation.
- 2 MS. LEIGHTON: And there are
- 3 rules. There are the rules of professional
- 4 conduct.
- 5 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Right,
- 6 right.
- 7 MS. LEIGHTON: Who needs special
- 8 rules?
- 9 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Right.
- 10 Your position Julia would be that the ethics
- 11 rules say we have a zealous representation
- obligation to the client and to protect
- privileged communications. End of story.
- 14 Therefore, if you're sitting in on
- a team meeting and you're advocating
- 16 zealously, you cannot reveal to that team that
- 17 your client just told you, "I had some coke
- 18 last night."
- 19 MR. ROSE: Absolutely.
- 20 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Am I
- 21 right?
- MR. ROSE: Right.

1 MS. LEIGHTON: And in the juvenile 2 context we do participate in these team 3 meetings, and we participate as advocates. Ι mean, it's a rehabilitative model, but we're 5 there, to be very clear, the voice of our 6 client, our client's stated interest as judge 7 after judge looks at us in these cases, or a few meetings look at us. 8 9 Judges will look at our clients 10 and say, "Ignore what your lawyer just said," 11 and we fight back with that. You know, it's that rehabilitative mode. 12 13 I'm going to talk to your client. The client has already been adjudicated. 14 making excuses. It's time, young man, to step 15 16 Ignore your lawyer. up. And we push back and say, you 17 18 know, one, you can't denigrate our role. 19 can articulate what you see as the interest, 20 but do not denigrate the role of the lawyer in front of our client like that. 21 And the role in these team 22

meetings in the face of -- yes, I sometimes

would. You know, a lot of experts are saying,

"He's 13. This is what has happened to him.

He needs to go to this special residential."

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And our fight is absolutely not,
absolutely not, absolutely not. If he has to
stay at Oak Hill, he wants to stay in the
community. That is his stated goal, and we
will use every argument we have to try and
persuade the experts that they're exceeding

12 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: We are

13 unfortunately over on time, but before we let

14 you go, and this has been a fascinating

15 conversation, we appreciate you for having it

16 with us.

their expertise.

What is your recommendation to us as a body who is about to publish a report on specialty courts, and assuming that we have no pre-conceptions or limitations whatsoever?

Should these courts be abolished? Are they salvageable?

If each one of you could just take
a minute or two and tell us what is your sense
of that.

MS. LEIGHTON: When I hear what's happening elsewhere, I like a couple of our courts, but I really do think since you are looking nationally the challenge ought to be out there. Why do we have them all? How are they an effective use of resources?

I mean, intervention clearly helps people, but are we getting the intervention to the people who need it? Can we demonstrate that we're doing that? And can that be done in the court system?

We are making judges and the court system -- I think we're really getting close to twisting principles here and missing what's really needed, which is those resources spent before people get into the system and those resources equally available to everyone that's in the system, with the lawyers, with the time and the case load that allows them to try and

- put together those packages for the clients
  whose expressed interest is served by those
  packages.
- 4 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you.
- 5 Thank you very much.
- 6 Paul.

7 If they are to MR. DeWOLFE: 8 continue to exist, and I suspect that they 9 will, then I think the recommendation of the 10 Criminal Defense Lawyers Association should be 11 that these courts should not be standardless, that there should be some overriding 12 13 principles that guide these courts, that the role of the defense attorney should be 14 15 strictly or at least should be spelled out in a way that is consistent with the ethical 16 obligation of each attorney in any court in 17 18 the country, and that the attorney should not 19 abrogate his or her duty to the client.

I agree with the recommendation
that the expressed interest of the client
should be paramount in all of these courts,

1 and that attorneys participate in Public 2 Defender Offices that participate should be 3 concerned about the due process issues that have arisen throughout the country in so many 5 of these courts and that the Defense Lawyers Association should be vigilant in making sure 6 7 or assuring that drug process concerns are addressed in all of these courts. 8 9 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you. 10 Peter. 11 MR. ROSE: I think thus far the 12 Maryland Office of Public Defenders is 13 essentially managing what we see as a liability. As I mentioned, as you knew, we 14 15 are currently litigating now the validity of 16 these courts as they're set up in Maryland. I suppose my suspicion is that they will 17 continue in some form or another. 18 That form 19 may dictate whether we view as management 20 liability or embracing real option for 21 clients.

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Overarching, I think, the

1	philosophical question for us is probably
2	whether drug courts is an appropriate response
3	to drug crime related problems, and I'm
4	talking about drug courts specifically, or
5	whether they're really an inappropriate
6	response to a failed response to public health
7	problems and socioeconomic problems. But
8	that's a philosophical debate, but that's
9	where our heads are.
10	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Well, thank
11	you, and thank you all for a very, very
12	productive conversation.
13	We have gone over, as you know.
14	We are scheduled to take a 15 minute break.
15	We're going to turn that into a five minute
16	break because our next speaker is coming to us
17	via videoconference, and we want to make sure
18	that we are timely back for him. So let's
19	have everybody back at 11:45.
20	Thank you.
21	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter
22	went off the record at 11:41 a.m.

and went back on the record at 11:50 a.m.)

CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: We just want to start out by thanking you very much for taking the time to do this. We're on the last leg of a portion of our journey which has been to travel around the country and meet with and talk to stakeholders in problem-solving courts around the country. We're very pleased to have this time to speak with you.

And the way that we operate is that we would like for you -- and you should know if you can't see completely and I'm assuming that what we see in the lower left-hand corner is what you see, and if that's the case, you might not be able to tell that this room goes a little deeper than your picture and that there are other folks in the room as well beyond our task force.

But the way that we operate is
that we would like to give you five minutes or
so to just sort of tell us a little bit about

you, about yourself and the work that you're doing, and then we have some questions that we'd like to put to you.

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- The way that we operate is that one of the members of the task force is principally responsible for the questioning, and for this conversation that's going to be the gentleman sitting next to me, Jay Clark.
- 9 So at this point, I hope you heard
  10 everything that I said. The floor is yours,
  11 and we're interested in hearing about you and
  12 the court that you run.
- JUDGE BOZZA: Okay. Would you

  like to know a little bit about my background?

  Is that where you want to start?
- 16 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Yes, sir.

JUDGE BOZZA: Well, I've been on
the bench almost 20 years. Before taking the
bench in 1989, I was an associate professor of
criminal justice at Gannon University. I had
been both a defense attorney and a prosecutor,
and I had taught at that time probably for

somewhere in the area of 16, 17 years at two or three different universities.

My educational background is that

I have, of course, my law degree from DePaul.

I have a Master's degree in criminal justice

from the School of Criminal Justice at the

State University of New York at Albany.

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My very first foray into criminal justice was back in the early 1970s when I served as a probation officer in Monroe County in New York, New York State.

So that's a thumbnail sketch of where I've been, and of course, my interest in this topic comes from both my academic interest as well as my experience here in the court, and I have been involved to one degree or another in criminal justice, criminal law, and related psychological and psychiatric issues for probably more than 35 years.

So that's where I think I would let that stand unless there's something more that you think that you need to know about

1 that.

2 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: That's

3 wonderful and we appreciate that. If you

4 could give us a little bit of a sense of the

5 court.

6 JUDGE BOZZA: The court that I

7 serve in?

8 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Yes.

JUDGE BOZZA: Erie County is a

10 moderate size community in northwestern

11 Pennsylvania. We are a court that's comprised

of nine common pleas judges, and 15 -- I think

it's now 15 district judges. The common pleas

14 judges are general jurisdiction judges that

15 handle all manner of cases, civil and criminal

16 up to the appellate level.

17 And so my experience here has been

in every area of the court. Initially I

19 served in both the Trial and Family Division

for a couple of years. Then I was assigned to

21 the Family Division for a few years. Then I

22 served as the Administrative Judge in the

family court. I served as the president judge
of the entire Court of Common Pleas for five
years, and then Administrative Judge of the
Trial Division of the court for about seven
years or so.

Currently I'm assigned to doing mostly juvenile delinquency in dependency work where there are similar issues to the ones we're talkinga bout here, but in a slightly different context, and so I have a variety of experience.

Now, I also teach sentencing at the National Judicial College, which is a part of the University of Nevada, affiliated with the American Bar Association. I've been teaching sentencing and some other courses there since 1998. I teach for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, New Judges School. I teach sentencing for them as well, and I also occasionally do seminars for the Supreme Court, the Administrative Office of

Pennsylvania Courts for judges across the

1 state.

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So that's a thumbnail sketch of my

experience as far as the judging side of

things goes.

Now, I would gather from my
initial discussion that I had with Mr. Cutler?

7 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Right.

JUDGE BOZZA: That perhaps I'm somewhat of a lone voice in the woods on this issue of the role of judges in drug courts and the efficacy of drug courts, but I can tell you that I've been teaching about and involved with this whole drug court movement for a considerable period of time.

We do have a drug court here in Erie County. I am not directly involved in it. One of my colleagues was the initiator of it and has presided over it for a number of years.

We also have a mental health court, not so much as a separate undertaking, but it's a part of the entire drug court

- approach, and together they're oftentimes
- 2 referred to as treatment court.
- We do not have a domestic
- 4 relations court. We don't have a DUI drug
- 5 court or actually another other specialty
- 6 court. There is a juvenile court program that
- 7 is affiliated with the adult program, and so
- 8 that's the essence of what the lay of the land
- 9 looks like here in Erie County with regard to
- 10 drug courts I am involved in.
- 11 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you.
- 12 At this point I'm going to turn
- the questioning over to Jay Clark, who you see
- 14 sitting next to me.
- MEMBER CLARK: Good morning,
- 16 Judge.
- JUDGE BOZZA: Good morning.
- 18 MEMBER CLARK: Judge, I've read
- 19 your article about benevolent behavior
- 20 modification that got published in the Widner
- 21 Law Journal.
- JUDGE BOZZA: Yes.

1 MEMBER CLARK: And you make the 2. statement that the drugs courts and the 3 problem-solving courts have distorted the traditional role of the judiciary that judges 5 participate in. My question is this. What do you think the effect of the problem-solving 7 courts have been on the traditional role of 8 the defense attorney? 9 JUDGE BOZZA: I think that it has 10 made life very difficult for defense attorneys 11 in many cases because the notion of drug court has moved us away from the notion of advocacy 12 13 in an adversarial context to a collaborative and cooperative model, an I do not believe 14 15 that ordinarily defense attorneys are either well equipped or prepared and, quite candidly, 16 I don't believe it is their role to be 17 collaborators in treatment. 18 19 I think they are advocates for

I think they are advocates for their clients. I think advocacy is a very different thing than what is practiced in the drug court setting.

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1	MEMBER CLARK: Do you think if
2	drug courts were structured and they had
3	guidelines or requirements that, in effect,
4	restored the advocacy of the traditional role
5	of the defense attorney and the judge and
6	basically eliminated the team approach that
7	they could exist or continue to exist, and
8	would you be in favor of that?
9	JUDGE BOZZA: I don't know because
10	I would have to see what the restructuring is.
11	You know, when you say take away the team
12	approach, you know, that perhaps is one of the
13	things that would need to be successfully
14	altered in my view, significantly altered in
15	my view to even get to the point where I
16	believe we would be back to where we should
17	be, but I'd have to see how that is
18	structured.
19	It's important to understand that
20	the notion of specialty courts, but in
21	particular drug courts and mental health
22	courts, is that you are no longer talking

about whether or not somebody should be

punished or, more broadly speaking, controlled

by the state. You're now talking about, in

effect, an agreement that the person should be

either punished or, more broadly speaking,

controlled by the state.

And the only question becomes how

effective you will be in accomplishing that,

and I think that raises very significant

jurisprudential issues, and I'm not sure that

they can really be resolved by simply

modifying the current approach, but I'd have

to see what it looked like.

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MEMBER CLARK: You've done quite a bit of research, and a lot of thought went into your article. I want to talk to you about what you rated with effectiveness. Do you find or do you have a sense that some of these drug courts in terms of selection of who is admitted in the drug court, the criteria he admitted or taking people who are first time offenders, likely to succeed because the

court's numbers of success are higher? 1 2 they taking a hard core drug user who truly needs the intensive treatment? 3 4 JUDGE BOZZA: Well, it's very 5 difficult to generalize about that, and the reason is because there is no one standardized 7 approach to drug courts in the country, and 8 that's a very important thing to recognize. 9 Every court essentially operates 10 independently, even within states. 11 For example, in Pennsylvania there 12 is no standard format to proceed in a drug 13 court in Pennsylvania. The court that is here in Erie may be very different than the court 14 15 that might be in your county or Philadelphia or Allegheny County. There is no one way to 16

And since it is a discretionary decision on the part of those people who are involved, I suspect very strongly that you

or perhaps even within the court.

proceed, and with that said, the selection

criteria are arbitrary either among the courts

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will find diversity, great diversity, from

state to state, county to county throughout

the country in the way in which they're

chosen.

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Now, parenthetically I'll say
this. Originally, the original notion of drug
courts was targeted towards those individuals
who met certain criteria largely because the
initial effort had to be sold as a program
that would not endanger the community. And so
very often in the beginning courts selected
individuals who were nonviolent, who had
relatively speaking more minor offenses and
met certain other criteria.

15 Now, that has expanded, and there 16 are some places in the country, I understand, who do, in fact, accept higher risk offenders. 17 But I think that the important thing to 18 19 recognize is in evaluating the concept is that 20 you are not evaluating the same kind of 21 program that's simply being replicated every There are tremendous differences. 22 place.

1	MEMBER CLARK: Your understanding
2	of the way the courts in Pennsylvania were,
3	statistically speaking is the demographic
4	breakdown of the people who were accepted in
5	the court along racial lines, along gender
6	lines; does it track the overall demographics
7	of people who are going into the system in
8	general?
9	In other words, is it
10	disproportionate to one group that's getting
11	into the court as opposed to the general
12	arrests?
13	JUDGE BOZZA: I cannot tell you
14	that because I have never seen any statewide
15	data. I can tell you that anecdotally
16	actually, I'm losing your voice and your
17	picture got fuzzy there. Can you still hear
18	me?
19	PARTICIPANTS: Yes.
20	JUDGE BOZZA: I can tell you that
21	anecdotally in Erie County, it does seem that
22	there has been a consistent effort to avoid

- those pitfalls. That is to say that they work
  hard at making sure that there is, shall we
  say, a representative group that gets the
  benefit, whatever those benefits are, of the
  drug court experience.
- I haven't seen that here, but I

  can't tell you for the rest of Pennsylvania.

  I don't know that.
- 9 MEMBER CLARK: Do you know how do
  10 they do that in Erie County? Is there
  11 statistics that are kept? Is there a person
  12 who tracks that or how does that work?

13 JUDGE BOZZA: There are statistics 14 that are kept. There is an annual report that 15 is prepared. It's prepared by the Civic Justice Institute or the Civic Institute, 16 actually I think it's called, of Mercyhurst 17 College, which also is responsible for doing 18 19 the research that involved our program here at 20 sanction certainty, and they do it. They do a report. They compile largely a descriptive 21 22 report. It is not really an evaluative

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MEMBER CLARK: The program in Erie

County, a person successfully completes it.

What do they get out of that other than the

obvious benefit of being drug free, we'll

assume? Is the case dismissed? How is the

case itself dealt with?

JUDGE BOZZA: Well, no, it's not dismissed, as far as I know. The case is actually simply brought to conclusion. have to, I believe -- and I may not be completely up to date on this because this program has gone through, you know, revisions over time, and I'm not directly involved in it, but I believe what happens is that the individuals typically plead guilty to the They would normally be expected to go events. Instead of jail, they're placed on to jail. They're placed on probation for probation. varying lengths of time. If they complete the program, I believe then that they are released from their probation.

1	MEMBER CLARK: With your article
2	I'm clear that you think that the courts have
3	basically undermined the role of the judge
4	traditionally.
5	JUDGE BOZZA: Yes.
6	MEMBER CLARK: Do you think that
7	there's a way that the courts can be salvaged
8	to restore the judge's traditional role?
9	JUDGE BOZZA: Do you mean in those
10	places where there are drug courts?
11	MEMBER CLARK: Correct.
12	JUDGE BOZZA: Yes, yes.
13	MEMBER CLARK: How? What would
14	that look like?
15	JUDGE BOZZA: Well, I think, first
16	and foremost, what you do is you remove the
17	judge as a therapist. The judge cannot be the
18	treatment provider, cannot be the therapist
19	and be the adjudicator. It's like saying what
20	we really ought to do is we ought to have
21	psychiatrists and then have them be the judge.
22	Let's let them treat the patient and then when

they're finished treating the patient, they

can determine what happens to them, what the

government's role will continue to be.

I mean, I think there's a fundamental problem, a fundamental inconsistency, and what we all need to understand, I believe, about the drug court notion, the specialty court notion is that we are talking about an effort to systematically use the court as a vehicle for changing behavior.

Now, I would be the first to suggest that that enterprise has only modest success, but I would also be the first to argue that as the technology of changing behavior improves, and I believe it will, success will improve, and when success improves in that undertaking, the role of the judge in my view will be even more critically compromised.

Now, I should tell you I have written about this as well in an article

published in 2002 with a bit of a different

twist to it that has to do with the dangers of

advocating treatment as the outcome in the

judicial system. So they're related and

importantly related topics.

with one of the conclusions in the article
that I've got. We've heard some testimony in
the other locations we've been to that there's
some who feel that the financial resources,
the money that is being used and devoted to
the drug courts would be better spent if it
was placed earlier in the system before the
individuals came in contact with the criminal
justice system.

What do you think?

JUDGE BOZZA: I doubt it because, first of all, I doubt that the government would spend that money wisely in that regard either, quite frankly. I mean, you know, it's common for us to say if we took the money from there and put it over there, it will work out

fine, but there's some assumptions about that
which tend to be a little bit optimistic.

So I doubt just taking in a lot of money, which is actually in relative terms it's a fairly small amount of money, that it would really do much good at the front end.

And the reason I tell you this, in fact, has to do with the fundamental notion of drug courts. That is to say that they are interested in presenting to defendants the opportunity to participate in treatment, something we call treatment.

The notion is that we must have some strategies that effectively change behavior, and if we apply those strategies, that behavior will, in fact, go away. We know that that is true only to a degree, and that degree is not nearly what we would like it to be.

And so if you move that to the front end, you still have the same limitations on the technology of behavioral change there

- 1 that you did at the other end. There's 2 nothing different about that. Drug courts do 3 nothing to improve the efficacy of treatment. Science is what we depend on to tell us about 5 treatment. 6 If the science doesn't improve, 7 then our efficacy to use it can only improve 8 to a certain degree. 9 MEMBER CLARK: Do you think given 10 the degree that drug courts are successful for 11 a certain number of participants and that the 12 number of course we have in place or would you 13 advocate abolishing them? JUDGE BOZZA: I would advocate 14 15 their adopting the approach that we adopted here in Erie County under the sanction 16 certainty notion, with significant 17
- 19 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Judge, let me
  20 ask you this. If the ability to successfully
  21 treat people with alcohol and chemical
  22 dependency improved, if the efficacy of those

modifications.

1 programs and our ability to actually do 2 treatment substantially improved such that we 3 were to some degree of certainty able to 4 scientifically know that we could treat 5 people, where in society should that be housed, be placed? 6 7 Whose role is it? Whose job is 8 I'm assuming that we don't think it 9 should be judges in courts. 10 JUDGE BOZZA: No, I don't. 11 believe it's the correctional system's role, 12 and I mean, that's a whole other issue, but I 13 believe that the justice system works well when it stays focused on what it really 14 15 accomplishes or what it is intended to 16 accomplish, I should say, and that I believe 17 is this. 18 We feel very strongly that government control of human behavior --19 20 (Pause in proceedings with 21 videoconference technical interruption) 22 JUDGE BOZZA: -- roughly defined,

- but at the very least it is a matter of the
- 2 government controlling --
- 3 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Judge, can you
- 4 hear me? Judge, can you hear me?
- JUDGE BOZZA: Yes.
- 6 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: I hate to tell
- 7 you this, but we lost the last minute of what
- 8 you were saying.
- 9 JUDGE BOZZA: Okay.
- 10 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: So if you
- 11 could just start that thought over we'd
- 12 appreciate it.
- JUDGE BOZZA: You probably didn't
- 14 miss much.
- 15 (Laughter.)
- JUDGE BOZZA: And many people here
- 17 would agree with that.
- 18 What I was trying to get at it
- 19 this. You know, the justice system itself is
- intended to bring responsibility to people who
- 21 we believe are responsible for engaging in
- behavior that we don't like, and we punish

- them. That's what we do. We punish them in all matters of way. We punish them by hurting them. We punish them by changing them. We punish them.
- So that's what the system is

  designed to do. It's accountability, and so

  I believe that really the fundamental issue

  here is how we should deviate from that.

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Let me give you an example. Any time I have somebody who appears in front of me who has some profound problem that we see as explaining criminal behavior, we try to come up with a solution for them, and we ordinarily say that we're going to do that by trying to rehabilitate you.

Rehabilitation is a form of punishment because it's the government telling the person we're going to change you. That's sort of the bottom line of what we do.

Now, we may not be good at it. We may do it in a very uneven sort of light, but that's what we do. That is what we do.

Now, if there comes a time when,
in fact, science teaches us how to change
behavior predictably, efficiently, this raises
very large jurisprudential issues from our
point of view on how we proceed. Does that,
therefore, mean that when we put individuals
in the correction system one way, they will
come out another way, whether they want it or

not?

require their cooperation, that would be effective use of science, and if that's where we want to go, if that's what society says we want to do, then I believe that needs to be done in the correctional system in the executive branch of government so that -- and then the critical point of this sort of long speech -- so that judges can watch that process closely and see what the government is doing in making sure that, in fact, if we're in the business of behavior change, we do it in a way that meets our jurisprudential

1	requirements. I think that's critical.
2	MEMBER BERNHARD: Can I ask a
3	question at some point?
4	MEMBER CLARK: Yes, go ahead.
5	MEMBER BERNHARD: Hi. I'm Adele
6	Bernhard, and you're really thinking a lot
7	about the role of the judge and the role of
8	the court, and I tend to agree with everything
9	that you've said, but I'm wondering why are
10	these courts then so popular with judges.
11	What's going on that makes this whole
12	enterprise so very attractive?
13	JUDGE BOZZA: Well, you know, this
14	is a question I've thought about quite a bit,
15	and you know, the bottom line is this.
16	Whether you as advocates for your clients can
17	see this or not, the business of judging can
18	be very difficult because we see very little
19	success.
20	MEMBER BERNHARD: Right.

experience significant changes in behavior of

JUDGE BOZZA: Seldom do we

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- the people that we are sentencing. I think
  there is a burning desire, a really very
  positive desire to see people change, to see
  success.
- So when we come along and we offer
  to judges something that we feel is a success,
  we present it as a success, it's easily
  understood that we latch onto it, that we
  really want to give it a whirl. We want to
  see people change, and we want to have a role
  in that.
- I think that is the general feeling that many, many judges have.
- MEMBER BERNHARD: Well, and we
  don't want to really lose that positive
  engagement. At the same time there are
  definitely problems with the way the courts
  are structured.
- JUDGE BOZZA: Yeah, I agree. I
  mean, I do think there are alternatives, but
  I don't see them on the horizon.
- 22 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Judge, as

we've found as we've gone around the country
that there's never enough time to engage as
thoroughly as we would like with people who
come to us.

We've got one last set of questions from one of our members, and so I'm going to let him go ahead and ask that question.

MEMBER SCHUMM: Judge, under the sanction certainty model that you wrote about, that's part of probation. So there's still a conviction at the end. Would that be necessary or would it be possible that someone — is there any reason someone would have to have a conviction still?

JUDGE BOZZA: No, no. In Erie

County or in Pennsylvania, I should say, we
have a program. It's called the accelerated
rehabilitative disposition program. The
shortened acronym is ARD, and that is the
dominate pretrial diversion program in
Pennsylvania, and so that is available to

first time offenders. They're placed on

probation, and if they successfully complete

it, they can, in fact, have their charges

dismissed. In fact, they are dismissed. It

isn't an option.

This model could be very easily used in that setting. Now, I would recommend, strongly recommend that if there's a sanction certainty approach going to be taken that it be a lot more sophisticated than the one we're using, and its chances of helping would be improved greatly, but it does not require a conviction. A conviction could be one of the incentives.

MEMBER SCHUMM: And when you

mention success, is that no arrest for

anything for a certain length of time? I

mean, how do you define success? For a hard

core drug user, isn't success maybe getting

their life mostly back on track?

JUDGE BOZZA: From my point of

view, within the court, not within the drug

1 and alcohol community, not within the broader 2 community, within the court community, my 3 belief is that success is that the person does not commit anymore crimes. The only reason that individual is here is because of criminal 5 behavior. They're not here because he's a bad 6 7 They're not here because they have mental health problems. They're here because 8 9 they've committed crimes. We are a crime 10 responding to entity. That's what the courts 11 do because if you committed a crime, then you are convicted of that. We actually say you 12 13 You get punished. That's the notion did it. 14 of the justice system. 15 So I really do believe that we, the court, see our role as keeping people 16 within the limited ability we have -- I have 17 to say that -- limited ability we have to keep 18 19 them from committing crimes. 20 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Last question, 21 yes, last question.

MEMBER YOUNG: Okay. Do you think

1 that the way that your sanction certainty 2 program has been implemented in Erie County is 3 a viable alternative to drug court or what are 4 your limitations? 5 JUDGE BOZZA: I think it is I 6 wouldn't say viable alternative because I 7 believe what it is is drug court. It's drug 8 court transposed. It's drug court without the 9 judge. It's exactly the same theory being 10 used without the judge's direct involvement and without compromising the role of the 11 12 players. 13 And so it's not so much it's an alternative. It's the concept in a different 14 15 setting. They do exactly the same thing in sanction certainty as the drug court does with 16 the judge, the same thing: use sanctions, use 17 18 rewards. You use it in a way that is a part

21 MEMBER YOUNG: Can it be more

of whatever the science says it should be

22 broadly applied beyond --

done.

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1 JUDGE BOZZA: Absolutely. There's 2 no question it is a simple concept, and it is almost without additional cost. I mean, one 3 4 of the phenomenal things about this whole 5 approach is it is so cheap to use this 6 approach. It requires so little in the way of 7 added bureaucracy that it should be broadly 8 attractive, but unfortunately, sometimes the 9 programs that are adopted and most attractive 10 are the ones that get, quote, funded. 11 need money. 12 Once they need money, someone is 13 going to be giving it out, and therefore, someone is there to receive it. And so I 14 15 believe that the sanction certainty model can 16 be sold as an approach to doing just what you're doing in drug court with almost no 17 18 expense, very easily managed, but I think it's something that could be done in most places. 19 20 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Judge Bozza, 21 thank you so much for taking the time out of 22 your day to have this conversation, to bring

- 1 your voice and your ideas to this
- 2 conversation. We greatly appreciate it.
- JUDGE BOZZA: You're very welcome.
- 4 It's nice to meet all of you. We should get
- 5 together like this more often.
- 6 (Laughter.)
- 7 JUDGE BOZZA: A wonderful
- 8 technology. It's ideal.
- 9 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you.
- JUDGE BOZZA: Thank you. Good
- 11 luck to you.
- 12 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you.
- 13 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter
- 14 went off the record at 12:22 p.m.
- 15 and went back on the record at
- 16 12:26 p.m.)
- 17 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: All right. We
- are inevitably slightly behind, but not
- 19 hopelessly so. So if I can get everyone to be
- 20 quiet, we will start the next panel.
- 21 We have with us now Terrence
- 22 Walton, who is the Director of Treatment at

- the D.C. Pretrial Services Agency and Spurgeon
- 2 Kennedy, who was the Director of Research,
- Analysis and Development at the same D.C.
- 4 Pretrial Services Agency.
- 5 Welcome. We are pleased to have
- 6 you and look forward to an engaging
- 7 conversation. The way that we work is that
- 8 one of us is responsible to lead the
- 9 questioning of each panel, and for this
- 10 particular panel that's going to be Marvin
- 11 Schechter, but before we get to Marvin's
- 12 questioning, I'd like to give each of you the
- opportunity to take five minutes or so and
- give us the benefit of your professional
- 15 experience and the work that you're currently
- doing.
- 17 So having said that, the floor is
- 18 yours. You can decide amongst yourself who
- 19 will go first, but we're excited to have this
- 20 conversation.
- 21 MR. KENNEDY: Well, first off,
- 22 good afternoon and thank you for the chance to

- 1 present this information.
- I've always been told as a speaker
- 3 there are two places that you never want to
- 4 be. One is before lunch; one is after lunch.
- 5 So with that I'll try to be as brief and
- 6 hopefully --
- 7 PARTICIPANT: You're doing at
- 8 lunch.
- 9 (Laughter.)
- MR. KENNEDY: We'll try to be as
- 11 brief and as informative as we can.
- 12 As you mentioned, my name is
- 13 Spurgeon Kennedy. I'm currently Director of
- Research, Analysis and Development with the
- 15 D.C. Pretrial Services Agency. It is one of
- the largest pretrial programs in the country
- 17 and one of the most comprehensive. D.C.
- 18 Pretrial Services manages close to 24,000
- 19 defendants on pretrial supervision, diversion,
- and a few actually sentenced in the District
- of Columbia. We serve both the D.C. Superior
- 22 Court and the U.S. District Court for D.C.

1 We have done a great many programs 2. in the 46 years or so that we've been in 3 existence. Three of those programs are problem solving initiatives: our drug court, 5 which we began in 1993; our community court, which I believe we started in 2003; and our 7 mental health diversion court, which started back in 2008 -- 2007. I'm sorry. Time flies 8 9 when you're having fun. What we found is what I think a 10 lot of American communities have found who 11 have been forced to sort of become 12 13 laboratories for new and different approaches as case loads have increased, as prisoners 14 15 have come back from prisons and resources have become scarce. 16 17 You've got to be smart, as smart 18

as you are tough when it comes to crime, and for many defendants, the smarter approach isn't the traditional let's arrest them, let's prosecute them, let's throw them in jail or put them on probation until they screw up, but

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- 1 rather to address the root causes of crime.
- 2 And for many defendants in our city and
- 3 nationwide those causes are substance abuse,
- 4 mental health related.
- 5 We have in our specialty courts a
- 6 population of defendants that traditionally
- 7 have responded to these special programs.
- 8 They have responded to treatment. They have
- 9 done well. They have graduated. They have
- shown a reduction in drug use. They have
- shown better functioning in mental health.
- 12 There are things about our
- programs that have really found over the years
- 14 that these are alternatives that actually work
- 15 to the extent that I don't believe that they
- should be alternatives anymore. I have always
- 17 believed that if you really want something to
- 18 fail, call it an alternative. Make it
- something that only gets used when it has to
- 20 be used. We can't put more people in the
- jails. So we have to do pretrial services,
- and once the jail builds new beds or once it

becomes less filled, then we'll go back to
business as usual.

You have to take alternatives and make them the thing that you do. One of the failures, I think, of this movement has been a reluctance to take the alternative and make it something that everyone in the system benefits from it. There's no reason after 20 years that drug courts should still only handle the small number of people that they handle. The precepts of drug court, the benefits of drug court ought to be open to far more defendants.

In Washington, D.C., for example, our drug court managed about 369 people throughout the year. We have another treatment program that managed close to 900.

It's a smaller number. Those defendants go through the same treatment. They go through the same sanction space scheme. They present themselves the same way that drug court defendants do. They don't have the luxury

1	though	of	the	same	benefits	of	drug	court.
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2 Fortunately, in our city about a third of our criminal bench have served on the 3 4 drug court. So they have created their own 5 diversion programs. That doesn't happen in 6 other jurisdictions. For the movement to 7 really succeed and to sort of go into the next 8 generation, I really think it has to stop 9 thinking of itself as a movement, and that 10 might be a little tough. It's get out of your 11 comfort level and show what you've learned to 12 the rest of the criminal justice system so 13 that defendants who aren't lucky enough to 14 qualify for drug court can still get the 15 benefits that we've seen over the years at drug courts and that kind of thing. 16 17

Thank you.

18 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you.

19 MR. WALTON: Good afternoon.

20 Again, I'm Terrence Walton, Director of

Treatment for the D.C. Pretrial Services 21

22 Agency.

1 I'm delighted to be here. There's 2 nothing I like more than talking about 3 treatment and, in particular, I enjoy talking about drug court treatment, something I've 5 done for almost the last ten years. I've been in the treatment field first as a practitioner 7 and then as an administrator and things of 8 that nature for the last 22 years. I guess 9 that's right. As you can imagine, I must have 10 started when I was very, very young to have 11 been here so on. But I'm in a good position because 12 13 I began my field, my career working in the private sector, in the non-criminal justice 14 15 setting, treatment settings that are much more traditional without the benefit of a judge, a 16 sanction contract, and the like, and things 17 went well there. 18

Then I transitioned to D.C.'s drug court in 1999 and this is my first exposure to a court involved, quasi-coercive treatment, and so I am happy to answer questions about

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the differences, having worked as a practitioner and administrator in both environments.

At D.C. Pretrial, I am also in a fortunate position because, of course, we're a supervision agency, but we're also an agency that provides, that facilitates drug treatment for criminal defendants, but we don't just facilitate treatment. We also operate, as Spurgeon referenced, operate our own intensive out-patient treatment program where our case managers, our supervision officers are licensed and/or certified addiction specialists, and they provide a full fledged, intensive out-patient treatment program for both our drug court population and the other program that Spurgeon referenced.

And so it gives me an opportunity
to really get an up close view of at least
from a practitioner's point of view, and a
sort of on the street point of view whether or
not treatment works and whether or not drug

court treatment works as opposed to other models, and I'm happy to answer questions about my observations there.

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One of the things that also has given me some additional insight is the fact that I am also on the faculty of the National Drug Court Institute, and so I've spent some time traveling the country helping to establish drug courts and helping to set them So I certainly have an opinion, and I am certainly an advocate, but I also understand that drug court isn't right for every person, for every defendant, and my expertise is treatment. And so my perspective is whether or not treatment works, and when it works, how it works, and if we establish that treatment does or doesn't work, and I think that it does a lot of the time but not always, then the question is does drug court treatment work. Is there anything about the drug court model which either makes treatment more likely to be successful or less likely?

1	And the kinds of questions that
2	often come up is the coercive nature, the loss
3	of some confidentiality, the involvement of at
4	least external forces. Does that somehow
5	interfere with the kind of internal lasting
6	change we want? And I'm happy to talk about
7	my observations about those in response to
8	your questions.
9	And so that's who I am. I do
10	treatment, but I work in a law enforcement
11	agency. So I'm certainly able to answer those
12	issues also, but I'm especially here to talk
13	about the treatment aspects and how drug
14	courts impact those.
15	Thank you.
16	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Great. Thank
17	you.
18	Marvin.
19	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Mr.
20	Walton, I guess we'll start with you. Our
21	last speaker made the following statement.
22	Let me quote it to you. "Drug courts do

- nothing to improve the efficacy of treatment,"
- 2 unquote.
- 3 Do you agree with that or disagree
- 4 with it?
- 5 MR. WALTON: No, I disagree with
- it, and I'll do it from two perspectives.
- 7 I'll do it first from my observation having
- been a practitioner, and I'll talk about just
- 9 a little bit about what some of the research
- shows, and Spurgeon can talk about research
- 11 from our agency perspective, but I can address
- sort of a larger perspective, I suppose.
- 13 As I mentioned, I began in the
- setting that wasn't a drug court model, and
- there were lots of people certainly who got
- 16 better in that respect, but my observation in
- 17 moving to the drug court treatment model is
- that there is in most cases nothing about the
- drug court model which really impedes the
- 20 effectiveness of treatment.
- Now, when treatment doesn't work,
- it doesn't work for the same reasons that it

- doesn't work in any environment, either
- 2 because of the readiness level of the
- 3 participant or the program is not providing
- 4 the kind of treatment that is needed to match
- 5 the needs that come in the door.
- 6 The biggest struggle I had before
- 7 I switched to my current setting was getting
- 8 individuals to show up and to keep showing up
- 9 long enough for it to kick in, to stay engaged
- 10 long enough for it to work.
- 11 You know, treatment is designed
- for people who are dependent, for people who
- are addicts, and so, my goodness, those first
- 14 few days and weeks can be awful trying not to
- use, and so many times people simply stop
- 16 coming, and it's just too hard, and that's
- 17 where drug court has been helpful. Because
- 18 people have a real incentive, a carrot and a
- 19 stick to help them stay engaged just long
- 20 enough for it to work, and so that is the
- 21 biggest difference that I've seen.
- 22 Now, again, it's all about whether

the treatment is effective or not, whether or 1 2. not the treatment is well structured, whether it's evidence based, whether it is designed 3 properly. Those things being equal, then I 5 far prefer the model where we have the involvement of the court, the involvement of 7 defense attorneys sometimes encouraging people that this is a good deal for you, try and make 8 9 this work, the involvement of other players to 10 help make it happen. 11 The other part is I hope that someone has talked about the Georgia Law 12 13 Review article. Has it been referenced yet in your hearings? 14 15 This is the Georgia Law Review, Spring 2008, Volume 42, Number 3. 16 I'll have it here at the end to look at it. 17 It has an excellent article called "Drug Treatment 18

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Courts in the 21st Century: The Evolution of

the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, "co-

authored by retired Judge Peggy Hora or

California and defense attorney Theodore

1 Stalcup, also from California.

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2. And there's lots of good stuff in 3 here, b ut one thing in particular that I thought was interesting is that references, 5 without going into detail, but it references a couple of pieces of research which address 7 this issue, and I'm quoting now from page 752, where it describes that "evidence indicates 8 9 that substance abusers mandated to receive 10 treatment benefit as much and sometimes more 11 than substance abusers who spontaneously elect 12 to enter treatment."

And that was based on a piece of research, a five-year outcome study done by John F. Kelly and his colleagues called "Substance Abuse Disorder Patients who Are Mandated to Treatment: Characteristics of the Treatment Process." They looked at one year and five year outcomes, looking at abstinence and, I believe, evidences of recidivism.

The last thing that I will quote also from Judge Hora's article in the Georgia

Law Review is the issue about sort of 1 2. recidivism rates following drug court 3 treatment. Because at the end of the day, while I'm in this business because I believe 5 it's good to help people get clean and sober, I'm in this business because I want to help 7 people break free. I believe addiction is bondage, and I believe that I'm a liberator. 8 9 That's why I'm in this business. 10 But I work for D.C. Pretrial, and 11 our business is helping to protect public 12 safety, and one way we do that is by 13 addressing the kinds of issues that we believe contribute to defendants being unable to 14 15 observe the conditions of their release, including the requirement to do all they can 16 not to get rearrested. 17 And so the Urban Institute did a 18 19 study looking at recidivism rates for drug 20 court graduates that was published in 2003, and they found that in the first year 21

following drug court treatment nationwide, 85

percent of offenders had no new arrest. 1 Two 2. years out, 73 percent of offenders who 3 graduate, by the way, had no re-arrest, and I don't have in front of me the comparison data, 5 but my observation in the field is that those are significantly better recidivism rates than 6 7 we see in other environments. So, again, that's some of the 8 9 research that I've seen, but frankly, my real 10 observation is from my experience. 11 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Let me

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ask. I assume that you've attended staffing sessions at drug courts in your experience.

What do you think is the proper role of the defense attorney in those staffing sessions?

MR. KENNEDY: Oh, boy, that's a good question. I hate those staffing sessions, and I'll tell you why. They're not staffing sessions in the usual sense of people getting together to figure out what is not

appropriate for defendants' continued success

anyone who has been in the group will tell you, there's no such thing as a group of equals.

You don't get people together with equal stature, with equal interest, and with equal importance and go, "Tell me what you think." Usually what happens is that one voice, one dominant person can run a group, and persons either gravitate to that or they don't.

The tendency that I've seen, and the limited ones, and surely I've not gone to as many as Terrence has, to sort of go to the mean, and sometimes the mean is the voice of the judge, and that is not always the most articulate voice when it comes to treatment need and what that person, that defendant, should have in his or her protocol.

The defense attorney is really in a precarious position, I think, in these meetings. I don't think that you ever stop being an advocate, even when you're part of

this team. As a defense attorney, you cannot say to yourself, "I no longer represent this person."

And when a group is telling you that, you know what, two days in jail is what this guy needs to stop using drugs, when you look at the research out there that shows that it's not the severity of the sanction but the certainty of the sanction that matters; that you could do something a little less stringent and get the same result, it's tough to be a team player and go, "No, I don't want to do that."

But as a defense attorney, I think you have to. I know what the staffings are about. I know what they're trying to do, but I think they really put defense attorneys in an almost untenable position of wanting to be part of what you're trying to accomplish, but still being the voice of the defendant, the defendant, not the treatment person but the defendant in that room, and I'm not sure if

- 1 there's a real answer to that.
- 2 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Mr.
- 3 Walton, do you agree?
- 4 MR. WALTON: Not entirely. I

5 certainly agree that there are staffings that

6 go all kinds of ways, but I've also seen

7 staffings where it was very difficult to tell

8 until the end who exactly was the judge there

and who was the defense attorney because there

10 was a very open discussion about what's best

in this case, and we did a little exercise

trying to guess who was who and many of us

were wrong.

14 That's when it works like it

should work because that's the intention. But

16 the role of the defense attorney, again,

17 certainly it's advocated. There's no question

about that, but if the drug court model is

19 properly designed, the defendant entered that

20 program with full consent, full knowledge,

able to consult with his attorney or an

22 attorney who understands drug court, and a

decision has been made that this is a good deal for you.

I, first of all, do not believe
that drug courts are good deals for people who
don't need drug treatment. I just don't. I
think that while certainly it might be a good
legal deal, but I think it's abusing the
model, and drug court isn't easy to do. So it
really ought to be for individuals whose drug
involvement is such that they need help to
stop.

And so assuming that the person coming into drug court has had good counsel and the decision has been made, good advice has been given from the attorney about if this is the right option for you, and the defendant has consented and is able to consent that this is what I want to do, then the primary role, I believe, of the defense attorney during the staff meeting is to be sure that the terms of the, quote, almost like sort of a plea agreement really, but the terms of the deal

1 are being met; that my defendant, my client is 2 being treated as per the agreement; that if, 3 for instance, someone is pushing for this person to be removed from drug court, which is 5 sometimes the case, to be put out of drug 6 court and be put into regular case processing 7 because they're taking too long to get it together, the attorney should be advocating. 8 9 "Wait a minute. This is drug treatment court. 10 This is why he's here. Look. He's done this, " trying to see the sessions he's 11 attended, not just the ones he didn't attend, 12 13 advocating in much the same way that you do in other environments because the decision has 14 15 been made that this is the right program for this individual. 16 I don't think -- and while I 17 certainly understand the dilemma -- I don't 18 19 think it is that a defense attorney should 20 necessarily feel obligated to argue against a 21 couple day jail sanction. Now, if, in fact,

the jail sanction as in some programs is much

longer where it almost resembles a sentence,

30 days or more, then certainly the attorney,

you know, might want to argue that this is

excessive. This person needs to be in

treatment, not in jail, and this is contrary

to the model is an appropriate discussion to

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have.

So, again, I believe the attorney is about being sure the deal is being kept, looking at all the facts and while not trying to shield the client from all of the sanctions because that's the model, and that's sort of how it all works, but to be sure that the sanctions are being distributed fairly and in proportion and based on the individual attorney's knowledge of what happens in that court.

18 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Let me ask
19 both of you tow related questions. In the
20 drug courts you're familiar with or the
21 problem-solving courts, who determines the
22 eligibility requirements for people coming in?

And the literature that we've 1 2. looked at makes reference to a concept called 3 "creaming," which the program are accused really of taking the people who really need 5 the least help and putting them into the drug court system, and they turn out to be success 6 7 stories as opposed to a hard core person. 8 So I want to know have you seen 9 evidence of that not only in the drug courts 10 in your jurisdiction, but anywhere. 11 MR. WALTON: What I have seen is 12 that in most drug courts everywhere, perhaps 13 except here in D.C., that most will not and cannot take violent offenders; that based on 14 15 the terms of the grants that fund them, they can't take them. 16 We don't have that problem in 17 18

We don't have that problem in D.C., by the way, but we're very unique in that respect. So in the sense that if we believe that a lengthy criminal history or violent charges or arrest, if we believe that excluding those individuals is somehow

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creaming them, that certainly happens. Many programs are either the community won't support allowing people with violent offenses or even violent charges to benefit from drug court or the grants don't allow it.

Now, however, I don't think that's the issue. I don't think that there is -- at least I haven't seen evidence to suggest that a drug addict with a less extensive criminal history is any easier to treat than someone with a lower extensive criminal history. I mean, I think that it really is about the severity of addiction.

If you have drug courts who are refusing to take people who have real substance dependence, then that's creaming, and to me that's contrary to the model. I haven't seen that as much.

There's some jurisdictions that don't have enough treatment available. They don't have the liberal residential resources that we have available here and other places.

And so in that sense they can't take certain people because they can't treat them.

3 But to the extent that they should be reaching out to the individual with the 5 most serious substance dependence, most advanced substance dependence that they can 7 treat, that they have the capacity to treat, and so, again, I think that most of the courts 8 9 I have seen, they are treating severe 10 dependent methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, 11 using DUI courts. Many of them are treating alcoholics of many years of dependence. 12

And so I don't think that's a fair charge.

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MR. KENNEDY: One of the more interesting trips I ever took as a consultant was in the late 1990s. I had the chance to go to Birmingham, Alabama, to review two drug treatment programs. One was the drug court. The other one was one run by the TASC Program, the Treatment Alternative to Street Crimes. I think that's what TASC stands for.

1 The TASC Program population was 2. predominantly male, predominantly black, charged with major misdemeanor and felony 3 4 The typical time in treatment was 5 anywhere from one year to about 18 months. The drug court was primarily 6 7 female, primarily white, usually charged with theft and shoplifting crimes, and the average 8 9 time in treatment was three months. 10 Now, I was told that this was a 11 totally random assignment that got those 12 persons into the various categories.

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Are there programs that do this?

Certainly, and I think it's not just drug

courts that are guilty of that. Treatment

programs in general sometimes do that,

especially if your goal is to remain

successful and to be funded. You sort of

minimize the number of people that might make

your reduction rates look worse than what you

that's one random calculator I'd love to get

my hands on one day.

1 want them to be.

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2. The problem is, and I think Terrence has mentioned it, is that a lot of 3 drug courts have not gone beyond the original restrictions that were outlined in the federal 5 grants that started them. I believe back in 7 November 2008, BJA, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, identified about -- I don't know 8 9 -- close to 2000 drug courts in the 50 states 10 here in D.C. and the American territories, and 11 by their admission most of them still abided 12 by the restrictions that were placed on them 13 when they were federal grantees, which means no major felonies, no people with serious 14 15 criminal histories. It's almost here's your 16 population. Now, that's a great population to 17 start a pilot program.

You know, if you're short of money and you want to start small and gradually work your way up, that's the good way of doing it.

The problem is most drug courts have started small in mind and stayed that way. They're

very comfortable with the populations that
they're using right now, and there's not a lot
of inclination by these programs to expand.

Now, what we're finding in D.C., and again, Terrence is correct, is that if you look at treatment results and what people do before and after treatment and doing treatment by charge, simply by what you're charged with and what your previous criminal history has been, there's absolutely no difference at all. A person who is addicted to heroin who gets treatment will do better in our sanctions based programs no matter what got them in the criminal justice system.

To have that as a restriction, as we still do, 14 years after being established is something that we should not be very proud of. Again, most drug courts have not moved beyond the initial populations, and that's one of the real sticking points and one of the issues that has to be addressed if these are going to stop being boutique courts and really

start being things that are very good and useful for the entire system.

MR. WALTON: Let me add I think that's exactly right, and I think that this is where advocacy is important here, even advocacy at the policy level, because even the most recent grants that have come out of BJA and SAMHSA for drug courts and other problemsolving courts, every one of them included the restrictions against violent offense and histories, every one of them, at least the ones that I was involved in reviewing.

So I think that Kenny is correct, that that is an area where if I were a part of a drug court team and helping to establish eligibility criteria, I'd be pushing to open that some, you know, unless the fund is prohibited.

To answer the first part of your question, that eligibility criteria is supposed to be set through a collaboration of the players on the team, the USAO. The

prosecutors always have a role there, of course, but the defense attorney should also be involved, the judge, and others involved, stakeholders, to figure out based on our community how wide can we spread this net.

If the intention is to have some impact on public safety, it certainly makes sense that you want to reach out to the drug addicted men and women who appear to be most involved in serious crimes if you can.

MR. KENNEDY: Domestic violence defendants, just to give you an example, have a prevalence of mental health issues and also alcohol and drug issues. That almost goes hand in hand with those particular kinds of crimes.

Bureau of Justice Assistance initially when it set up problem solving courts, particularly the mental health courts, openly discussed excluding domestic violence offenses because politically they didn't want this to be seen as a break, of someone who is

charged with these kinds of offenses and not going through the adjudicating process.

Again, you're taking a population that has a pronounced need that can be addressed by these courts and saying, "Nah, I'd rather not." And as long as that attitude is out there, as long as we are okay with saying that this person is a good candidate, but politically they just don't suit you very well. You're always going to have these specialty courts as specialty courts, and I think that's the shame of the movement so far.

MEMBER YOUNG: Judge Bozza had set up as I understand it in Erie County, is addressing treatment, but more from the probation officer perspective, that is, either after conviction, but obviously you could go back on a violation, and I'm trying to get a sense from you because you say that the fact that there is the coercion element to keep someone in a program exists for your pretrial and drug court.

1	Would the same factors play in if
2	it were a probation type treatment? And
3	therefore, you know, our concerns on the
4	criminal justice end are sort of dealt with
5	before they get into the probation part.
6	You only do pre-conviction work;
7	is that correct?
8	MR. KENNEDY: Pretrial.
9	MEMBER YOUNG: In the D.C.
10	Probation Department, do they have the same
11	kind of drug court type treatment programs and
12	what's their success or not?
13	MR. WALTON: Well, they do. They
14	do. There is a probation court called Star
15	HITDA, and I don't know what the Star name is
16	for, Star HITDA, and then there is a sort of
17	reentry court called Saint HITDA. They have
18	a similar model. I unfortunately don't know
19	what their success rates are like.
20	What I do know though is that
21	while they are similar models, in the Star
22	HITDA and Stain HITDA programs there really

1 isn't a single drug court judge. They use our 2 drug court judge for sanctions, but there is 3 no single judge who handles status hearings and those kind of things and to sort of 5 develop that rapport. 6 And so at least in D.C. and on the 7 probation and reentry points --8 MEMBER YOUNG: Or maybe supervised 9 release. 10 MR. WALTON: That's right. 11 they don't have the benefit of the full model, 12 and I think you may be hearing from Judge 13 Rankin later on, who was our drug court judge for two years, and he has some real opinions 14 about that and about how the lack of the 15 regular judicial involvement he can tell the 16 17 difference. I don't know the other model you 18 19 referred to, but was the judge less involved 20 in what you just referenced? 21 MEMBER YOUNG: Correct. He's the 22 judge that if there is a probation violation,

1 it goes forward, but he's saying he thought 2 that most of that sanction and the imposition 3 of sanctions, I guess, being delegated within 4 the probation department, his opinion or, you 5 know, what research they had seemed to indicate it was as effective as the other 7 model. 8 MR. WALTON: Well, that may be 9 The part that concerns me though is not true. 10 the judge's presence to sanction, but the 11 incentive nature. You know, listen. 12 drug court graduations, and every one I've 13 seen around the country, and I do about 30 a

year, that those who graduate they spend -
MEMBER YOUNG: It's all about the

change.

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MR. WALTON: They reference the judge, not the poor case manager who has struggled with them day after day. They talk about the judge, you know, how making -- you know, Judge, when you stepped me back and I really didn't care, it just -- and Kenny knows

1 the research better than I do, but it 2 certainly seems like the judge appears to be 3 a hugely important role. Maybe it's a fatherly or motherly figure. I don't know 5 what it is, but a hugely important role to those who actually succeed. 6 7 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Going 8 along the same lines about judges, can the 9 judge who is so invested in the client, not 10 only as a judge but as a therapist really, a father figure if you want, mother figure, can 11 that person also be an adjudicator of that 12 13 individual if they fail or should it be somebody different? 14 15 MR. KENNEDY: No, I think that 16 it's very possible for judges to remain both the judicial figure and also a dominant person 17 in the treatment. I think the truth is the 18 19 fact that we've had 20 judges throughout the 20 history of our drug court who seem to have 21 done the trick here at least locally.

One of the things that I tell drug

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1 court advocates, and I get varying responses 2 about it, is that the problem-solving 3 initiatives really aren't new. Pretrial 4 diversion, for example, predates drug courts 5 by a good 20 years. A lot of those diversion programs are almost split. 6 Some were 7 exclusively administrative, and some require 8 you to go back to a judge before recommending 9 a person's graduation or termination. 10 And what we found early on with 11 those diversion programs was, as Terrence mentioned, there is a difference when the 12 13 judge is involved, and what seems to be the

those diversion programs was, as Terrence mentioned, there is a difference when the judge is involved, and what seems to be the difference is (a) you have someone who cares about you, but you also know that there's somebody in the room that can actually do something both bad to you if you don't comply with the rules.

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If you listen to defendants at graduation, if you look at focus groups that have been conducted and the research that has come out of it, defendants are telling us that

there are some specific elements to drug

courts and problem-solving courts that are

effective with them. The judge, their

relationship with other defendants in those

groups, the relationship to the case managers,

those persons who work with them day in and

day out, those are the things that drive them.

They have their own varying levels of readiness for treatment, but if you give them people who show that they care, if you give them a structure that they have to do, if you give them a person who will root for them, but at the same time lay the hammer down when it needs to be laid down, I think that's an effective thing.

There is something about having a judge in the process. Does that judge have to be the central figure? I would argue that, but having a point of authority in treatment certainly goes a long way to making treatment better.

22 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Two prior

speakers here today said the following: one, that they've looked at these courts from the eight American Bar Associations, and they find

these courts to be standardless.

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Two, we had Judge Bozza tell us that these courts varied from state to state and county to county.

You say they have to stop being an alternative court and stop being a movement and become part of the mainstream.

So here's my question. Would you support a recommendation that all problemsolving courts adhere to a set of general standards no matter where they're located in the United States and no matter what the type of problem is, with variation for a mental health court versus a drug court or DUI court, but that they must have set standards before they can be effective and used, as you would have it, part of the mainstream.

21 MR. KENNEDY: For full disclosure,
22 I'm a liaison member with the American Bar

- Association's Standards Committee on 1 Diversion. So of course my answer is going to 2 3 be yes to that. 4 (Laughter.) 5 MR. KENNEDY: If you look at --6 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: 7 good. 8 MR. KENNEDY: If you look at every 9 major segment of the criminal justice system, 10 the attorneys, the prosecutors, judges, 11 pretrial programs, probation programs, they have a set of written standards. 12 It's not 13 something that you fight over. It's not something that you debate. You have a set of 14 15 standards that people read, agree on, and at least if you don't follow every single one, 16
- The fact that 20 years after the
  first drug court was implemented that the drug
  court movement itself has shied away from
  standards I think is inexcusable. The drug

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page.

you at least know that we are all on the same

courts have what I believe they call the ten
key components, and if you ask a lot of
advocates, ah, those are just a -- they're
not.

You should have standards that say this is what a drug court is, this is what it should try to accomplish. These are the kinds of defendants that need to go into the courts, and this is the kind of data that you need to process and maintain to show whether or not you are effective.

I'll go you one better. Drug courts have got to start collecting evaluation and research oriented data. It's surprising how many drug courts cannot tell you the very simple things of how many people went through your program last year, how many people had a reduction in drug use, how many graduated and didn't recidivate within a year's time.

Again, they shied away from this.

Every other part of the criminal justice

system is moving towards performance measure

1 and tracking, research and evaluation. 2 drug court movement has got to come there as 3 well. Any other problem solving courts, too. Standards, performance measures, 5 and data, research designs have got to be the three things that problem-solving courts have 7 got to move to, I think. 8 MR. WALTON: I agree with that. 9 That's a part of bringing drug courts to 10 scale. It really is. That's sort of what the 11 National Association of Drug Court Professionals, that's what they're pushing for 12 13 one way or the other. I would just offer perhaps one 14 15 caveat, and that is that the standards ought to be broad enough to allow for certain 16 differences based on cultural -- we have 17 wellness courts that serve a different 18 19 population, and there are certain -- there 20 will be some differences between rural courts 21 and urban courts. 22 So certainly standards, but that

- are broad enough to allow for some uniqueness in individual stages.
- 3 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Have
  4 either of you had any requests, meetings or
  5 interest from the federal judiciary about
  6 setting up your model or what you do in
  7 federal district courts across the United

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States?

it.

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9 MR. KENNEDY: Years ago, the 10 federal districts actually had two programs, 11 one in the Clinton administration later on, 12 but the latest was called Operation Drug Test 13 where they actually set up drug testing and it's kind of a sanctions based treatment 14 15 regime in some pilot ports. I don't know what I do know that our 16 has gone on at them. agency because we're here in Washington, D.C. 17 and the Administrative Office of the U.S. 18 19 courts is here locally. We have a lot of 20 interaction here with them. I don't know if 21 Terrence has ever been asked to help out with

I haven't, and I don't know where the

1 federal system is with that.

2 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Are either

3 of you familiar at all with the federal

4 sentencing guidelines?

5 MR. KENNEDY: To the extent that

6 we have to be. Our agency is a federal

agency, though we don't handle sentenced

8 defendants. It applies to us a little bit,

9 but not a whole lot.

MEMBER KELLY: Back to the top of standards, why in both of your opinions has the drug court community been so reticent to

13 promulgate standard?

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MR. WALTON: Well, despite the fact that the drug courts have been around since 1989 and many more in the early part of the '90s, it's still a relatively young movement, I believe, and that its focus has been on spreading out as wide as possible, you know, allowing as many, establishing drug

21 courts in as many places around the country

and around the globe as possible.

And part of the way you do that is sort of opening the door pretty widely. You know, I think the ten key components is a great start in that direction and trying to have some consistency. So I think it has been part of the urgency to try and get this out there and get people doing it.

And quite frankly, I think that's healthy. I think we have needed a period, you know, maybe even a couple of decades to sort of do it long enough to say, well, what are the best set of standards to use. So I think it's time for the transition now. I think that in its infancy trying to come in too early with the rigid standards would have stunted the growth of drug courts, and I think that whether they don't approve or not, I think that is sort of the reason why we aren't further along yet.

MR. KENNEDY: I think the other reason, frankly, is neat. The movement has never really needed standards. I'll give you

1 a parallel. Pretrial Services Agencies began in the 1960s. We had our first set of 2. standard in 1977. A lot of that as Terrence 3 has mentioned was the maturation of the 5 movement itself, but also back in 1977 you had 6 a jail crisis. Jails were being overcrowded 7 all over the place. The standards were a nice advertising tool that said to the rest of the 8 9 field, this is well established, well thought 10 of, real alternative to detention pretrial, 11 and standards became almost a nice little 12 advertisement for pretrial programs.

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Drug courts have never really
needed help to be sold. The old drug court
program office pumped money to jurisdictions
to start drug courts. You have judges who are
on board in a lot of these that are effective
salesmen to local funding agencies. You don't
need that nice advertisement that we are real
and we're legitimate because we have standards
the way that other parts of the criminal
justice system may have.

I think now that those funding sources might be drying out a bit, that might prompt the movement a little bit to think about setting down standards that make sense and wide ranging enough to apply to all of the specialty courts going on.

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MR. WALTON: If I could just add one thing, while I don't know the details, I do know that the National Association of Drug Court Professionals is in at least the planning stages of setting up an accreditation program where drug courts can be accredited, and I suspect because of our close relationship with BJA and other funders that at some point that will become a requirement in order to receive grant funding, and that will greatly increase the incentive for establishing and adhering to some standards.

MEMBER KELLY: I want to discuss high risk offenders again. A very cynical person might say that if all of a sudden drug courts started spreading their nets wider and

1 being willing -- strike that.

> A cynical person would say that the reason why drug courts do not spread their nets so widely and bring in the high risk offenders is because they know that they would not treat them as successfully as they would the low risk offenders thereby basically indicting their own methodology and success.

> > How would you respond to that?

10 MR. KENNEDY: Boy, that is

11 cynical.

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12 (Laughter.)

13 I would say my MR. KENNEDY: answer to that would be our programs here 14 15 locally that don't handle drug court defendants, our new directions program, our 16 sanctions based program, our new direction 17 program handles about two and a half times the 18 19 numbers of people that go through drug court. 20

They apply the same sanctions based treatment.

21 One of the things that's missing

22 is the role of the judge, but even though you

1 have a defendant population that is more 2 serious by charge, that usually grades out with our ASI results as more in need of 3 treatment. At the end of the day, you have 5 almost the same percentage of people 6 successfully graduating that program and 7 staying clean on that program as you have in 8 drug court. 9 And I think the reason to that, 10 again, is you figured out what treatment 11 protocol works for that defendant population. 12 Can drug courts expand to more serious defendants and still do what they're doing? 13

If you want to take treatment that might work for the lower end defendants and try it with the seriously addicted defendant, you've got to fail. But if they're willing to open up the treatment regimen, if they're willing to really apply the kinds of services and the kinds of strategies that work for those kinds of defendants, I think they can

In a lot of jurisdictions the answer is no.

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get the same rates of success. It really is
up to what they want to do and what they're
funded to do.

MR. WALTON: To piggy back on that, I agree with what Kenny has said there.

In some ways D.C. is an excellent model to study. Because we are a federal agency that has a congressional allotment, we don't have some of the financial struggles that many courts do. So we are able to make residential treatment widely available.

We have hundreds of defendants in residential treatment right now. So that allows us to treat a more seriously dependent individual, but in looking at criminality and the more serious offenders, in order for drug courts across the board to open their population, we have to do a much better job at the clinical assessment piece because drug court is not designed to treat criminality. It's not designed to treat -- it really is designed to treat individuals who are drug

addicted and whose crimes no matter how 1 2 serious they are, that there is a convincing nexus between the addiction and the criminal 3 behavior. 5 And so we have to become much more 6 sophisticated at clinically assessing and 7 looking for that nexus, and to the extent that we're able to do that, then I believe that 8 9 drug courts would not harm themselves by 10 treating the addicted individual who has very 11 serious charges in criminal history, if indeed a nexus can be found between the criminal 12 13 behavior and the addiction. There are some individuals, you 14

There are some individuals, you know, and I understand I'm talking to defense lawyers, but there are some individuals who, you know, don't need to be in the community in drug court. They need to be, you know, locked up.

20 PARTICIPANTS: No.

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21 MR. WALTON: Drug court is

designed for people, despite how serious their

criminal matters are, for people who are in that situation as a direct or indirect result of their substance dependence.

MEMBER KELLY: And inasmuch as the prosecutors in so many of these drug courts effectively act as gatekeepers, do you think you could get them to buy into that?

MR. WALTON: Well, we've done it here in D.C., but you know, listen. We're 15 years in, and we for many years could have opened up to anyone because we do not have any congressional or even community mandate not to treat violent offenses or charges in drug court, but we haven't. You know, we have used the same kind of restricters as other places until this past year when we have adjusted our criteria.

So this is 15 years in that we finally -- interestingly it was the USAO, the prosecutors, who suggested let's open this up some. Now, we still have certain limits, but we allow almost anyone with the agreement of

1 the U.S. Attorney and the drug court judge.

2 So we haven't been doing it long enough to see

3 how this is going to work out, but for the

first time in 15 years, we're able to consider

5 virtually, virtually any charge and any

6 criminal history as long as the USAO agrees

7 that it's an appropriate drug court candidate

8 and the judge agrees.

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So I think that at least in our jurisdiction, because we happen to have a USAO who really believes in the drug court model and is interested in being able to treat anyone who is truly addicted to the extent we're able to do that.

MR. KENNEDY: I think the lesson
there is sometimes in order to change the
minds of the people in charge you have to
change the people in charge. Terrence
mentioned now our current United States
Attorney is very supportive. He's gone
through the ranks, and he's seen the benefits
of this.

1 He has also seen that judges, as I 2. mentioned before -- about 65 calendar judges. 3 Twenty of them are former drug court judges or 4 community court judges or on the mental health 5 side. They have pretty much established their 6 own, you know, for lack of a better word, 7 under the radar diversion programs. 8 If you go into New Directions and 9 you look a lot like a defendant that goes in 10 drug when accepting the charge, a lot of 11 judges have been saying over the last two 12 years, "Hey, how about dismissing this case or 13 nulling this charge or reducing it down so that the person can get probation and continue 14 15 treatment with our probation authority?" And a lot of prosecutors have been 16 17 saying, "Yes, that's a good idea." I think if the court practice 18 19 helped the prosecuting attorney realize that 20 we were being a bit more restrictive with our 21 drug court guidelines than we really needed to

be and that helped to open it up, we're lucky

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1 in that regard. In jurisdictions where one 2. judge has done drug court forever, one 3 prosecuting attorney has been there since day one, you don't have that mix of the drug court 5 and other calendars so that other people know that there's a benefit there, and they'll keep 7 being cloistered and keeping it as that 8 boutique court really does a lot more harm 9 than does good. 10 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: My refrain is 11 We are sadly out of time. We're the same. going to have one last question from Joel, and 12 13 then we're going to wrap it up. This is for you, 14 MEMBER SCHUMM: 15 Mr. Walton. It's about treatment and sort of the ten principles. How soon after arrest do 16 you think treatment, drug court enrollment 17 needs to occur? 18 19 MR. WALTON: Well, my answer is as soon as possible. What we look at is how soon 20 21 is it happening now through normal court 22 processing, and you want to make significant

1 improvements over that.

Frankly, if you can do it from the

time the person enters the system through

arrest, if the person can end up in treatment

within a couple weeks or 30 days, that's

excellent. The sooner the better, but again,

what we're doing is look at what's happening

now and trying to cut down that gap.

It's done for a couple of reasons.

I suppose the main one is that even for a population where some of whom are used to being arrested, an arrest is often a crisis moment. It's a moment where an individual is at a point where they are often ready to try and do something.

So if you can move a person, if
you can get that person in front of a
treatment person during that process, during
the crisis essentially, the likelihood of
getting them engaged and interested is
greater.

So, you know, I think the short

answer is just as soon as possible. I want to add one thing to that. Kenny has referenced two programs, our drug court program and another program, New Directions, which is ripe for study, because one of the traditional drug courts, a single drug court judge, a full array of sanctions including a three-day jail sanction. 

The other one is a court involved treatment program that does not have a single judge. It does not have a jail sanction, and the one on this side has never had any restrictions on criminal history, both treating. Both treat substance dependent folks, but the drug court treatment for those who are eligible for drug court and then for everybody else.

And Kenny has described we've had very similar results in terms of recidivism rates and rates of people getting clean, but what's under that, where the difference lies is that part of what I have to do is look at

how we're spending our treatment contract
dollars, the residential treatment dollars.

While both programs have similar success rates, both the New Directions and the drug court program, the New Directions program consumes by percentage a much higher percentage of our residential dollars than drug court. More drug court defendants being just as dependent as the New Directions folks are able to achieve sobriety while they're in intensive out-patient treatment, as opposed to having to be placed in residential, which happens with the New Directions program more frequently.

I believe that's because in the drug court model we have the presence of the judge, the regular contact with the judge, and more stringent array of sanctions, and more immediacy with the sanctions. A person in drug court tests on one day. If they are positive or you don't show up, you're in court the next day.

1 In New Directions, you're in court 2 when we get you in court, and the sanctions we do are administrative sanctions that don't 3 have the immediacy or the weight of the 5 others. So two programs, similar outcomes, 7 but when you look at what went into that, it's 8 costing a lot more and requiring many more 9 defendants to be removed from their

environment and placed in necessary but

intrusive residential treatment.

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MR. KENNEDY: We actually have two and a half programs. Part of the New Directions program merges with our community court. Our community court judge has the option of placing people into treatment, and he very much uses the New Directions program, and he almost sits as a de facto drug court judge for those programs.

It will be very interesting to see if there's a difference between the community court/New Directions defendant and the New

		Pag
1	AFTERNOON SESSION	
2	(2:04 p.m.	)
3	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: All right.	
4	Let's start the afternoon session.	
5	We're pleased to have with us this	
6	afternoon Doug Marlowe, who actually his ears	
7	must be burning since he's been sitting here	
8	all morning and heard his name come up two or	
9	three times already. He's the Chief of	
10	Research, Law and Policy, National Association	
11	of Drug Court Professionals.	
12	Laurie Ekstrand is the former	
13	Director of Justice Issues, U.S. Government	
14	Accountability Office.	
15	And Tim Jeffries, who I think has	
16	also been with us most of the morning we	
17	appreciate that policy advisor for	
18	substance abuse and mental health at BJA.	
19	Welcome all three of you. We're	
20	pleased to have you.	
21	As some of you know, and for those	
22	who don't, the way that we operate our panel	

discussions are to give each of you five or so 1 2 minutes to give us sort of an opening statement, tell us a little bit about 3 4 yourselves and the work that you do, your 5 connection to the issues, the benefit of your thoughts, and then we've got a number of 6 7 questions that we'd like to pose and have sort of a general discussion. 8 9 And one of us always leads the 10 questioning in each panel, for this panel that 11 person will be Elizabeth Kelly. 12 So without me spending anymore 13 time talking, let me turn the floor over to I guess ladies first, and Ms. Ekstrand, 14 15 the floor is yours. 16 MS. EKSTRAND: Thank you. 17 As you said, I am the former Director for justice issues at GAO. I retired 18 19 about a year ago. During my career there, we did several drug court studies, including one 20 in 2005. 21 22 For that one, we reviewed 117

different evaluations of drug courts, and we
found 27 that we thought were methodologically
rigorous enough to hang our hat on.

The good news from all of that was that basically we found that in terms of recidivism, drug courts had a positive impact. Recidivism, the way it's measured in these studies, really is arrests, and we all know that lots of crimes go on that don't result in arrests, but it's a terrific surrogate, and when we get the same results over and over and over again, we can feel pretty positive that there is a relationship there.

That was the good news. The rest of the news is all about how complex it is to measure the impact of drug courts, and one of the things that makes it complex is that you can't really look at it by itself. You need to have some kind of comparison basis upon which to measure how well the drug court does compared to probation or compared to other potential programs.

1 So this gets very complex, and you 2. might have an ability to collect data and control the environment for those that are 3 actually in the drug court program, the 5 treatment group, but for whatever comparison 6 group you have, you have much less control and 7 much less ability to gather things like whether they remain drug free or not, whether 8 9 they move out of the area or not. 10 happens to them is much harder to capture.

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But because recidivism is such a big, big issue in relation to drug courts, I think that overall the message is good. We really would like to be able to measure drug relapse. We would like to be able to make sure that we understand the impact of dropout rates. We would like to know what it is about drug courts, what factors are the ones that have the greatest impact on the success of the program. We'd certainly like to know cost benefit and extend it out not just to the court system, but to cost benefits for the

- 1 society as a whole.
- 2 And with that I'll be quiet.
- 3 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you very
- 4 much.
- 5 MR. JEFFRIES: Good afternoon.
- 6 I'm Tim Jeffries with the Bureau of Justice
- 7 Assistance, which is under the Office of
- 8 Justice Programs, which is also under the
- 9 Department of Justice.
- 10 How I came to be here -- I thank
- 11 you for inviting me to speak on drug courts --
- is that initially I started working in
- detention homes at Virginia Beach, and I
- didn't even know the word "recidivism." I
- 15 just knew that there were a lot of kids coming
- 16 back into the system and couldn't figure out
- 17 why is so-and-so right back here where he
- 18 started when we tried to work with this client
- or this person or this individual or family.
- So it prompted me to deal more
- 21 with the societal issues and what's going out
- there that's encouraging these kids to

continue to do substance abuse and commit 1 2. crimes while on substance abuse, which got me into going back to school for a Master's 3 4 degree. 5 So I tell folks that I'm an MSW, 6 hopefully so that you guys don't beat up on me 7 because I'm a treatment guy. 8 (Laughter.) 9 MR. JEFFRIES: And also to let you 10 know how I have a marriage of interventions 11 for treatment and the judicial system back 12 with working in detention. So somehow that 13 landed me in what was called the Drug Courts Program Office in 1999 and 2000. 14 15 And from there the Drug Courts 16 Program Office merged with the Bureau of 17 Justice Assistance, which handles at least 17, 18 other programs, of course, including one 18 19 other specialty court, the mental health 20 courts. 21 And from there I ended up in the 22 policy sector. So that's kind of like my

history of how I got to be with the drug court
discretionary grant program.

Over the last eight or nine years or so, I've had the luxury of seeing at least 40 or 50 drug courts as a drug court grant manager. So I've heard a lot of different experiences from different roles within judges, prosecutors, treatment folks, even dealing with juvenile issues, with school liaisons and evaluation.

So I'm glad to have the knowledge and the background and also eight years of dealing with different drug courts to see how they have evolved over the last ten years since I've been working with them.

I was not quite sure how to prepare for this afternoon. So what I did do was present or bring some information about our Website. I don't know how familiar you guys are with our Bureau of Justice Assistance Website, but it has a whole host of resources and links that you can use to connect you to

1 some valuable tools.

2. So I can run through that or I can 3 wait for any questioning and try to plug in some information that we have on our Website, 5 including some current announcements that are 6 open for solicitations. It's up to you guys. 7 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: If you think 8 that there's one or two sort of highlights, 9 you can give us the headlines. 10 MR. JEFFRIES: Well, I will say 11 that once again, we have a current

that once again, we have a current
solicitation open. It's for our adult drug
court program. Every year we run that
solicitation, as you know, based on the
appropriation from Congress.

16 One thing I also wanted to correct
17 the previous panel on is that we are
18 collecting performance measures. I believe
19 they said that the Bureau of Justice
20 Assistance needs to get more involved in
21 collecting performance measures. We are doing
22 that as a result of the PART, the performance

assessment regularly that we undergo, which

I'm sure GAO can speak more to that effect.

And one of the other suggestions that the PART said was make your results available to the public. So we do that. Every implementation enhancement and statewide grant that we have operational is available on our Website in terms of the number of rearrests that you reported in the last six months, in addition to six or seven other performance measures.

So that is available at all times to the public. We also currently have the drug court planning initiative, which is a way that we engage teams in our planning phase, and it is a free training, and I do mean free.

So we have had to scale back because of cost on our end. Sometimes we've had to have the teams pay for their actual travel dollars to the training, but the actual training is free for up to this year it was 30 teams, to learn the in and outs of drug court,

1 the policy and procedures, how to set up your 2 eligibility and look at your population to see 3 what you can serve and also how to evaluate 4 your program and see the effectiveness of it. 5 It was also mentioned before that we serve nonviolent offenders. I do want to 6 7 point that out. Also on our Website we do have the 8 9 ten key components, and those are our Bible 10 components that have been, I believe, in 11 existence since at least 1996, 1997. The Drug 12 Courts Program Office began operation in 1994, 13 when I believe there were 50 drug courts, and 14 the ten key components came out in 1997, and 15 currently we do have over 2,000, I believe, 2,150-some drug courts in existence today, and 16

19 So I think with that I'll turn it

those include adult, juvenile, family, and

over.

tribal.

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21 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Great. Thank

22 you.

1	MR. JEFFRIES: Thank you.
2	DR. MARLOWE: Hi. I'm Doug
3	Marlowe. In addition to my role as the Chief
4	of Research and Policy for NADCP, I have been
5	a senior scientist at the University of
6	Pennsylvania since 1998, at the Medical
7	College of Pennsylvania before that working in
8	substance abuse treatment research.
9	In 1998, I got a grant from the
10	National Institute of Drug Abuse to ask a
11	question in drug courts: do we really need
12	the judge? That was the question.
13	So we set up a randomized
14	experimental trial. It was a question about
15	how do you set up a strong comparison group.
16	The answer is you randomize. So we randomly
17	assigned consenting drug court clients either
18	to appear for status reviews in a court
19	monitored intervention or to get all of the
20	other services the same as the other clients,
21	but to be monitored by the treatment program.
22	Now, they were still under court

jurisdiction and they still could be brought back for a termination, but they were not getting the judicial supervision.

We followed these people for two years looking at outcomes, and we found that when we compared people who saw the judge every two weeks throughout their enrollment in drug court versus those who basically did not see the judge at all, no differences in outcomes between the two groups.

So the assumption, therefore, could be as was suggested earlier that who needs the judge, if there's no difference whether they see the judge or not, but probation administered treatment and sanctions and sentence and the like.

There was one problem. There's something called risk needs responsivity theory. It's not a theory. It's a very well validated body of research in the criminal justice system that says intensive interventions get their best bang for the buck

- with high risk offenders, and I want to talk 1 2 about in a minute what I mean by high risk because I don't think you're using the term 3 4 the way the research literature does like when 5 you said that now. 6 High risk does not mean risk for 7 Okay? There is such thing as risk violence. 8 for violence. My wife had a high risk 9 pregnancy. Okay? That did not mean that she 10 was going to go out and kill somebody, 11 although when she had some hormone surges I 12 did worry about that. 13 (Laughter.)
- DR. MARLOWE: It means when you're
  high risk that you're likely to have
  complications. You're likely not to do well
  in treatment. You need more intensive
  treatment. That is what the word "high risk"
  means.

The problem is when people assume
high risk means risk for violence when
somebody scores high on a risk assessment

tool, the prosecutor, who you all suggest is the gatekeeper, and that's the case in most places, might say, "I'm not taking the risk because that person will go out and kill somebody. They can't go in." And so they are screening out of drug courts exactly the core prognosis cases that need to be in drug court, and my research showed that. 

What we did was called an interaction analysis where we compared outcomes for high risk and low risk people. We found that high risk people did better seeing the judge, much better off seeing the judge. Low risk people did as well and, frankly, better not seeing the judge.

We call that interaction effect.

These people are doing better in this group
and these people are doing better in this
group, and we look at the groups as a whole.

They cancel the effects out, and this way you
get no differences. That's called interaction
effect. It looks like this when you graph it.

1 It doesn't match.

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2. It's not enough to do that once. 3 It could be something about that one judge. 4 You all talked about the personality of the 5 judge. It's all judge driven. Go to two 6 other drug courts in other counties, other 7 jurisdictions, different judges, different 8 populations, moving from misdemeanor to 9 felony, to probation cases; found the same 10 effect.

And in fact, when we did high risk felony populations, the high risk offenders who were not seeing the judge were doing so badly that the ethics board that oversaw my research study stopped our study. It was no longer ethical to randomly assign high risk drug offenders to a non-court supervised intervention. They were failing out, and guess what happens when they fail out. They go to jail, and we don't want them to go to jail. We want them in the community, and therefore, not supervising them put them at

- 1 risk for incarceration, and they stopped our
- 2 study. You can't do it anymore. It's
- 3 unethical. Okay?
- Now, we had set up safeguards for
- 5 that. We knew that we were monitoring it, and
- 6 we would stop if that happened.
- 7 We then developed a new study
- 8 where we did a risk assessment and made the
- 9 high risk people see the judge more often.
- 10 Again, they are agreeing to be in the study,
- 11 but we assigned high risk people. You see the
- judge every two weeks. Low risk people, you
- don't have to see the judge at all, and we'll
- compare you to treatment as usual.
- No ethical problems because
- 16 everybody is getting what the research says is
- better for them or they would have gotten
- 18 anyway. The effects were extremely powerful
- 19 for the high risk people and lasted out two
- years, and I think you have some of my
- 21 articles. All of those data have been
- 22 published, four grants funded by the National

Institute of Drug Abuse identifying the
population that ought to be in drug court.

Now, let's talk about real world practice. When drug courts came into being in the late '80s and early '90s, we were still in the tough on crime, War on Drugs era, and if you wanted an alternative to that approach, a drug court was seen as an alternative. You had no choice but to take the low risk population because that's all the prosecutors were willing to accept for the risk of what would happen to their reputation if they showed themselves to be soft on crime.

And the results was that drug courts were what you used the word "creaming." I've heard "cherry picking." "Net widening" is another term. The problem with that is if you take low risk people into your drug court and you say, "Look at this. We've got a very high success rate in our program. Those same people would have done just as well on pretrial diversion, probation, and all you're

- doing is capitalizing on people that would have gotten better anyway." It's a false positive.
- Also, if these people are not
  really jail bound, then you're not making much
  contribution to saving society money and
  diverting people from prison. They weren't
  going to prison anyway. So you're not doing
  what you said you were going to do.

10 And worst of all, you're taking 11 low risk people and you're net widening. 12 You're bringing them deeper into the criminal 13 justice system and exposing them to higher levels of supervision, higher levels of 14 15 treatment, and the risk for higher level sanctions than they would have gotten if they 16 17 had gone through adjudication as usual.

So the goal then is for drug

courts to move to their target population.

The National Association of Drug Court

Professionals' official position on this is

that drug courts should be serving high risk,

meaning poor prognosis cases, not violence
cases, although we don't have a position on
whether or not you take violence cases, and
high needs cases, i.e., people actually have
to have a drug problem in order to be in drug
court.

The problem is there are a lot of people getting into drug courts because they have picked up a drug charge. Just because you have a drug charge does not mean that you have a drug problem. It is the official position of NADCP; it's part of our training; it's part of our publications that you should be moving towards treating a high risk, high needs population, and that the low risk, low needs populations are suited to less intensive interventions, and the violence population, that's a policy issue for the state to decide whether they're going to be in drug courts or not.

Now, the gatekeeper as you have all suggested is not the drug court judge. It

- is not the drug court program coordinator.
- 2 The gatekeeper is the prosecution, and it is
- 3 the prosecution that generally will allow,
- 4 will sift off the lower risk cases for entry
- 5 into drug court.
- The problem is the prosecution
- 7 often out foxes himself or herself because
- 8 where does he or she think the high risk cases
- 9 go? They think, oh, we're being tough on
- 10 crime. The high risk cases wind up on
- 11 probation getting less supervision and less
- services while the lower risk people are in
- it. It is, in fact, in some jurisdictions
- 14 turned on its head.
- 15 But it's not turned on its head
- 16 because the drug court model calls for it to
- 17 be turned on its head. It is not, you know,
- 18 a necessary implication of drug court practice
- and the ten key components to cream or net
- widen. It is just the political reality out
- 21 there from the gatekeepers, prosecution and
- the like.

1 The other important thing to keep 2. in mind is that as a result of these findings and a result of our training, the evidence is 3 4 quite clear that drug courts are moving toward 5 taking a higher risk, higher needs population. 6 Most of the problems that people are quoting 7 and citing, though legitimate, come from the late '90s into the early 2000s, maybe 2003, 8 9 2004.

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If you look at our painting the current picture, surveys of drug court programs nationally, the most rapidly growing drug courts take multiple probation violator cases. They are moving away even from the diversionary models because in the diversion programs all they can get are the first time offenders. That's the only people eligible for diversion.

We don't want the first time offenders unless they have other very serious, high risk characteristics. We want people who have failed multiple times with less intensive

1 interventions. We want the people who would 2 be facing substantial time either in 3 incarceration or some community correctional 4 programming that restricts their freedom and 5 that kind of thing. That's our target 6 population. 7 If you guys come out saying drug 8 courts ought not to cream and net widen and 9 the research suggests they ought to hit their 10 appropriate target population, we will love 11 We will cite you for that proposition. We will welcome that conclusion. It is not 12 13 anathema to where we're coming from. CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Will you 14 15 pay us? 16 DR. MARLOWE: No, we will not pay 17 you. 18 (Laughter.) 19 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Just

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checking.

question though.

Neal R. Gross and Co., Inc. 202-234-4433

DR. MARLOWE: It was a good

In fact, I'll shut up in just a

second, and those of you who know me know that

that's not true. It might surprise you to

know that most of what you guys have been

talking about here today, the concerns you've

been raising are our concerns as well.

For example, should the same judge, adjudicator, be sentencing a case who was a drug court judge? Our official position is no. The official position of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals is if somebody is facing termination and/or a sanction that involves loss of liberties, in other words, a jail sanction, they should have a due process hearing akin to revocation, and if they then have a termination and they're going to sentencing, a different judge should sentence that individual with the caveat that there are some very rural jurisdictions and the like where that's not feasible.

And then we say that it's an actual prejudice standard. And if there's

1 some evidence that the judge is being 2. punitive, that's a question for appeal. 3 is our position. We train on it, publish on 4 There were a lot of other things, ex 5 parte communications. It is our official 6 position that ex parte communications -- it's 7 not our position. They are an ethical They are subject to appellate 8 violation. 9 review in overtime; that there should not be 10 conversations between the judge and 11 prosecution without defense counsel present. 12 The problem is that there are 13 jurisdictions where defense counsel says, "We're not going to be at staffing," sometimes 14 15 for good reasons, sometimes for political Sometimes because they simple can't 16 reasons. afford it. Whatever reason, "we're not going 17 to staffings." 18 19 The question then is does that 20 mean there can't be a staffing because they're 21 not present, it's ex parte; it essentially 22 cripples the program, and programs that are

- not having staffings, by the way, are not drug
- 2 courts. They can call themselves drug courts.
- 3 They can call themselves anything they want.
- 4 If they don't have staffings, they're not drug
- 5 courts. They're non-compliance with the ten
- 6 key components.
- Now, you probably already know
- 8 this, that the supreme court, I believe, of
- 9 Iowa -- I think it was Iowa -- or Idaho has
- 10 just passed new procedures and a new
- interpretation of the ex parte rule saying
- that if defense counsel is aware of the
- 13 staffings, has notice, knows what's going to
- 14 be covered -- I'm not saying that you can
- 15 agree. It's not our position. I'm just
- 16 telling you what's going on -- and they elect
- 17 not to go and they are told everything that's
- 18 discussed and given an opportunity object, you
- 19 know, it's not a violation of ex parte.
- We don't have a position on that.
- It's a new rule. I'd like to hear what you
- 22 guys have to say about it. Maybe we could

have a similar reaction to it, but the point
is we need guidance from you guys about how to
resolve these issues, but resolving them,
guidance on how to resolve them is different
than guidance on how to abolish something that
you're not going to be able to abolish anyway.

It's not practical as suggested, but we need
improvement, and we need your input on it.

And if a drug court does not have regular defense counsel involvement and independence, and if defense counsel are not operating in compliance with their own ethical guidelines, then it is not a drug court that complies with the drug court model. That is our position. It is not well espoused, and I agree with you.

We recently hired a very seasoned Public Defender who is taking up a lot of that material for us. We are increasing our Public Defender representation on our board. We have the Public Defender of New Jersey who was previously on our board. We have two more

1 Public Defenders.

Any of you want to be on our

board, we'd love to talk to you. No, we wil

board, we'd love to talk to you. No, we will

4 not pay you for it. It's a voluntary.

5 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: What about

6 travel?

DR. MARLOWE: Yes, travel expenses
are covered, and there's a very generous per
diem.

10 Anyway, I will stop there simply 11 to say that if you guys come out saying that we need better standards, real standards for 12 13 drug court programs, that will strengthen our position because we are moving towards 14 15 standards and credentialing, and we are getting push-back from the field that doesn't 16 17 want to have those standards pushed on them. 18 This is an innovative, ground up, grassroots 19 program. Most state court systems, AOCs say 20 we already credit courts. Drug courts are 21 not a new court. They're not like family 22 court. They're not like whatever, juvenile

- 1 court or family court. They're not separate
- 2 courts. They're part of our criminal courts.
- 3 Therefore, they don't get a separate
- 4 accreditation. We accredit it.
- We're coming in and saying no. As
- 6 a professional organization, we accredit
- 7 programs, and we want to develop accreditation
- 8 criteria. We would love it if you came out
- 9 saying that was critically important and that
- 10 you would participate actively in the
- 11 development and promulgation of those
- 12 standards. You would actually be
- 13 strengthening our position.
- 14 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Great. Thank
- 15 you.
- 16 Elizabeth.
- 17 MEMBER KELLY: All right. First
- of all, I'll start with Ms. Ekstrand.
- 19 During your remarks you noted that
- as a result of your study, you found that
- 21 approximately 27 I think was the number of
- drug courts across the country were, quote,

1 unquote, methodolo	gically sound.
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MS. EKSTRAND: No, ASME found 27

drug court evaluation studies to be

4 methodologically sound.

5 MEMBER KELLY: Okay.

6 MS. EKSTRAND: Out of 117.

7 MEMBER KELLY: Okay, and tell us

8 what you mean by that term "methodologically

9 sound."

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10 MS. EKSTRAND: That they had a 11 reasonable comparison group, that is, on basic 12 characteristics, the drug court population we 13 were looking at and the comparison group population they were looking at was very 14 similar or else statistical means could be 15 used to basically make them similar for the 16 17 comparison.

Sometimes this population could be drug offenders who had gone through the system somewhat prior to the institutionalization of a drug court or, you know, as you mentioned, they could be randomly assigned to drug court

or not drug court. That's the premo way to do it, but often not possible.

Sometimes there are drug court offenders from another jurisdiction that doesn't have a drug court program that is basically very similar to the other jurisdiction because basically you're always wanting to make the comparison of how well the drug court did compared to what would have happened had there not been a drug court.

You know, so you can't run these people through twice, you know. So basically you have to come up with the best possible option to be able to make that kind of comparison, and these studies, these 27 studies did this well.

So we felt -- and they measured their variables very well, and they had other qualities that made them methodologically sound. The sophistication of their analysis was strong. You know, again, as Doug said, they looked at subgroups to make sure that

1 subgroup findings were not masking total 2 findings. They were able to use the 3 appropriate controls to make sure that they were getting results that were reliable. 5 MEMBER KELLY: And who basically conducted these studies? Independent 7 agencies, the courts themselves? 8 MS. EKSTRAND: It was a 9 combination. 10 MEMBER KELLY: Okay. 11 MS. EKSTRAND: You know, many of 12 them were conducted by academics, and many of 13 them were under contract with NIJ, but there were a lot of studies that were funded by the 14 15 states, various states, to look at their drug court programs. A lot of the state studies 16 were particularly interested in cost benefit, 17 of course, but they also, of course, measured 18 19 the basics like recidivism and relapse to the 20 extent possible. 21 So it was a wide variety of 22 researchers, and in fact, in many ways that

- makes it a stronger case that these were sound studies.
- MEMBER KELLY: One of the

  criticisms we've heard today has been there

  just is not enough data out there about drug

  courts, and so what I would presume through

  your remarks, that there is data.
- 8 MS. EKSTRAND: As a researcher,
  9 I'd love more data, but --
- MEMBER KELLY: But there is -
  MS. EKSTRAND: -- but it depends

  on what it is. I mean, you know, we do have

  data on quite a few things, and you mentioned

  that BJA is collecting some drug court

  performance data. You know, that's all to the

16

good.

But studies that really get to,

you know, some of the nuances of drug courts,

what really works, some of the things that

Doug was saying about, you know, does the

judge matter or not, you know, what kind of

sanctions matter, we don't really know too

1 much about that yet.

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You know, what kind of treatments

are the best treatments? How many social

workers need to be involved with somebody

before it makes a difference? Would it be a

good idea to have employment help and housing

help and all kinds of social skills help for

people in drug court programs?

Those are all the kinds of things that we just don't know enough about, and getting that kind of data, that's incredibly labor intensive and incredibly resource intensive. So that's what we don't have at this point.

15 MEMBER KELLY: And who -- I'm 16 sorry. Yes?

DR. MARLOWE: I just want to follow up. There has been since the GAO report, there have been five what are called meta-analyses. Meta-analyses are where independent scientists that have nothing to do with the drug court field. They're from top

research institutions, gather all of the 1 2. research that's been done, statewide studies, 3 local evaluations, and they score them in terms of how good the studies were. Only the 5 studies that meet high scientific credibility 6 get kept. 7 They then average across all of those effects of what's called a meta-8 9 analysis. All five of these meta-analyses 10 have found that drug court reduce recidivism. 11 We don't know much about other outcomes 12 because as said, following the cohort to get information after they leave is very 13 expensive. We don't know a lot. 14 15 Here's the point. You could say, "I've read all of the meta-analyses. 16 read the hundreds of studies. I don't think 17 18 there's proof that drug courts reduce recidivism." You can reach that conclusion. 19 But if you reach that conclusion, 20 21 then you must reach the same conclusion about

every other criminal justice program in

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existence and every other substance abuse

treatment program in existence with the

exception of methadone and maybe buprenophine,

which medications.

There is no other intervention.

In fact, if any of you are taking, you know,
hypertensive medications and other things,
probably less scientific data on some of those
medications than there is for drug courts'
effects on recidivism.

So, again, do I know whether Judge Smith's drug court works? I have no idea unless I go in and study that particular drug court, but the drug court model across dozens and dozens of studies, if you don't accept the data, you can't accept the data for anything else because it's the highest level.

MEMBER SHIFMAN: Just a follow-up.

Let me just ask you about that data and all

those studies. I mean, that's taking studies

of courts that include like marijuana courts

or misdemeanor drug courts or that very narrow

- net of offender that they're bringing in who
  probably would succeed at a variety of levels,

  right? Is that --
- 4 DR. MARLOWE: Well, let me address 5 that. First of all, there's wide variation in the courts, which is one of the things you 7 want in there now. So some of them were like 8 you said, low risk courts. Some of them are 9 probation violations. They're all mixed 10 together, and the only way you get into the 11 meta-analysis is if you had a suitable 12 comparison condition so that you k now how 13 these people would have done if they weren't in drug -- you don't know that. 14 You don't know how Bill would do, but you know how 15 people like Bill would do. That's the only 16 17 way they get into the meta-analysis, is if you have a comparison. 18

There's no comparison. So you

couldn't answer that question. The

researchers throw it out. It doesn't get to

be used.

1 MEMBER KELLY: One group that we 2 have been trying to understand more about seems to be rather elusive. That is to say we 3 can't seem to find anyone to come in and 5 testify. No one has really kept track of 6 these folks or if they have, they're not 7 sharing, and that is people who were either rejected for drug courts or who went through 8 them for a time and for whatever reason were 9 10 terminated. 11 Have you as individuals looked 12 into that population? Do you know of other 13 people or other organizations who study them? 14 DR. MARLOWE: The second group, 15 the dropouts, we do have data on. Once somebody enters a drug court, they're in the 16 analysis whether they graduate or not. 17 those people we know about. 18 19 The people who don't get into drug 20 court either because they are determined not 21 to be eligible, they choose not to go, we very often know very little about other than 22

- 1 numbers in some jurisdictions.
- 2 MEMBER KELLY: Okay. So no series
- 3 of interviews have been conducted with this
- 4 population or --
- DR. MARLOWE: We'd love to do it.
- 6 We have been unable to get funding. See,
- 7 research is very expensive. That's the rate
- 8 limiting factor. It's not that we're not
- 9 interested in that. We're particularly
- interested int hat for issues of racial and
- 11 cultural and other biases, gender. Are groups
- getting in at different rates than their
- 13 eligibility?
- We'd love to study that, and we
- 15 have sought foundation support. We have
- 16 sought federal government support to study
- 17 that.
- 18 MR. JEFFRIES: On the surface,
- just on that same topic, when I first came
- into the drug court program office in 1999 and
- 21 2000, we had the data collection survey, and
- that's capturing a lot of information about

the demographics of each client that came in or at least was referred to the program.

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One of the things that they noticed was that African American males were failing out of the program at an alarming So to address that, the federal government created the cultural competency curriculum to look at African American retention, and it spread from that to look at other minority groups specific to whatever your population is not served. So if the particular client is in California, if it's an Asian population that are not continuing to sign up for the program or are failing out because of, let's say, there are language barriers, I know there are four or five different Mandarin and different cultures and languages in northern California. They won't address that so the people within the court could have some sort of understanding of how to look at each individual jurisdiction makeup and how to address those cultural issues.

1 MEMBER KELLY: Do you have any 2. response to that? 3 MS. EKSTRAND: Well, just to make sure that when we're talking about drug court 5 success, we're talking drug court success for 6 those who are eligible, who are in drug 7 I mean, you know, the people who are courts. screened out at the beginning may very well 8 9 have been screened out for many other reasons 10 that, in fact might have made them ineligible 11 for many other programs. They could have co-12 occurring mental health conditions. could have had all kinds of family situations 13 that would make them not an eligible person. 14 There would be a variety of reasons. 15 So you know, it doesn't denigrate 16 the validity of the data that we have on drug 17 courts because we don't know about those 18 19 people that didn't go in. I mean, it's 20 definitely an interesting question and an 21 interesting population, but it's just a different question. 22

1	MEMBER KELLY: I understand.
2	DR. MARLOWE: It will be a good
3	question for you guys to say ought to be asked
4	and funding.
5	(Laughter.)
6	DR. MARLOWE: I mean, it obviously
7	speaks to due process and equal protection
8	issues. It's very much your concern to find
9	out what's happening in terms of entry into
10	this program. It's of our concern, too, and
11	the more groups that call for it, make a big
12	deal about it and yell and scream about it,
13	the more we get the feds. or, you know, other
14	organizations to give money to study.
15	I mean, we live on grants. We're
16	a nonprofit organization, and as a researcher
17	at the University of Dennsylvania 100 persont

a nonprofit organization, and as a researcher

at the University of Pennsylvania, 100 percent

soft money. If we don't get funding these

questions don't get answered. So it's

something to ask for.

21 MEMBER KELLY: Mr. Jeffries, when

22 you --

1	MEMBER BERNHARD: Let's get their
2	attention later.
3	MEMBER KELLY: When you introduced
4	yourself, you said unabashedly, "I am an MSW,"
5	and throughout the country as we've been
6	conducting these hearings, we've heard some
7	public defenders say, "Look. I'm acting as a
8	social worker even more than I am acting as an
9	attorney."
10	We have some judges who say, quite
11	frankly, they enjoy being more of a social
12	worker than a judge.
13	How do you feel about all of these
14	people dabbling in your field?
15	MR. JEFFRIES: Well, more power to
16	them.
17	MEMBER KELLY: Okay.
18	MR. JEFFRIES: If they can help to
19	identify a client, I mean, I think that's the
20	approach of drug courts, to be a
21	nonadversarial team. So whoever can jump in
22	there and advocate for the client under zero

- sum means to do whatever the best interest of 1 2 the client is, let's do it, and it doesn't 3 matter to me if it's the judge, the Public Defender or the treatment provider. 5 Ultimately usually it is the judge 6 because people don't have a relationship with 7 the judge that's effective. So if the judge 8 wants to step out of his role to be a social 9 worker, mediator, broker, all those other nine 10 terms we learned at MSW school, then so be it. 11 Let him do that as long as the ultimate
- MEMBER KELLY: Okay. Speaking of the role of the judge, Mr. -- Dr. Marlowe.

benefit is an overall increased quality of

DR. MARLOWE: Doug.

Excuse me.

life for these clients.

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MEMBER KELLY: Doug, you've

written about the role of the judge and how

arguably the fact that there is someone

wearing a black robe on a podium is integrally

important to the success of the program. You

- heard Judge Bozza speak, and he is distinctly uncomfortable with that role. I was wondering if you have some reactions to his remarks.
- 4 DR. MARLOWE: Well, one point of 5 contention. I've read his Law Review article. he cites me pretty extensively int hat for the 7 opposite proposition that my research stands I don't mean that as a -- you know, I'm 8 9 sure he didn't mean to, but my position is 10 that the -- and I don't know that it's the 11 black robe. I don't think anyone knows what 12 it is.

I do know a scientific fact that

high risk offenders appearing in status

hearings have better outcomes than high risk

offenders who don't. I know that replicated

an experimental study.

Now, the issue of a social worker,

I actually share some of the concerns about

judges and social workers. If the judge says,

"I really prefer the social worker than a

judge," then go to graduate school and be a

1 social worker.

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2. In other words, you know, the 3 reason why we believe drug courts work is because everybody does their job. 5 do it in a team integrated way. The judge should be the judge. The public defender 6 7 should be the public defender or private 8 defense counsel. The prosecutor should be the 9 prosecutor. Treatment should do the 10 treatment, and people are not supposed to 11 cross those roles. They're supposed to 12 integrate or coordinate those roles. 13 So I think that that is a concern, but for example, there are judges that take 14 15 drug court clients out on field trips. Okay? We consider that a problem, you know, and I 16 think we'll be coming out with position papers 17 on that. 18 19 MEMBER KELLY: A lot of them.

DR. MARLOWE: I understand, and we agree with you that we need standards. The question I would point to that I'd ask you, do

you think that these same problems don't

plague every kind of criminal justice program,

every kind of treatment program where people

overstep their roles, don't have the right

competencies.

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I think that those problems, you'll see them in probation. You'll see them in pretrial services. The idea is to fix the program so that they don't do those kinds of things. There would need to be a statement that a drug court judge should not be outside the courtroom interacting with the clients in a planned way except under certain circumstances, and I guess we'd have to figure out what that is. Maybe if there were chaperons and both counsel were present or something, but we haven't spoken to that, and so judges do -- don't quote me on this -- but some judges do dumb things. I mean, you know, they do things that are embarrassing, and they are problematic.

But that's not the drug court

- 1 model. That's judges not engaged in their 2 appropriate role.
- 3 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Do you have
- 4 more?

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5 MEMBER KELLY: I just have one 6 more question. Admittedly the focus of 7 today's hearing has been drug courts, but 8 nonetheless, virtually everyone who has 9 testified today has mentioned at some point 10 mental illness or mental health courts, and if 11 you have an individual who has a mental 12 illness and who may probably be medicating him 13 or herself with illegal drug usage, how do you treat that person?

> Do you put that person in a mental health court if your jurisdiction has one? you have mental health courts that are also equipped to deal with these issues?

Then, Ms. Ekstrand, you referred to some other drug courts that will automatically exclude you if you have a mental illness. So how do we grapple with these co-

- occurring issues? 1 2. MR. JEFFRIES: That question is 3 for me or --MEMBER KELLY: For any and all. 5 DR. MARLOWE: One concern I have is the artificial lines drawn. You know, 7 people say we have five courts. We have a 8 drug court. We have a DUI court. 9 this court, and they have 23 clients in each 10 of those courts, and they're holding status 11 reviews during different times of the day. 12 There may be distinctions without a 13 difference. The overlap between substance use 14 15 and mental illness is quite substantial. So if you think you're going to treat one or the 16 other with a co-occurring case, you're making 17 a mistake because all of the research says you 18
- 21 So if you're going to take 22 mentally ill clients into your drug court

both concurrently.

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don't treat one or the other. You treat them

1 program, then you need to have the right 2. services, evidence based services for that 3 population. You also need to know that 4 sanctions or rewards need to be applied I 5 don't want to say differently. There are 6 differences in how they -- the basic rules are 7 not different, but some of the art of the application and what you're focusing on 8 9 changes.

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So if you're going to take that population, you had better know what you're doing. So you need to be trained on it, and you need to take it. The alternative is to say we're not equipped for it, which I have personal problems with, but I'd rather see a program say we can't do it than to say we now have a mental health court because we said we have a mental health court, and in fact, it's no different than the drug court. That's a big problem.

MS. EKSTRAND: And the treatment really needs to include the mental health

treatment or else, you know, success seems to

me to be pretty limited.

resources.

You know, if you're going to take their drug of choice away, then there needs to be the kinds of therapy and the kinds of other medication that can help them with their chemical imbalances that are causing them mental health problems.

9 MEMBER KELLY: Mr. Jeffries.

MR. JEFFRIES: I agree with what they both said. I think that the treatment definitely needs to address co-occurring disorders and those with those specific issues. I heard earlier, you know, about the eligibility requirements and certain populations being excluded, and I think you have to go back to what we do in our drug court printing initiative training. We ask the individual teams, the drug court teams to

If they don't have the resources

identify their needs and their availability of

1 to deal with co-occurring populations, then 2 they probably can't include them in their 3 eligibility. So it's about the need to meet the community because we're seeing a large 5 number of co-occurring disorders within our 6 existing drug court populations. 7 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Adele. 8 MEMBER BERNHARD: One thing, I got 9 a little bit lost when you were talking about 10 the studies. Okay? When you're talking about finding out that we're reducing recidivism, 11 we're talking about people who have graduated 12 13 from --14 DR. MARLOWE: No, everybody who 15 entered. 16 MEMBER BERNHARD: Everybody who entered --17 18 DR. MARLOWE: Including failures. 19 MEMBER BERNHARD: -- is doing 20 better. 21 MS. EKSTRAND: The dropouts, 22 including dropouts. Even the dropouts.

1	MEMBER BERNHARD: Even the
2	dropouts. Now, do we have sort of separate
3	studies looking at both separate things that
4	I assume
5	DR. MARLOWE: Well, graduates
б	always do better than dropouts.
7	MEMBER BERNHARD: Because they got
8	all the way through.
9	MS. EKSTRAND: Always, right.
10	MEMBER BERNHARD: But even people
11	who just start and are there for a little
12	while are still
13	MS. EKSTRAND: They're generally
14	doing better than those were never in the drug
15	court, were never in another program or in
16	another in the comparison group.
17	MEMBER BERNHARD: Okay. So that's
18	one answer. Then the second thing you said
19	that I also got a little bit lost with was you
20	said, well, you can look at all of this and
21	you can say that this isn't working, but if
22	you do say that, then you also must say that

- 1 nothing else is working, right?
- DR. MARLOWE: Correct.
- 3 MEMBER BERNHARD: So another way
- 4 of saying what you've just said is that
- 5 nothing really is working terribly well or
- 6 we're all working a little bit well or we're
- 7 all doing the best we can or --
- DR. MARLOWE: Well --
- 9 MEMBER BERNHARD: I mean, to some
- 10 extent, yeah, we're out, you know -- it's
- 11 relative.
- DR. MARLOWE: I think that we have
- a long way to go to improve outcomes for
- addicted individual in general, and especially
- 15 addicted individuals involved in the justice
- 16 system.
- For a long time we have nothing.
- 18 We really had nothing. We now have some
- 19 programs, not just drug court; some programs
- that are showing reliable, statistically
- 21 significant and clinically meaningful and find
- it better than the alternative.

1	What we need to do is build on
2	those programs, not say we're done, but build
3	on them.
4	MEMBER BERNHARD: And that's part
5	of why we should be looking at the various
6	different components.
7	DR. MARLOWE: Absolutely.
8	MEMBER BERNHARD: So that we can
9	figure out what it is that's making a
10	difference and why.
11	DR. MARLOWE: Tomorrow you'll be
12	hearing from Mike Finigan, right? He is one
13	of the researchers who has looked at the
14	compliance with the various ten key
15	components, like ranking programs on how
16	compliant they are with the key components and
17	looking at outcomes, not the only person to
18	have done that. Faye Taxman through the NIDA
19	CJ-DATS have looked at it, which is the basis
20	of our accreditation standards going forward.
21	Legal said, "Well, how do you know
22	what a drug court ought to be doing?"

Well, the answer is we're starting
to get evidence of which drug courts are more
effective than others and why, and that's
going to be the basis of credentialing, but we
have a long way to go.

MEMBER BERNHARD: Yeah, yeah,
yeah. We're trying to kind of focus a little
bit also on the role of the defense attorney
in these drug courts. Is there anything that
you know of that looks at the role or the
activities or the intervention, the support of
defense attorneys that looks like it makes any
difference one way or the other?

DR. MARLOWE: The only thing I can tell you with the scientific strength is that the presence of defense counsel at status hearings and staffings is predictive of better outcomes. Defense counsel is disengaged. The program has worse outcomes. That I can tell you, and Mike Finigan can tell you in greater detail, which is why we're saying to you we can't have defense counsel pulling out of drug

1 courts. We need them investing more in drug 2 courts, and we understand that that is a 3 negotiating process. 4 There are reasons why defense 5 counsel have pulled out. Some of it is 6 because of judges who did say -- I know a 7 judge who said, "We don't really need your 8 buy-in, you know. If you don't want to refer 9 your clients, don't. We're doing this 10 anyway." 11 And we always say to those judges, 12 "Are you crazy? I mean, of course you need 13 defense counsel buy-in. You know, they're part of the team." 14 15 So I can tell you that if defense counsel is disengaged the outcomes are worse. 16 17 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Vicki. 18 MEMBER YOUNG: One -- one --19 MEMBER BERNHARD: Do you know why? 20 DR. MARLOWE: The short answer is 21 no. 22 MEMBER YOUNG: Well, part of my

1 question was when you first started and you 2 said, "I was supposed to determine, you know, does the judge matter," and then you were 3 4 saying, you know, you did these studies, but 5 then as I was listening, what I thought I 6 heard you were comparing is whether somebody 7 was, you know, going through the drug court 8 process and going to the -- you know, showing 9 up every two weeks to drug court and they're 10 staffing or not. 11 But if you look at that process, 12 they have, assuming that the defense counsel 13 is engaged as well; the defense attorney is present at those same times, as well as the 14 15 judge, as well as, I guess, the treatment 16 provider, and there's contact every two weeks

So how did you separate out it's the fact that the judge matters or is it the fact that they're showing up every two weeks or who's there matters?

DR. MARLOWE: No, what I'm saying

or whatever you want to call it.

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- is they're not having court hearings. We took
- 2 the court hearings out of the equation.
- 3 MEMBER YOUNG: Right.
- DR. MARLOWE: Oh, I see what
- 5 you're saying. So it could be -- okay.
- 6 That's fair.
- 7 MEMBER YOUNG: So which player in
- 8 the court hearing?
- 9 DR. MARLOWE: You're right.
- 10 That's fair, and in fact, no, we don't know.
- 11 That's actually a very valid point, and you
- know, we've sometimes equated the judge with
- the court because the judge controls the court
- 14 proceedings, but you're correct. It was the
- 15 court milieu that was taken out of the
- 16 equation. Everything else was the same.
- 17 You're not monitoring treatment, case
- 18 management. It was the court. The better
- 19 word is the court rather than that.
- 20 MEMBER YOUNG: And I don't know
- 21 how you separate. You start taking out the
- 22 different players, but I --

2 Finigan has tried to do, but he didn't	do ++
	do it
in the way I did where we randomly assi	ign
4 people. What he has done is he's gone	to
5 dozens and dozens of drug courts and ra	ated
6 them on how much defense counsel is inv	volved
7 and then looked at their outcomes. It'	's
8 correlational. It's not as strong. He	e's
9 trying to get at that question.	
10 MEMBER YOUNG: I had a ques	stion
for Mr is it Jeffries or Jeffrey?	
MR. JEFFRIES: Jeffries.	
MEMBER YOUNG: Jeffries.	
Because since you're with B	BJA and
as far as I understand it, BJA has been	n a
large funder of drug court programs, ar	nd
17 remember, you know, just the topic before	ore.
People were saying, well, the original	fund
said we could only use this little popu	ulation;
you know, that we were constrained by t	the
21 terms of our grant.	
So if BJA is the grantor, i	is BJA

1	putting those limits, or is it because the
2	prosecutors won't buy into the process and,
3	therefore, you won't give the grant or now
4	you'll give grants to a bigger population?
5	MR. JEFFRIES: Our limits are
6	generic, but we also have to look at the
7	population within the community and what they
8	can house and how many clients they can house
9	based on their resources. Back to resources
10	again.
11	We mandate that there are no
12	violent offenders within the court system.
13	MEMBER YOUNG: That's just a
14	rule.
15	MR. JEFFRIES: That was just a
16	generic rule. A statute came from Congress
17	that said that there would be no violent
18	offenders set forth by X, Y and Z definitions.
19	Those are the parameters that we put on the
20	actual grantees.
21	MEMBER YOUNG: And there has been
22	no effort to try to modify the terms of that

- original legislation or anything?
- 2 MR. JEFFRIES: This past year they
- 3 have modified the violent offender definition
- 4 to make it state that no violent offenders
- 5 with jail term punishable by one year,
- 6 exceeding one year, but this is the first year
- 7 that is being grandfathered in.
- 8 MEMBER YOUNG: Okay. So it is
- 9 starting to broaden a bit.
- DR. MARLOWE: And they made it
- 11 clear it has to be a conviction, that arrest
- 12 history is not sufficient. So it has been
- narrowed, the definition of a violent
- offender.
- 15 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: I want to
- 16 go back to that issue of defense attorneys not
- 17 part of the staffing. It's clear that it
- doesn't work out as well, and we don't know
- 19 exactly why, but what it suggests -- and your
- opinion is what I'm really looking for -- what
- it suggests is just as in a regular case, a
- 22 non-drug case, that the amount of time spent

- 1 by the defense attorney with the client 2. enhances the defense attorney's credibility 3 and professionalism even with the most ardent 4 client. 5 And so when you get to the 6 staffing meeting what we've seen, at least 7 what I have seen, is those attorneys who go to 8 the staffing meeting who have already met with 9 their clients and are way ahead of the curve 10 and know more than anyone else in the room, 11 they're not going to sell the client out. 12 They're in a position to really make a 13 difference in that staffing meeting because they know more than anyone else in the room. 14 15 Is that what we're really talking Is it a function of the defense 16 about? attorney personally? Do you think that's 17 18 what's going on? 19 DR. MARLOWE: You're asking an
- 21 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Yeah.
- DR. MARLOWE: Not data. My

opinion now.

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opinion would be I think you are probably

accurate. Part of it is that it's an

indication of a defense attorney doing his or

her job better, and that more better will lead

to more better outcomes.

So one of the problems that happens sometimes, and this is anecdotal, but sometimes the Public Defenders Office assigns their most junior Public Defenders to drug court because they see it as a less important program. In fact, it would be better if your most seasoned Public Defenders were at least there occasionally.

I understand there are resource issues. I get that, but one of the problems is you can set a program up for failure if you pick the most junior judge to run the docket, if the Public Defender sends their most junior — you know, their 1Ls or whatever, their first year; the Attorney General has some, you know, disengaged D.A. That's an invitation to disaster.

1	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Just to
2	follow up on that, would it be your position
3	that a Public Defender Office, that the better
4	model is to have a dedicated group or a unit
5	of drug court attorneys with specialized
6	training as opposed to a general group of
7	attorneys in the office who go in and just
8	take cases on an ad hoc basis?
9	DR. MARLOWE: Again, this is all
10	speculation.
11	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Right.
12	DR. MARLOWE: And my feeling is
13	like all other specialized cases and dockets,
14	having a team that's well trained and focused
15	on those issues and then letting other
16	attorneys in the office perhaps rotate through
17	to get a taste of it, to witness it, but yeah,
18	I mean, drug cases are among your most
19	populous cases and the most complex cases, and
20	so, yes, you need specialized units just like
21	you have specialized units for capital cases
22	and rate cases and all of that.

1	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: And so as
2	a standard for drug court where participation
3	by a Public Defenders Office is necessarily
4	required, would it be a sine qua non of such
5	a model or a standard that the Public
6	Defenders Office has to have not only
7	dedicated personnel but specially trained
8	personnel?
9	DR. MARLOWE: I mean, I think the
10	answer to that is yes. I mean, I'm not
11	speaking NADCP policy.
12	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Just a
13	general
14	DR. MARLOWE: My personal view is
15	having done research and looked at countless
16	drug court programs, you know, it's not a big
17	shock that when the Public Defender knows what
18	he or she is doing, they get better outcomes
19	than when the Public Defender doesn't know
20	what he or she is doing.
21	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: And
22	finally, on the other side that rule is going

1	to be true for the prosecutor.
2	DR. MARLOWE: Yes, it would.
3	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Right?
4	DR. MARLOWE: Yes, it would.
5	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: The more
6	the prosecutor has a specialized unit and
7	trained personnel the better will be the buy-
8	in and better will be the result. Would that
9	be a fair statement?
10	DR. MARLOWE: I guess my sense is
11	that, again, this is pure speculation. I
12	think the answer is yes. I can be more clear
13	about that if you want to take it to the judge
14	level where judges are specially trained and
15	dedicated to the docket. Those judges do
16	better than when judges are rotating through,
17	where they're assigned sort of willy-nilly or
18	they have one year assignments. Those
19	outcomes are poorer.
20	So I can say that about judges.
21	It would make perfect sense to me that the
22	same thing would apply to all of the other

1 actors in the drug court.

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no data on.

2. CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: And if we made a recommendation that those are 3 requirements for a standard of the drug court 5 for prosecutors and defense attorneys and 6 staff lawyers and even members of the private 7 Bar in certain jurisdictions, that that is not only a standard to be aspired to, but one 8 9 which will be required after studies are 10 urged. Would that be something along the 11 lines of what your organization is look for? 12 DR. MARLOWE: If you were to say 13 that you would think it's very important to 14 study --15 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: issue. 16 17 DR. MARLOWE: -- that issue, we would -- I think we would endorse it. If you 18 19 were to say we think that should be the 20 standard, we would say we don't know.

couldn't stand behind something that there's

1	But if you say it should be
2	studied, we would definitely sign onto it.
3	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Ms.
4	Ekstrand, in all of those reports that you
5	looked at?
6	MS. EKSTRAND: Well, in all of the
7	reports we looked at, there wasn't much in it,
8	but it seems like a basic management tenet is
9	that, you know, people who are experienced and
10	well trained do better.
11	So, you know, from a common sense
12	perspective and from my current position at
13	the National Academy of Public Administration,
14	I would say that, you know, it's almost a no-
15	brainer that they're training. If they're
16	dedicated to that particular area, you know,
17	I can't imagine that it would be
18	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: But
19	nonetheless, that is a no-brainer, and it
20	makes perfect sense from a managerial point of
21	view. We know that is not the case in many
22	jurisdictions.

1	DR. MARLOWE: We don't know it.
2	We're very concerned. I suspect it's probably
3	not the case. We haven't studied that
4	question, although you should ask Mike Finigan
5	tomorrow at least for the programs that he's
6	studied, and he might be able to tell you
7	about 50 programs that we looked at how they
8	scored on those things. It's not 2,000
9	programs, but it's 50 programs.
10	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Elizabeth and
11	then Gail.
12	I'm sorry. Ms. Ekstrand.
13	MS. EKSTRAND: If I could just add
14	one more thing.
15	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Sure.
16	MS. EKSTRAND: You know, this is
17	pure speculation on my part, but you know, I
18	would think that there are probably not a lot
19	of prosecutors and Public Defenders or maybe
20	judges that are spending their life aspiring
21	to have a seat in the drug courts. I would
22	think they're thinking that something else is

1 probably much more interesting and prestigious 2. and something that will further their career. 3 So, you know, I think you have to 4 have a carrot out there to get people to be 5 willing to take training, to specialize in that area to make that something where they 7 aspire to have some of their best work. 8 You know, I really don't know the 9 judges' attitudes toward their courts, but you 10 know, in the case of a lot of juvenile courts 11 or family courts, that's not where judges want 12 to spend their time, and so you're not getting 13 people who are willing to put in the extra effort to become super experts on this area. 14 15 So there has to be something in it for them. 16 17 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: I'm sorry. MR. JEFFRIES: And from our 18 19 federal perspective, we would look at how we 20 would train those folks because we have role 21 specific training now. Each district judge or

the District Attorney are evaluated and

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1	trained. The National Drug Court Institute
2	does that, and we only have funding for up to
3	80 participants for each year for those
4	disciplines, and we've exceeded that.
5	I know National Drug Court
6	Institute has called us and said, "Look.
7	We've got 90-some people registered. We're
8	going to try to take 90," but they only have
9	accommodations for so many people. So how do
10	we fund those slots for those training
11	availabilities?
12	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Would you
13	do funding with other organizations if you ran
14	a program like that?
15	MR. JEFFRIES: I can't speak on
16	behalf of our director, but an MOU with
17	another organization, but
18	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Let's say
19	you are looking at NADC. I said we know 20
20	defense attorneys around the country in big
21	drug programs. We have a foundation. We
22	might want to go to them and ask them for some

- money for specialized drug training in conjunction with a program that you're running.
- Would there be a problem with that?

I'm certain that we MR. JEFFRIES: 7 would be amenable to that. The funding that 8 we get for the specific training comes from 9 the Office of National Drug Control Policy, 10 and without that funding, we wouldn't be able 11 to do the role specific trainings that we do 12 in that arena. Because our budgets have been 13 cut annually, as you probably are aware. 14 any other assistance we get would add more 15 slots to the available trainings that we have scheduled. 16

17 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Elizabeth.

18 MEMBER KELLY: As you may know,

19 NACDL represents not only Public Defenders but

20 private defense attorneys, and there is

21 somewhat of a recognition that many of these

drug courts effectively exclude private

- defense attorneys namely at the staffing
  meetings for a couple of reasons.
- Number one, those staffing teams

  are basically perceived as closed clubs where

  a Public Defender might be welcome, but a

  private attorney is not necessarily welcome.

And, secondly, as a practical
matter, there are not a lot of clients out
there who would probably be willing to retain
an attorney not only for the court appearance,
but for 20, 30, 40 staffing meetings.

So do you have any suggestions about how to be more inclusive of the private Bar?

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15 DR. MARLOWE: Can I just tell you how they do it in Delaware? Most of my 16 research is in the Delaware drug court. 17 have the Delaware Association criminal defense 18 19 lawyers, which is their private Bar 20 essentially, and they have -- actually the 21 head of that organization is the private bar 22 representative to the drug courts. He is at

all of the staffings, and anybody can go with him for cases or whatever. His name is Andy Ahern. It's a good model.

Now, of course, Delaware is a small state. They can pull stuff off that other places can't. The biggest problem, of course, they'll tell you is there may be so many private defense counsel that that's the problem and the judge can't work the status here. They've got to fit them all in when they're available, and it becomes difficult to get them into the staffings, magnifies that.

So my sense of that is there are some jurisdictions where they basically interact with the Public Defender and the Public Defender's presence there. Somehow they have some interaction with the private counsel, and I don't know if there's any literal legal status there. I don't know how that works.

But I just know that's how people are trying to get around it. I don't know if

- it's working well. I don't have any research
  on it. It's a big issue, needless to say.
- A lot of the courts I work in none

  of the clients can afford private counsel. So

  it's not their most -- they're 85, 90 percent

  are Public Defenders.
- 7 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Gail.

do.

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8 MEMBER SHIFMAN: I wanted to
9 follow up on the specialized training. I
10 mean, we all know that the more experience you
11 have, the better you are in all fields like
12 the pilot who landed that plane. Remarkable,
13 and a junior pilot might not have been able to

But for you guys, what does the specialized training for defense lawyers mean?

Does it mean, for instance, being trained in the various aspects of substance abuse and treatment and co-concurring diagnoses and problems? Is that the kind of specialized training?

Does it include being a member of

1 a team in a cooperative environment as opposed to the traditional adversarial role? 2 3 I mean, so when you refer to the 4 specialized training, you know, with detail 5 I'd be interested in knowing -- I think all of us would -- what does that mean for a defense 7 lawyer. 8 MS. EKSTRAND: I'm looking at you, 9 Tim. 10 (Laughter.) 11 DR. MARLOWE: I don't believe a defense -- we have defense counsel that 12 13 deliver that training, but maybe you could answer it better than I could, but none of 14 15 these curricula are engraved in stone. So if 16 you guys wanted to work with us to improve our 17 curricula and you tell us that these issues are legal ethics. 18 19 We have a judge who delivers a lot 20 of this stuff on legal ethics. Maybe we need 21 to have --

MEMBER YOUNG: He's the guy from

- DR. MARLOWE: Bill Meyers.
- 4 from him.
- DR. MARLOWE: You what?
- 6 MEMBER YOUNG: He spoke to us in
- 7 Arizona.
- DR. MARLOWE: Yeah, and he's not
- 9 the only one, but as I said to you before,
- what our position is on some of these issues
- 11 he's been sort of our judicial fellow.
- But you know, if what came out of
- this was you guys worked with us to change
- those curricula -- of course I'm saying this
- 15 with a funder sitting right here as if it's
- 16 totally up to us to do that -- but I think
- that, you know, they're not engraved in stone
- 18 MEMBER YOUNG: So is it the same
- 19 program or different?
- 20 MEMBER SHIFMAN: And for you, Mr.
- 21 Jeffries, what?
- MR. JEFFRIES: I'm not a defense

1	attorney. So I wouldn't know the parameters
2	or what the curricula should reflect, but in
3	hearing what you just said, it should include
4	what the common issues are in drug court. It
5	should include what the top priorities are
6	that we have if it's addressing co-occurring
7	or what new issues that are going on just
8	generically in the courts.
9	I believe those are generic
10	components that are included in the
11	curriculum. I'm sad to say that I have not
12	seen one of those trainings. So I couldn't
13	tell you exactly what's included, but
14	definitely we would be amenable basically to
15	understand what should be included in that.
16	MEMBER SHIFMAN: And from your
17	organization, who's training the defense
18	lawyers?
19	MR. JEFFRIES: It's the National
20	Drug Court
21	(Simultaneous conversation.)
22	DR. MARLOWE: Yeah, we get BJA

1 monies to provide training to drug court 2 programs, and they don't have to pay to come 3 to the trainings. We get the money from the feds. and we go out and do X number of 5 trainings a year, and we have different training faculty depending on who's being 7 trained. So I do sanctions and incentives, 8 9 but we have pharmacologists do whatever, and 10 then there are defense counsel. defense counsel trainers who deliver the 11 defense curricula. So the reason I don't know 12 13 about it is not because it's unimportant. It's just I don't deliver that curricula. 14 15 Other people do. Well, I wasn't sure 16 MEMBER YOUNG: 17 because I knew that the National Association of Drug Court Professionals did training and 18 19 then you were talking about training as well, 20 but really you're talking about the same 21 training.

We are.

DR. MARLOWE:

1	MEMBER YOUNG: It's not two
2	separate sets of programs.
3	DR. MARLOWE: That's correct.
4	MEMBER YOUNG: You are funding
5	their organization to do that training.
6	DR. MARLOWE: That's correct.
7	MEMBER YOUNG: So let's say other
8	than the 80 or 90 defense counsel per year
9	that can be trained, are you aware of other
10	training in the drug court area other than
11	through
12	DR. MARLOWE: We have our Public
13	Defender.
14	MS. LONG: We have our conference
15	every year, but what we also do is we have a
16	technical assistance project that he goes
17	around and trades teams and the public
18	officials
19	MEMBER YOUNG: So you go on site.
20	MS. LONG: part of their
21	training, and we require that every team
22	member be there in order to conduct that

1 training. So we would go in at any time, in 2. front of the team or we do a lot of regional 3 trainings, and we also appear and do trainings 4 for public conferences. We did one for Alaska 5 where the PD had their conference and they asked for one of our senior Public Defenders. 7 Actually she's on our board and she went there and did a training of ethical and 8 9 confidentiality issues, and they asked for 10 that, for their drug court defense counsel in 11 Alaska. 12 So we're open and we're able to do 13 all kinds of things. CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: 14 Carmen. 15 MS. HERNANDEZ: I wondered what goes in to constitute your training. 16 17 PARTICIPANT: I'm having a hard time hearing you, the folks in the back of the 18 19 room. You'll have to 20 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: 21 speak up please. 22 MS. HERNANDEZ: I just wanted to

1 know your part of the training topics that you 2 would be taught as a defense attorney trainee. 3 Is it, you know, legal issues or is it MSW 4 issues or --5 DR. MARLOWE: All of the above. 6 MS. LONG: It's a combination of 7 everything. Terrence Walton, he's actually one of our trainers. He trains at our defense 8 9 counsel, specific training during the week. 10 They teach pharmacology, treatment, relapse. 11 We have someone to come in and 12 talk about cultural competency. We also talk 13 about ethical confidentiality issues. We talk about community service, probation issues. 14 15 talk about every role in the drug court teams to give them an overview of what they're going 16 to deal with in drug court. 17 18 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Can you two 19 just put your names and titles on the record 20 for the reporter, please? 21 MS. LONG: I'm Austine Long, 22 Project Director for National Drug Court

- 1 Institute, Technical Assistance.
- 2 MS. HERNANDEZ: I'm Carmen
- 3 Hernandez, promote defense attorneys.
- 4 MS. LONG: Yes, I'm also -- the
- 5 panel may know that, but I'm also a Public
- 6 Defender from Durham County, North Carolina,
- 7 and I also was in private practice for several
- 8 years as well.
- 9 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you.
- I just have a couple of thought
- and questions for you guys before we wrap up.
- 12 In listening to the process the process and
- this conversation, one of the things I think
- that you said about the NADCP's position is
- that you were an advocate of multiple judges,
- the judge for the day-to-day stuff, a
- different, separate and distinct judge for
- 18 hearings and then a separate and distinct
- 19 judge for sentencing.
- DR. MARLOWE: A separate judge for
- 21 sentencing.
- 22 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: So if we just

go to the day-to-day and the hearings, you're comfortable that that's the same judge?

DR. MARLOWE: Just make sure I understand. So there's the judge who's overseeing the proceedings. If there's going to be a termination hearing, that should not be done in a status review. There should be a due process hearing with notice, counsel, all of that stuff.

But we allow the drug court judge to make the determination or termination or we think it's appropriate. But once termination is made, that judge should not be the person who then says, "Okay. Now I'm sentencing on the original charge." It should be a separate judge, again, with exigency exceptions for when that's not feasible.

CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: And my sense is -- and people can tell me if they think I'm wrong -- my sense is that that's not only not going to be feasible and small jurisdictions and locales where there's one judge, but I

1 suspect that's not going to go over big in New 2 York City where they're going to think it's 3 ineffective and doesn't, you know, sort of assist in the smooth administration of justice 5 bouncing these things around to different 6 judges. 7 DR. MARLOWE: I don't know how to 8 answer that. 9 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: And my sense, 10 it's more common than --11 DR. MARLOWE: Yeah. In the courts 12 where I work, that's what was done. 13 Philadelphia and Delaware the sentencing is done separate. 14 15 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Another thing I just wanted to make sure that I was clear 16 17 about is when you said that the studies look at recidivism and you said that what 18 19 constitutes recidivism is arrests, that's 20 surprising to me because I would think that 21 from the drug court's perspective, they'd want a recidivist to be someone who has actually 22

- been convicted because then you're going to
- 2 have a likely higher percentage of folks who
- 3 are not recidivists.
- 4 If you just look at arrests, their
- 5 percent of recidivism is going to be higher.
- 6 No?
- 7 MS. EKSTRAND: Well, certainly if
- 8 you just look at arrests your percentage of
- 9 recidivism will be higher.
- 10 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Right.
- 11 MS. EKSTRAND: But, you know,
- maybe you could make the assumption that
- people that are arrested are innocent, and so
- they should stay in the drug court program,
- 15 but to my knowledge that has not been the case
- 16 that that assumption has been made. If an
- 17 arrest occurs, then your drug court data is
- 18 over.
- 19 DR. MARLOWE: That actually
- 20 varies. I'm sorry. The reason we settled on
- 21 arrest, frankly, is a practical matter.
- 22 Commission data are not reliable. That's the

- reason. They don't mean what you think they
- 2 mean.
- 3 Arrest data mean we know that
- 4 arrest says this person was arrested. Chances
- 5 are they were arrested, but conviction, we
- don't know if what's in the database is
- 7 accurate.
- 8 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: So then you
- 9 have to sort of almost put an asterisk by
- 10 recidivism because you may get arrested, but
- that doesn't mean you did anything at all.
- DR. MARLOWE: That's correct.
- MS. EKSTRAND: Well, and by the
- same token you have done ten crimes and not
- 15 get arrested for it.
- DR. MARLOWE: So then in that
- 17 you'd hope --
- MS. EKSTRAND: We're hoping that
- 19 this is a good surrogate, but you know, in the
- social science world this is probably as good
- 21 as it gets.
- 22 DR. MARLOWE: That's right.

1	That's	correct.
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- 2 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Carmen.
- 3 MS. HERNANDEZ: I was going to say
- 4 my understand was in most recidivism studies
- 5 that what they used.
- 6 MS. EKSTRAND: Exactly.
- 7 MS. HERNANDEZ: I know in the
- 8 General District studies there was a whole
- 9 dispute over why should you say that someone
- who has been arrested unlawfully, you know,
- 11 selective --
- DR. MARLOWE: Correct.
- MS. HERNANDEZ: -- analysis.
- 14 MS. EKSTRAND: Well, I mean,
- 15 you're hoping that, in fact, you're going to
- 16 have enough cases that the falsely arrested
- 17 and those who should have been arrested but
- 18 weren't, you know, I mean, that's quite an
- 19 assumption.
- 20 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: It is.
- 21 DR. MARLOWE: All the more reason
- 22 why studies don't get included unless there's

1 a comparison stud	ly.
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- MS. EKSTRAND: Exactly.
- 3 DR. MARLOWE: But those errors
- 4 should be equivalent in both groups.
- 5 MS. EKSTRAND: Exactly.
- DR. MARLOWE: So even though when
- 7 I say there's a 25 percent recidivism rate
- 8 here and 50 percent here, it may not really be
- 9 25 and 50, but that difference is probably
- 10 real. So this is higher than this. It's
- 11 probably right.
- 12 MEMBER SCHUMM: I quess, Mr.
- 13 Marlowe, you were here this morning when the
- 14 Public Defenders from Maryland talked about
- the things that have happened in staffing and
- then sort of what the client saw in court. It
- 17 seems to me that the key component is kind of
- 18 the second and third are probably the ones
- 19 that cause defense lawyers the most concern.
- You said staffing is essential.
- 21 If there weren't staffing, it's not a drug
- 22 court. What's so important about the staffing

at which the person isn't there? And are there models where that's not used?

DR. MARLOWE: Well, first of all,
I was saying that was based on the research
study that showed that when defense counsel
was engaged and attendant at staff meetings
and court hearings regularly, they could sort
of look at how often they were there.

Programs where defense counsel is there and engaged and have their outcomes, I was just stating an empirical fact. Now, one of the issues about this whole issue of nonadversarial approach has been somewhat misinterpreted. Our interpretation of that is that most of the zealous advocacy takes place in the staffing. That is where defense counsel is supposed to be saying, "Judge, you're wrong and we don't think it's a fair," whatever. It's supposed to take place out of the client's milieu, earshot.

21 And then defense counsel goes and 22 tells their client what happened. That's

1	what's supposed to happen. It's not supposed
2	to be a yelling match, but so there is
3	advocacy. It's just not in their head. Like
4	they don't stand there in court and defense
5	counsel is saying, "Judge, you're wrong," and
6	getting in between the judge's interaction
7	with the client. It's supposed to take place
8	in the staff.
9	MEMBER SCHUMM: And is that what
10	happens in Delaware and Penn, in the courts
11	you're familiar with?
12	DR. MARLOWE: In the good courts,
13	that's what happens. In the bad courts,
14	defense counsel keeps their mouth shut,
15	doesn't say anything, sometimes doesn't know
16	whether the urine was dirty. He's hearing for
17	the first time the urine was dirty. That's
18	not a competent
19	MEMBER SCHUMM: And are those on
20	the record in any way?
21	DR. MARLOWE: No.
22	MEMBER SCHUMM: No?

MEMBER KELLY: Can an attorney
have the option of bringing his or her own
court reporter if they know that the staff
meeting is going to be particularly
contentious?
CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: It would
destroy the whole model, wouldn't it?
DR. MARLOWE: No. I think what
would happen is you then if there is no
resolution, then the resolution is, then the
discussion is add in the court, and you've
have a synopsis.
I'm not saying you couldn't do it,
you know. I've never heard of that happening,
but what happened is defense counsel's
judgement, letting you when I got out there
I'm going to stay on the record, but I think
you're wrong.
And then the judge says, "Do what
you want," or says something else, whatever
judges say, and you go out there and defense
counsel should not be intimidated. That's

1	their job, is to say, "We talked about this,
2	Your Honor. As I said, my client denies that
3	the urine was dirty. We think it was a faulty
4	test. We're challenging and want a hearing."
5	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: It's
6	actually a little more subtle than that. In
7	good courts where the judge at a staffing
8	hearing knows that the defense attorney will
9	advocate and will push back against the other
10	forces around the table, if the defense
11	attorney says, "Okay. I don't agree with
12	everyone around this table. We're going to a
13	hearing," what I've seen is the judge says,
14	"Hold on," and that's when the deal strikes.
15	DR. MARLOWE: And keeps the
16	conversation going.
17	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Yes.
18	DR. MARLOWE: That's what's
19	supposed to happen.
20	CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: That's
21	what happens. The smart judge pulls everyone
22	back and says, "Wait a minute before we go to

1 loggerheads."

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What then happens is they strike a deal, which is a compromise between an all out fight and putting a guy back in jail with a sanction, and then at 2:00 p.m. when everybody comes out on the record, what I have found is it's almost like an assembly line because the deals have already been struck.

9 So your case takes 30 seconds.

10 Ms. Ekstrand's case takes a minute and a half.

11 You know, Adele's case might take three

minutes because they had a wrinkle. The in-

court stuff is a byproduct. It's extra. The

14 battle is within the hearing itself.

DR. MARLOWE: That's right.

16 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: The other
17 thing, and do correct me if I'm wrong because

this is important from what I've seen the way

you do, the staffing depends upon trust. Is

that pretty much how the model works?

DR. MARLOWE: It's supposed to.

22 Trust meaning you should be able to fill your

- 1 role, say what you want to say without retaliation. 2. 3 CO-CHAIRMAN SCHECHTER: Right, and that's what the problem is for the defense 5 attorney. Because everybody says we all trust 6 one another, except the defense attorney says 7 trust but verify. 8 DR. MARLOWE: Everybody is 9 supposed to say trust but verify, but you 10 know, that's what's supposed to happen.
- 10 Rhow, that's what's supposed to happen.

  11 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Ms. Ekstrand,

  12 when you say that the NADCP's position is no

  13 ex parte conversations, do you think of

  14 staffing as ex parte conversations?

  DR. MARLOWE: Our statement is

that defense counsel should be present at the
staffings so that the prosecution, for
example, is not having conversations with the
judge without defense counsel present. That's
our point.

So if by ex parte you mean the client should be present, that's not our

|--|

2 CO-CHAIRMAN	JONES:	So you're
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3 comfortable with the client not being present.

4 DR. MARLOWE: Right.

5 MEMBER BERNHARD: So in a way

6 isn't this like an old fashioned plea

7 bargaining session --

DR. MARLOWE: Yes, it is.

9 MEMBER BERNHARD: -- which no

10 longer happens at least where I practice

anymore, but used to be that everybody would

12 go up to the bench and everything would get

worked out and we'd go back and we'd either

14 put it on the record or we'd have our

15 argument, right?

16 DR. MARLOWE: That is the way it's

supposed to work. When they are pro forma or

when the people in the room don't feel they

19 can speak up, then it's dysfunctional, but the

question is would it have been dysfunctional

if it was a regular court proceeding and the

22 same actors are involved. You know, that I

- 1 can't answer.
- 2 MEMBER BERNHARD: And the only
- 3 real difference, it seems to me, is that we
- 4 have a few additional players who have
- 5 additional information.
- DR. MARLOWE: That's right.
- 7 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: I have got two
- 8 last questions unless others. Go ahead.
- 9 MEMBER CLARK: Mr. Marlowe, I'm
- 10 looking on your Website for your training for
- 11 this last year, and you did in April drug
- 12 court defense counsel training.
- DR. MARLOWE: I did? I didn't see
- 14 that.
- 15 MEMBER CLARK: Well, not you.
- DR. MARLOWE: Okay.
- 17 MEMBER CLARK: Do you guys keep
- 18 copies of materials that are used?
- DR. MARLOWE: Oh, sure.
- 20 MEMBER CLARK: Could you get us a
- 21 copy of what you sent to them?
- DR. MARLOWE: Yes, absolutely.

1	We'll	send	you	the	books	and	whatever.
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- 2 MEMBER CLARK: Yeah, whatever. If
- an attorney went, what they would be given.
- DR. MARLOWE: Absolutely.
- 5 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Just second to
- 6 last question is for your section, Mr.
- 7 Marlowe. I believe -- correct me if I'm wrong
- 8 -- you said in your opening statement or at
- 9 some point during this conversation that the
- 10 drug court model works. At least it works as
- 11 good as anything else that we know and have
- been able to study based upon the 27 clean
- 13 studies and the five or whatever it is meta-
- studies, that the drug court model works.
- DR. MARLOWE: They reduce
- 16 recidivism.
- 17 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Reduce
- recidivism, and you know, this morning if
- there was a theory or theme to the morning it
- 20 certainly was that drug courts are
- 21 standardless, and I think that to a greater or
- lesser degree you all subscribe to that notion

and that there should be standards.

I'm wondering, and maybe I should
know this, is there any place that you can
point us to? When you say the drug court
model works, I'm wondering what is the drug
court model if they're all different and
they're standardless.

Is there some place we can go to get a good assessment of what is the drug court model?

DR. MARLOWE: Well, that's what I was sort of getting at. I think you've got the right person coming tomorrow. I think you should definitely save a lot of these questions for Mike Finigan because what he's done and what Faye Taxman and a few other researchers have done is say the ten key components which are rather broad and aspirational, there is a way to measure the developed ways of looking at how close a court follows these.

22 And so what they're saying is the

- closer courts are to following these
  principles, the better the outcome. So it's
- 3 adherence to these.

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4 That's not good enough. 5 assessment is would you look at adherence now 6 and you can become the standards. So when we 7 say adversarial hearing, we mean X needs to happen, Y needs to happen, Z needs to happen, 8 9 A should not happen, B shouldn't. You know, 10 we need to operationalize these based on that 11 research.

So it's true there is no one model, but I think there's more similarities between drug courts than there are between drug courts and other courts. So, you know, that's sort of we're not done. We have a long way to go on them.

18 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: My last
19 question, and it's as much a statement of
20 aspiration as much as anything else, and I
21 guess it goes to you, Mr. Jeffries, and also
22 to you, Mr. Marlowe, particular BJA, is the

- deep pockets that are where they go for funding.
- You know, I understand that 3 4 research is expensive and there's lack of 5 funding and all of your money is soft and all 6 the things that you sort of said, but we have 7 been literally all over the country, and 8 everywhere we go, and if you were here this 9 morning you heard it this morning, we've asked 10 about what do you know about racial disparity.

And everywhere we go and it will

frustratingly be in our report that the answer

is always, "I don't know. The research hasn't

been done. The studies haven't been done."

What do you know about social disparities?

16 That's, I think, unacceptable.

DR. MARLOWE: I agree with you.

18 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: And so I think
19 that to the extent that this conversation goes

beyond this room, and I'm glad to see you're

21 writing, Mr. Jeffries --

22 (Laughter.)

1	DR. MARLOWE: He's a friend. So
2	we're on track.
3	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: I understand.
4	You know, I think that we would like to know
5	the answer to the racial disparity questions
б	in this field and in this area, and so to the
7	extent that we can leave you with that we
8	would, and thank you very much for your time
9	and for this conversation.
10	MR. JEFFRIES: Can I give you two
11	cents worth?
12	CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Yes, please
13	do.
14	MR. JEFFRIES: One of our
15	solicitations that's coming out February 2nd
16	is called "Translating a Research Enterprise"
17	(phonetic), basically to look at the research
18	out there and develop curriculum around what
19	works, what's going as Doug Marlowe can attest
20	to.
21	I would love someone to grab that
22	and say there are racial disparities within

- courts, and we would like to take the research
- and translate that into a curriculum. I'm
- 3 putting that out there in case anybody wants
- 4 to.
- 5 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Great. What
- 6 we know is that we don't know that there are
- 7 because of the studies, but we certainly
- 8 believe we can say it.
- 9 MR. JEFFRIES: Well, we'll make it
- 10 come out.
- 11 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: right.
- MR. JEFFRIES: And we're also
- taking money for additional slots for our
- defense attorneys.
- 15 (Laughter.)
- 16 CO-CHAIRMAN JONES: Thank you so
- much.
- 18 MR. JEFFRIES: Thank you.
- 19 MS. EKSTRAND: Thank you.
- 20 (Whereupon, at 2:29 p.m., the
- 21 meeting was adjourned.)

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## **Doug Marlowe**

## Transcript Edits DC Hearing Thursday January 22, 2009

<u>p. 241, lines 9 to 20</u>: The NADCP Board has not (yet) issued a resolution re. whether, and under what circumstances, the drug court judge should also be the sentencing judge. Therefore, it is inaccurate to say that our "official" position is against this practice. The paragraph should read as follows:

"Our position is no if it feasible to do otherwise. In our trainings by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, we recommend that if somebody is facing termination and/or a sanction that involves loss of liberties . . ."

## p. 264, lines 10-14: Should read as follows:

"There would need to be a statement that a drug court judge should not be outside the courtroom interacting with the clients in an unstructured way, without defense counsel and the prosecution present, except under certain well-defined circumstances . . . "

- p. 264, line 19: Please change the word "dumb" to "questionable."
- p. 264, line 20: Please change the word "embarrassing" to "subject to reasonable objections"
- <u>p. 302, line 10</u>: NADCP has no enforcement authority over judges, therefore it is incorrect to say that we "allow" them to do any particular act. The sentence should read as follows:

"But we have no objection if the drug court judge makes the determination of termination . . ."

p. 302, lines 12 to 14: Should read as follows:

"But once termination is made, that judge should ideally not be the person who . . ."

- p. 302, line 15: "It should ideally be a separate judge . . ."
- <u>p. 303, line 13</u>: Please omit "Philadelphia". The drug court is undergoing major changes with a new president judge and I don't know if this is still true.